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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to study how new knowledge is created, used, and shared at 
both micro- and macro- levels in healthcare organizations so as understand how this can 
improve evidence-based practice and provide new roles for information professionals to 
better EBM and clinical decision-making.   
 
Using Dervin’s SMM as the primary research framework, supplemented with Snowden’s 
Cynefin Framework for data analysis, the results demonstrated that individual knowledge was 
created in the gap-bridging process as the sense-making moment. Situation movement state 
and gap-bridging strategies were two predictors for knowledge creation. The knowledge gaps 
were identified and a wide range of gap-bridging strategies were employed to cross the gaps 
and create new knowledge.  This micro process of knowledge creation is linked to the 
organizational level thorough knowledge sharing.  This whole process of knowledge creation, 
utilization and sharing were mapped into a new micro-macro sense-making model, showing 
all the barriers and enablers identified in this research. These findings have filled the missing 
gaps in the literature and answered the long-standing question of how new knowledge is 
created in organizations.   
 
These findings would be able to shed new light to the practice of EBM.  Some possible ways 
are to shift the attention to the use of medical knowledge, place more emphasis to the use of 
case-based reasoning approach, develop personalized medicine, and raise the importance of 
narratives in clinical practice.  The new roles for information professionals in support for KM 
include: 1) the provision of different case-based reasoning systems; 2) use of IT tools in KM 
to assist clinicians to make sense of the situation; 3) taking user-centered verbing approach to 
organize knowledge sources; 4) building up expertise network; 5) use of narratives and 
storytelling for knowledge sharing; 6) engaging in virtual communities of practice; and 7) 
equipping library space to facilitate learning. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are drowning in information, and starving for knowledge. 
Naisbitt 
 
The gap between what we know and what we do yawns like the Grand Canyon, but it can and 
must be bridged. 
 Sir Muir Gray 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Health information professionals are concerned with providing the best information services 
to assist healthcare professionals to make informed clinical decisions for optimal patient care.  
To heal a patient’s illness has always been the core value of medicine since the Hippocrates 
of Kos, “the Father of Medicine”.   Clinicians nowadays are still exploring the best model of 
care given the great resource constraints.  The Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) movement 
can be said to be a response to this call.  However, this new paradigm is also faced with 
epistemological, philosophical, ethical and practical limitations.  Some of these limitations 
sparked my interest, as I wished to explore how the theory of knowledge management (KM) 
might be used to provide a deeper understanding of the clinical decision making process in 
the hope that this will shed new light on the practice of EBM and the role of information 
professionals in supporting EBM. 
 
1.1.1 The Emergence of Evidence-Based Medicine Movement 
In the Western world, clinical practice for most of the 20th century was dominated by the 
“biomedical model” which “treated medicine as the application of biology and basic sciences 
to the problems of disease” and “the term disease was restricted to unique pathophysiological 
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malfunctions that could be connected logically to the patient’s signs and symptoms” (Henry, 
2006, p. 191). Clinical knowledge is founded on inductive reasoning whereby a physician 
infers diagnosis from a set of symptoms through meticulous observation of the patient’s 
problems and understanding of the pathophysiologic mechanisms of diseases (Djulbegovic, 
Guyatt, & Ashcroft, 2009, p. 163). Clinical experience and expertise of individual physicians 
are required to make informed decisions.  This naturally leads to the entrenchment of 
individual authority or a panel of experts to provide guidelines for clinical practice 
(Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992).    
 
This biomedical approach that is based on “clinical judgment” or “the art of medicine” 
worked well until the early 1970s when some major problems began to emerge.  First, there 
was mounting evidence showing great variations in clinical practice across different countries 
(McPherson, 1990) and different provinces (Health Services Research Group, 1992, p. 467) 
and states within a country (Wennberg & Gittelsohn, 1973; Wennberg & Gittelsohn, 1982).   
It was believed that this phenomenon was a direct result of the idiosyncratic and subjective 
nature of clinical judgment.  In fact, many researchers discovered that the variations 
correlated more strongly with differences in physicians’ practice style than with differences 
among patients (Wennberg & Gittelsohn, 1973).  People began to question the validity of 
using traditional clinical authority as the basis for clinical decisions making.   
 
Second, the quality of clinical services was also called into question.  A number of studies 
found that a large proportion of some surgical procedures were considered inappropriate even 
by the standards of medical experts, and many common medical treatments were not 
rigorously validated (Chassin et al., 1987; Kahn et al., 1988; Park et al., 1989).  Many clinical 
services were underused, overused or misused.  The situation was so serious and extensive 
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that the health of a lot of Americans was harmed (Chassin, Galvin, & National Roundtable on 
Health Care Quality, 1998, p. 1000).  Many intellectuals were increasingly concerned about 
the biases in expert opinions and errors in clinical reasoning.   There was a growing demand 
for more informed clinical decision making not relying on the traditional biomedical 
paradigm, as applied by the individual clinicians, based on their own experience. 
 
Third, the gap between clinical research and practice was widening.  It was estimated that 
only 10 - 20% of medical practices were based on randomized clinical trials (RCT) 
(Committee for Evaluating Medical Technologies in Clinical Use, 1985, p. 5). This could be 
attributed to the fact that many research studies at that time were poorly designed.  Reports 
abound of researchers using the wrong techniques either wilfully or in ignorance, adopting 
the right techniques wrongly, misinterpreting their results, reporting their results selectively, 
citing the literature incompletely, or drawing unjustified conclusions (Altman, 1994, p. 283).  
But even when there were vigorous research studies, it would take decades for them to be 
implemented.   The findings by James Lind of the effectiveness of lemon juice for scurvy was 
not adopted until 50 years later; the discovery by Ignatz Semmelweis of the efficacy of hand-
washing in chloride of lime in reducing maternal mortality was not put into practice for 30 
years; and the demonstration of the ineffectiveness of bloodletting for pneumonia by Pierre 
Louis in 1835 was not recognized until the early 20th century (Doherty, 2005).   
 
EBM, a term officially coined by the School of Medicine at McMaster University in 1992, 
was born in reaction to this atmosphere of inconsistent clinical practice, substandard care and 
the uptake of unproven interventions.  To address the problems of the old days, EBM 
emphasizes the use of scientific evidence to replace “intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience, and pathophysiologic rationale” of the former paradigm in clinical reasoning 
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(Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992, p. 2420).  It was hailed as a new paradigm 
shift.  Under the strong advocacy of three pioneers: Archie Cochrane in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Alvan Feinstein in the US and David Sackett in Canada (Daly, 2006), the new 
approach looks to the principles of clinical epidemiology and biostatistics for effective ways 
of appraising the validity and relevancy of medical literature for patient care and puts high 
values on the power of systematic reviews and RCTs as the gold standard for clinical 
decision making.  In practical terms, the EBM approach advocates a five-step linear and 
objective methodology to manage clinical problems: 1) formulating relevant and answerable 
questions from clinical problems; 2) searching for evidence; 3) appraising the evidence for its 
validity and relevance; 4) applying the evidence into patient problem using clinical 
experience and judgment, and 5) evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the process for 
continuous improvement (Sackett, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 1997, p. 3). 
 
It is undeniable that the movement gained rapid popularity among academicians, medical 
educators and politicians.  The number of citations of the term “evidence-based medicine” in 
MEDLINE grew dramatically from 6 in 1993 to 24,692 in 2007 (Andersson et al., 2007, p. 
S64).  Within a short time, “the principles of evidence based medicine have become core 
concepts of undergraduate, postgraduate, and continuing medical education, and courses, 
workshops, and online resources have proliferated” (Guyatt, Cook, & Haynes, 2004).  
Hundreds of books and thousands of journal articles were published elaborating the idea.  
Many evidence-based practice centers were established in US and UK. Its contribution to the 
effectiveness of patient care is enormous.  Without it, most women with early breast cancer 
would still be undergoing mastectomy instead of lumpectomy and radiation; many babies 
born prematurely would not be saved from respiratory distress syndrome by having their 
mothers to take corticosteroids; pregnant women in Boston might still be taking 
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diethylstilbestrol to prevent miscarriage and to find that many of their children would be 
developing reproductive abnormalities and cancer; television advertisements might still 
influence the choice of a drug to help prevent a second fracture in elderly women; and 
significant health resources amounting to US$1.4 trillion could not have been saved from 
applying AIDS research, and, what was more, the cost of treating cardiovascular patients 
could not be reduced by 35% (Dickersin, Straus, & Bero, 2007).   The influence of EBM was 
so huge that it was acclaimed as the idea of the year 2001 by The New York Times (Hitt, 2001, 
p. 68).  
 
1.1.2 Limitations of Evidence-Based Medicine 
The strong popularity of EBM is, however, coupled with equally fierce criticisms.  So far, 
EBM has not been totally accepted by practicing clinicians.  While nobody would say that 
their practices were not evidence-based, some measures of “commitment” to EBM such as 
working knowledge of EBM terminology, the use of practice guidelines and frequent 
consultations of the Cochrane database illustrated that they have not fully incorporated EBM 
into their clinical practices (Miles, Loughlin, & Polychronis, 2007, p. 482).  It is not my 
intention to negate the value of EBM in healthcare as it demonstrably does bring about a lot 
of improvement to patient care and clinical practice.  But it should also be recognized that it 
also “takes for granted incorrect presuppositions about medical knowledge and practice that 
render its current conceptualization incapable of being the overriding paradigm for patient-
centered medical care” (Henry, Zaner, & Dittus, 2007, pp. 292 - 293).  Many people have 
criticized and debated hotly the various limitations of EBM (Au, 2000, 2002; Braude, 2009; 
Charlton & Miles, 1998; Cohen, Stavri, & Hersh, 2004; Djulbegovic, Guyatt, & Ashcroft, 
2009; Dopson, Locock, Gabbay, Ferlie, & Fitzerald, 2003; Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997; 
Haynes, 2002; Henry, 2006; Henry et al., 2007; Kulkarni, 2005; Malterud, 1995, 2001; Miles, 
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2009a; Miles et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008; 
Thornton, 2006; Tonelli, 1998).  I intend, however, to focus the discussion on its 
epistemological and the related philosophical problems, which is the interest of this thesis.  
 
Questionable epistemological foundation of EBM 
The controversies surrounding EBM are mainly rooted in the nature of the term “evidence”.  
When the EBM concept was first contemplated, it was defined in this way:  
…evidence based medicine is rooted in five linked ideas: firstly, clinical decisions 
should be based on the best available scientific evidence; secondly, the clinical problem 
– rather than habits or protocols – should determine the type of evidence to be sought; 
thirdly, identifying the best evidence means using epidemiological and biostatistical 
ways of thinking; fourthly, conclusions derived from identifying and critically 
appraising evidence are useful only if put into action in managing patients or making 
healthcare decisions; and, finally, performance should be constantly evaluated 
(Davidoff, Haynes, Sackett, & Smith, 1995, p. 1085).   
The so-called “best available scientific evidence”, though not clearly explained in this 
definition, is described in the authoritative manual of EBM, Users’ Guides to the Medical 
Literature: A Manual for Evidence-Based Clinical Practice, to mean results of studies carried 
out by those research methods ranked at the top level of the following “evidence hierarchy”:    
 N-of-1 randomized trial 
 Systematic reviews of randomized trials 
 Systematic review of observational studies addressing patient-important outcomes 
 Single observational study addressing patient-important outcomes 
 Physiological studies (studies of blood pressure, cardiac output, exercise capacity, bone 
density) 
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 Unsystematic clinical observations (Guyatt et al., 2008) 
 
The epistemology of EBM is founded on the premise that the evidence as produced by the 
highly ranked research methods like RCTs and systematic reviews is the least biased, most 
objective and highly reproducible, and thus could arrive at more rational decisions than those 
that depend on subjective opinions of experts which will result in wide variations in the care 
of patients.   Such reliance on empiricism and the elevation to primary importance of RCTs 
and systematic reviews over other forms of evidence like clinical judgment, intuition and 
experience often render the epistemological foundation of EBM as anti-scientific (Charlton & 
Miles, 1998; Braude, 2009; Haynes, 2002).  In the philosophy of science, the positivistic 
approach of EBM that treats “evidence” as facts and empirical observations and that the 
medical knowledge so derived from these evidences as objective, unbiased and value-free has 
been demonstrated by post-positivists and phenomenologists as problematic (Goldenberg, 
2006).  It has been shown that scientific observation is theory-laden and cannot be separated 
from the personal interpretation and biases of the observer.  The data so gathered can also 
support numerous or even contradictory theories.  The assumed objectivity of empirical 
evidence and its direct relations with one correct theory are thus no longer tenable.  
 
On the other hand, the observational studies of individual human body to understand the 
basic mechanisms of disease that underpin traditional medicine can be conducted by 
instruments that are both objective and bias free (Haynes, 2002). This leads to the criticisms 
that the contribution of basic sciences to medical advances was ignored in EBM (Charlton & 
Miles, 1998).  In the present pluralistic world, is it too simplistic for EBM adherents to place 
medical practice in the dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, rationality and 
irrationality, universality and particularity? Are the paradigms of basic sciences that underpin 
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traditional medicine and the reliance of EBM on applied research mutually exclusive?  Many 
seem to concur with the view of Au (2002) that “heterogeneity in medicine is a clinical 
reality; the real task is to take a close look for explanations of variation, not to get rid of it” (p. 
304).   
 
Narrow conception of evidence 
Relating to the questionable epistemological foundation of EBM is the narrow definition of 
evidence in EBM.  The fact that the definition only includes solely clinical research and 
excludes other types of evidence such as pathophysiologic knowledge unless the more highly 
ranked information in the evidence hierarchy is not available carries an implied presumption 
that RCTs and systematic reviews are more reliable than, and superior to, other research 
methods.   However, Senn (2009) has pointed out from the statistical point of view various 
double counting problems of studies included in meta-analysis and suggested different 
measures to improve their reliability.  There were also findings showing that RCTs on the 
same research question did not agree with each other; the result of large RCTs may conflict 
with meta-analysis of smaller studies, and observational studies would be better than RCTs in 
some circumstances (Kulkarni, 2005, p. 258; Haynes, 2002; Sehon & Stanley, 2003).  
 
Information in the lowermost rung of the evidence hierarchy has its own role to play in 
medicine.  Clinical reasoning is a complex process requiring a broad spectrum of information 
and data.  RCTs can at best provide epidemiological and statistical data which are not 
sufficient for the wide varieties of clinical situations.  The patient’s clinical state, co-
morbidities, personal preference and compliance to the prescribed treatment are sometimes 
more crucial to determine the degree of adjustment that should be made to the current 
indicated treatment.  The decision to start a new therapy will also depend on individual 
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pathophysiologic status, not on published evidence (Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997, p. 532). In 
addition, RCTs are not always available and sometimes lacking for rare diseases not 
amenable to large-scale trials.  Individual clinicians’ judgment and experience become the 
only resort.   
 
Perhaps, the term “evidence” is a misnomer.  To clinicians, it can be referred to any fact or 
proof helpful to clinical practice. The fault of both the advocates and opponents of EBM is 
that they cannot consistently differentiate between the everyday meaning of evidence and the 
evidence of evidence-based medicine (Henry et al., 2007, p. 293). While some critics 
suggested renaming “evidence”, thoughts should be given to the more important question of 
what actually constitutes evidence.  One such attempt to address this issue was Tonelli’s 
(2006) proposal of the casuistic or case-based approach to include, on top of empirical 
evidence, experiential evidence, pathophysiological rationale, patient goals and values, and 
system features such as economic, logistic, legal and cultural barriers or facilitators of care as 
relevant elements in clinical decisions.  This also concurs with the view of phenomenologists 
who argue that “patient’s self-understanding and experience of illness also offers a legitimate 
source of relevant medical knowledge” (Goldenberg, 2006, p. 2628). The interest of this 
thesis is to explore further into this epistemological question using the theories of KM.   
 
Reductionism in scientific methods 
Implicit in the universality claim of the EBM conception is the problem of reductionism.  
Many people have commented that, given the biological differences of individual patients 
and social-cultural variations in different locations, conclusions drawn from EBM’s 
population-level data may have limited relevance to treatment decisions for individual 
patients (Haynes, 2002; Henry et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2004, Au, 2000, 2002).  In order to 
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apply the principles of epidemiology and enable pooled statistical analysis, EBM tends to 
simplify the question asked by ignoring details and differences, and to reduce medical 
practice to linear steps and universal rules on the assumption that “all real knowledge must be 
wholly explicit and formalizable” (Henry, 2006, p. 205).  The subjects in the empirical 
research are assumed to be homogeneous; sub-group analysis to identify particulars is often 
found wanting as trials are usually set up to exclude patients with other conditions.  The 
resulting uniformity in medical practice is unable to accommodate the situated needs of 
patients and the many clinical skills and judgments that must be evoked for the applicability 
of evidence.  It is right for Henry et al. (2007, pp. 293 - 294) to argue that the failure of EBM 
was not that its formal rules lacked sufficient details, but because many medical concepts like 
“deep understanding” and “clinical judgment and expertise” could not be explained within 
EBM’s epistemological framework. 
 
Paradox in the philosophy of EBM 
In response to these criticisms, Sackett, the Father of EBM, together with Rosenberg, Gray, 
Haynes, and Richardson (1996) put forward another definition of EBM in an attempt to dilute 
the importance of evidence.  EBM was defined as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” (p. 71).   
Two more elements of clinical circumstances and patients’ preference are added to this 
widely-known definition, which is conceptualized in Figure 1.1 below:   
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EBM is interpreted as these three key elements intertwined together.  However, it has not 
stated clearly how research evidence can be integrated with patients’ clinical conditions and 
patients’ preferences, “except that ‘clinical judgment and expertise’ are essential to success” 
(Haynes, 2002, p. 4).  Sackett et al. (1996) emphasized that clinical expertise “decides 
whether the external evidence applies to the individual patient at all and, if so, how it should 
be integrated into a clinical decision” (p. 72).  This is where the paradox of EBM lies.  The 
gold standard evidence is privileged over clinical expertise but the applicability of gold 
standard evidence in treatment decisions relies in turn on the clinical expertise they try to 
avoid in the first place.  This reflects the failure of EBM to provide clinicians with any rule of 
guidance in the choice of the right “evidence” for the right kind of clinical situations.  Such 
choice, according to Urquhart (1998), requires clinicians to operate near the analytical pole of 
the Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum and be able to integrate that mode of thinking with 
their intuitive judgment at the other pole, “a feat that might be considered quite difficult” (p. 
427). 
Figure 1.1 Key Elements of Evidence-Based Medicine (Haynes, 2002, p. 5) 
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This handicap is not corrected in the further revision of the definition that becomes “the 
integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values” (Sackett, 
Straus, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000, p. 1; Strauss, Richardson, Glasziou, & 
Haynes, 2005, p. 1).   While this more advanced concept as depicted in Figure 1.2 below 
gives more emphasis on clinical expertise as the fourth element to “balance the patient’s 
clinical state and circumstances, relevant research evidence, and the patient’s preferences and 
actions if a successful and satisfying result is to occur” (Haynes, Devereaux, & Guyatt, 2002, 
p. 37), it remains unclear by what process this can be achieved (Charon & Wyer, 2008).  
Tonelli (1998) stated, “If it is to be meaningful, EBM must specifically address how to 
integrate various types of medical knowledge” (p. 1235).  This unanswerable question 
provides the genesis of this thesis and it is believed that KM may provide the direction. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 An Updated Model for Evidence-Based Clinical Decision (Haynes et al., 
2002, p.37) 
 
In sum, EBM emerges as a response to the problems underpinning the biomedical model.  
Yet, it also places clinical medicine in the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity, 
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uncertainty and certainty.  It fails to recognize that the practice of medicine has a lot of grey 
zones (Naylor, 1995) and its excessive stress on objective evidence over other non-
quantifiable evidence raises a number of epistemology questions.  The whole philosophy is 
placed on a fragile groundwork with narrow conception of evidence, reductionism in 
methodology and paradox in principles.  In short, the limits of EBM are on its failure to 
explore into different types of knowledge.  The concepts of KM may provide a new 
perspective to address these issues so that EBM can be more effectively and sympathetically 
implemented.   
 
1.1.3 Relevance of KM to address the limits of EBM 
KM has emerged as a new management philosophy in the business world to enhance the 
competitive advantages of companies at about the same time that EBM has attracted 
increasing attention in the healthcare sector.  The three KPMG consecutive surveys 
conducted in 1998, 2000 and 2002 on the acceptance of KM amongst top organizations in US, 
UK and Europe showed that the number of companies recognizing the importance of KM 
grew rapidly from the initially 43% of the top 100 UK companies (KPMG Management 
Consulting, 1998, p. 1) to 81% of the leading 423 organizations in US, UK and Europe 
(KPMG Consulting, 1999, p. 1) to 80% of the top 500 companies in UK and Europe in 2002  
(KPMG Consulting, 2000, pp. 4 - 5).  Knowledge was considered a strategic resource.  The 
practice of KM was approaching a higher maturity level.  The top management was more 
involved and the scope of KM was extended.  In the healthcare sector, KM is also 
increasingly acknowledged as an extension of EBM and is promoted to integrate with 
evidence-based practice (de Brun, 2007, p. 181; Bali, Dwivdei, & Naguib, 2005; Fennessy, 
2001; Gabbay et al., 2003; Gabbay & le May, 2004; Harding & Wales, 2007; Russell, 
Greenhalgh, Boynton, & Rigby, 2004; Sanders & Heller, 2006; Wickramasinghe, Sharma, & 
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Reddy,  2005, p. 134; Wyatt, 2001).  Cheng (2006) drew an analogy between the D-I-K 
(Data-Information-Knowledge) framework of KM and the five main stages of EBM.  
Miettinen, Bachmann and Steurer (2008) clearly pointed out the need to move away from 
EBM to knowledge-based medicine (KBM) that is characterized by “the adoption of a 
tenable conception of the requisite knowledge base of medicine... – practical and rational in 
form, typical of top experts in content, and codified in cyberspace for as-needed retrieval in 
the practice” (p. 771). Even the die-hard protagonists of EBM recognized the research-
practice gap of EBM and the importance of knowledge in its practice. Gray (1998) called for 
the need of a chief knowledge officer to manage the diverse range of knowledge of modern 
healthcare organizations.  Straus et al. (2005, p. 8) and Haynes (2007) espoused “knowledge 
translation” as a new strategy in bridging the knowledge-to-practice gap of EBM.  However, 
this so-called new strategy is just an old wine in a new bottle; a more fundamental approach 
involving a new mindset is needed if KM is to be wholly integrated into medical practice.  
 
KM has been defined in many different ways (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001; Dervin, 1998; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Firestone & McElroy, 2003, pp. 60-
87; Jennex, 2007, Snowden, 2002; Venters, 2001), but there is still no universally accepted 
understanding of the concept. This will be thoroughly reviewed in Chapter Two.  For the 
purpose of this Chapter, it is simply necessary to highlight from the literature areas in which 
KM concepts are found directly relevant to the improvement of EBM practice. 
 
1.1.3.1 Tacit Knowing 
The role of tacit knowing in getting clinical evidence implemented is widely discussed in the 
literature.  Most KM practitioners, the representative of whom is Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995), draw on the concept of tacit knowing and tacit knowledge from the Hungarian 
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physical chemist, economist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, and develop their own 
theories beyond Polanyi’s original formulation.  They mistakenly interpret that knowledge 
can be categorized into tacit and explicit that are opposite to each other.  As will be discussed 
in Chapter Two, in Polanyi’s theory of knowledge, tacit knowledge is inexpressible. It 
functions implicitly, subsidiarily and unspecifiably at the periphery of people’s attention to 
allow them to understand the world around them (Henry, 2006; Henry et al., 2007). Because 
the use of tacit knowledge is beyond one’s focal awareness, it is vividly described as “we 
know more than we can tell” in Polanyi’s words (1966, p. 4).  All knowledge including 
explicit knowledge has its tacit dimension.  Explicit knowledge is “capable of being clearly 
stated (Polanyi, 1966, p. 22).  The content and use of explicit knowledge is subject to focal 
awareness.  Yet, underlying this consciousness is an ineliminable tacit knowledge, which 
permits the explicit knowledge to function. The relation between tacit and explicit knowledge 
can be “understood as a functional distinction analogous to the background-foreground 
relationship in Gestalt psychology” (Henry et al., 2007, p. 294).  “All knowledge … is either 
tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 1969c, p. 195); a pure form of explicit 
knowledge is unthinkable.  Thus, according to Polanyi, tacit and explicit knowledge are not 
dichotomous; tacit knowledge will act as the background to make possible the explicit 
dimension of human knowledge, and there is no such thing as “objective knowledge”.  
Decisions can be made at an explicit level, but a wholly explicit system of knowledge is 
impossible.   
 
Tacit knowing is relevant to the practice of clinical medicine in many ways.  Polanyi (1966) 
often quoted the example of the use of an ultrasound probe by an ultrasonographer to 
illustrate the role of tacit knowledge in the acquisition of clinical skills. When the 
ultrasonographer employed a probe to explore the interior of a cavity, he would concentrate 
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focally on the sonograms without noticing how he moved the probe.  His tacit knowledge of 
how to control the probe would directly affect the explicit image he saw.  But this tacit 
knowledge was relegated to the background or subsidiary when he was attending to the image 
resulting from the tacit knowledge of using the probe.  The explicit focus on the probe, on the 
other hand, would preclude the explicit knowledge of the image.  This affirms Polanyi’s 
belief that all explicit knowledge and purposeful actions require a foundation of tacit 
knowledge for meaning and coherence (Henry, 2006, p. 189).   
 
Besides the acquisition of physical clinical skills, Goldman (1990, p. 48) argued that tacit 
knowledge also played a substantial role in the clinicians’ mental operations such as clinical 
judgment.   In producing a clinical judgment, the explicit knowledge gathered from all sorts 
of facts, rules and medical information is of course important.  But it is the underlying tacit 
component of knowledge, the know-how, which enables the clinician to use the explicit 
component of knowledge, the know-what, to interpret the relevance of the explicit clinical 
rules to a given problem and integrate the appropriate data (Goldman, 1990, pp. 52 - 53).  
Henry (2010, p. 293) used the diagnosis of Bell’s palsy to elucidate the impossibility of 
making sense of a neurological exam without tacit awareness of the patient’s body parts and 
how they are connected.  At the same time, clinical reasoning is an art that involves dynamic 
and complex clinical knowledge that is only tacitly recognized (Goldman, 1990, p. 55; Henry, 
2010, p. 293).  A clinician may be unaware of how he achieves diagnostic closure and decide 
upon a management course. This is exactly the state of “we can know more than we can tell”.  
All these lead Braude (2009) to conclude that “Polanyi theory of tacit reasoning appears to be 
in complete accord with Feinstein’s theory of clinical reasoning” (p. 195). 
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Applying Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge to clinical practice has direct implications for 
EBM.  The clinical evidence in EBM represents a kind of explicit knowledge.  But in clinical 
practice, it is not enough to have this kind of statistical data and rules as their application 
require the exercise of clinical judgment on their appropriateness in different situations, 
which in turn hinges on the clinician’s tacit knowledge. Polanyi’s conception clearly 
demonstrates the reductionism in EBM’s epistemology in downplaying the significance of 
tacit knowledge in clinical practice and explains the failure of EBM advocates in providing a 
clear process to incorporate clinical evidence into clinical expertise and patients’ preference.  
Thus, what is lacking in EBM is a language for valuing and externalizing the tacit knowledge 
residing in clinicians’ minds (de Lusignan, Wells, & Singleton, 2002). The approach of KM 
in recognizing the importance of tacit knowledge held by individuals while acknowledging 
the need for explicit knowledge in medicine is what is needed in the implementation of EBM 
and is well suited for correcting its reductionistic medical epistemologies.  Thus, Henry (2006) 
strongly argued that Polanyi’s thoughts “provide the framework for an epistemology robust 
enough to account for medical concepts EBM cannot accommodate” (p. 188).  Thornton 
(2006) appealed to the role of tacit knowledge, or judgment, to unify the tripartite definition 
of EBM.  De Lusignan, Pritchard and Chan (2002) also commented that this was not to decry 
EBM, but a broader approach was needed in a clinical environment, an approach that “take(s) 
into account the less formalized forms of knowledge acquired through clinical practice and 
from working with experienced clinicians” (p. 302). 
 
By encouraging clinical encounter and human interaction, Polanyi’s philosophy also lays the 
groundwork for a truly person-centered theory of medicine (Henry, 2006, 2010).  Physicians 
are told that it is only through face-to-face interaction with patients at the bedside in couple 
with objective data and clinical reports will they truly understand the patient’s illness.  This 
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multiple clinical reasoning model once again acknowledges the realities of daily clinical 
practice and the art of medicine valued by doctors.  It will make the rhetoric of EBM more 
acceptable to clinicians by embracing both the scientific and craft-based aspects of medical 
identity (Dopson et al., 2003, p. 322). 
 
1.1.3.2 Knowledge Sharing and Communities of Practice  
Knowledge sharing in the form of communities of practice (COP) is another key feature of 
KM that is essential for the implementation of EBM.  As will be reviewed in Chapter Two, 
COPs are “groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a 
topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an 
ongoing basis” (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002, p. 4).  These COPs are informally 
bound by common interests and self-organizing in terms of self-selecting members, setting 
their own agendas and establishing their own leadership.  It is very similar to informal 
networks that exist within an organization or across different companies. They are 
characterized by a domain of knowledge which creates a common ground to inspire members 
to contribute and participate; a community of people who creates the social structure that 
facilitates learning through interactions and relations with others; and the practice which 
specifies the knowledge the community shares, develops and maintains (Li et al., 2009; 
Barwick, Peters, & Boydell, 2009, p. 17). Examples include professionals of a discipline such 
as engineers that work together on similar problems or a network of surgeons that explore 
novel techniques together.  COPs allow active learning to take place and members are free to 
exchange their individual knowledge with others in creative ways to generate new collective 
knowledge to improve their own practices, to identify solutions to their problems and to 
feedback the outcome of solutions to the group for further refinement.  Because of this 
feature, Sandars and Heller (2006) quoted the experience of the National Health Service 
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(NHS) in UK to demonstrate that COPs are effective means to spread the best practice to 
improve health service and thus “offer the essential opportunities for evidence (explicit 
knowledge) to be integrated with individual and collective tacit knowledge, with the result 
that evidence can be implemented to produce a change in practice” (p. 345).  Similarly, 
Gabbay and le May (2004) were of the view that COPs enable clinicians to acquire tacit 
knowledge to refine their own “mindlines” that are built on their practical experience to 
implement research in a local context and to prevent the cookbook medicine from happening.  
Tolson, Booth and Lowndes (2008) also showed that the Caledonian Development Model 
effectively promoted evidence-based practice in nursing by facilitating transformational 
learning, knowledge pooling and translation. 
 
The importance of social interaction and informal dialogue in bridging the gap between 
research and practice in EBM is highlighted by the success of CHAIN, which was established 
by NHS as an informal e-mail network for healthcare professionals with an interest in EBM.  
By sharing knowledge virtually via e-mail messages and enabling members to learn about 
EBM by observing others from a peripheral position, it illuminates the process whereby 
knowledge is created, targeted, personalized, and made meaningful through informal social 
processes (Russell, Greenhalgh, Boynton, & Rigby, 2004).  The COPs in Ontario’s children’s 
mental health sector further illustrated that COP was a promising model for translating 
knowledge and promoting practice change (Barwick, Peters, & Boydell, 2009). Some more 
success examples of COPs in the fields of occupational therapy and nursing can be found in 
Li et al.’s study (2009). 
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1.1.3.3 Narratives and Storytelling 
In the KM epistemology, there is no such thing as an evidence hierarchy.  No one kind of 
evidence is privileged over the others. Instead of clinical research evidence, narratives and 
stories are promoted as the main sources of unique organizational knowledge and are taking 
on an increasingly important place in KM.  They can be used to distribute uncodified 
knowledge and tacit problem-solving competences, and generate “thickness descriptions” of 
contexts, thereby providing in-depth understanding of the complexity of real life situations 
and transforming explicit knowledge into actionable knowledge (Schreyogg & Geiger, 2006, 
p. 82). These concepts are gaining rapid momentum in medicine and are found useful to 
counteract EBM.  A new term called “narrative-based medicine” (NBM) was coined to 
describe these efforts.      
 
Narratives are not new in medicine.  But in exploring its relevance to EBM, the attention is 
turned to patients’ narratives.  In the perception of Greenhalgh and Hurwitz (1999), patients’ 
illness experiences as unfold in stories provide “meaning, context, and perspective for the 
patient's predicament. It defines how, why, and in what way he or she is ill. The study of 
narrative offers a possibility of developing an understanding that cannot be arrived at by any 
other means” (p. 48).  Such understanding, they continued, “provides a framework for 
approaching a patient's problems holistically, as well as revealing diagnostic and therapeutic 
options” (p. 49).  This calls for the art of medicine in the caring of patients, which is not 
accommodated in EBM as its reliance on empiricism is too general and “macroscopic” to 
discern the microscopic illness experience of patients (Au, 2002; Urquhart, 1998, p. 426).  
 
Narratives include not only patients’ illness stories but also those derived from medical 
practice and patient encounters as sources of medical knowledge.  Kalitzkus and Matthiessen 
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(2009) stated that NBM could be understood in the context of patient-centered approaches, 
incorporating the subjective experience of patients into the objectivity of evidence 
exemplified in EBM.  The patients’ illness narratives do not merely describe their 
pathological causes of illness, but also their own personal experiences in patient-doctor 
communication.  This enables doctors to interpret the illness by integrating the objective 
diagnostic conditions of the suspected disease with the case specific stories of the patients 
and their own clinical expertise, the three key elements of EBM (Greenhalgh, 1999). 
Narratives are regarded as the bridge between the evidence of large-scale RCTs and the 
medical art of applying the knowledge to a single case.  This leads to the initiation of 
“narrative evidence based medicine” (NEBM), an attempt to integrate both approaches of 
EBM and NBM and which “recognizes the narrative features of all data and the evidentiary 
status of all clinical text” (Charon & Wyer, 2008, p. 297).   To Goyal et al. (2008), this 
integration will superimpose the specific onto the general, representing a novel means of 
improving the quality and outcome of patient care.  I will return to this point in detail in 
Chapter Six as this research shows that narratives and in particular storytelling are proven 
approaches in organizational sense-making and KM.  
 
In sum, KM addresses many epistemological issues of EBM. Its broad concept of knowledge 
to include both tacit and explicit knowledge and the recognition that all knowledge has a tacit 
dimension are well suited for correcting the reductionistic medical epistemologies of EBM, 
making the rhetoric of EBM more acceptable to clinicians.  Knowledge sharing in the form of 
COPs emphasizes interaction and communication, and social learning (that is reminiscent of 
much clinical training on placement) that is contrasted markedly with the linear and 
rationalistic approach of EBM.  Patients’ narratives provide a framework for approaching a 
patient’s problem holistically. They now become the focus to whom the evidence of large-
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scale RCTs can be applied. These areas can be succinctly summarized as relating to 
knowledge creation, sharing and utilization, the main stages of the KM life cycle.  These are 
the main concern of this research.   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The above discussion leads to my argument that knowledge creation, sharing and utilization 
are required to bridge the research-practice gap of EBM.  Medicine is an evolving discipline.  
New diseases, new drugs and new diagnostic methods emerge every day.  As the 1956 Dean 
of Harvard, Dr. Sydney Burwell, put it at a Harvard dinner, “Half of what you are taught as 
medical students will in 10 years have been shown to be wrong. And the trouble is, none of 
your teachers knows which half” (Pickering, 1956, p. 115). Acquiring new knowledge to 
solve everyday clinical problems is essential to the practice of medicine.  In fact, knowledge 
creation is always the first stage in the KM life cycle (Dwivedi, Bali, & Naguib, 2005, p. 144). 
The 5-step model of EBM also starts with this activity -- formulation of an answerable 
clinical question relevant to the clinical problem at hand.  The fact that there is a question to 
be asked implies that the past education and experience of clinicians are unable to tackle the 
patient problem at hand.  New knowledge is thus required to close the gap exemplified in the 
question they raise.  But how do they learn new knowledge to solve clinical problems?  
Where does clinical knowledge come from?  
 
A more important issue is to place this individual level of knowledge creation into the 
organizational level if KM is to be meaningful.  Though it has been argued so far in this 
research that knowledge is always personal, which follows the theory of Polanyi, knowledge 
should also be made available to all members of the organization so that they can take 
advantage of it.  This is especially important in healthcare organizations which offer 
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ultimately a team-based service in the caring of patients by myriads of knowledge-intensive 
specialists in different fields of specialties; knowledge that remains in the head of a single 
clinician would not enhance the quality of clinical service of the organization as a whole.  
Another key question then becomes whether an organization as a whole, through procedures 
and policies, for example, will learn or only its members will learn.   
 
There are many models and frameworks attempting to explain the process of knowledge 
creation and sharing in organizations, but none is able to answer the above two questions of 
how knowledge is created by an individual and shared in the whole organization. The SECI 
(socialization, externalization, combination, internalization) model of Nonaka (1991), on 
which many later models are based such as the N-Form Corporation of Hedlund (1994) and 
the framework of Spender (1996a), is the most representative and influential one.  However, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Two, Nonaka’s proposition that organizational knowledge is 
created through the interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge from individuals to individuals 
and then to the organization and back to individuals via the four knowledge conversion 
modes of socialization, externalization, combination and internalization is not conceptually 
clear to argue why knowledge creation has to begin with socialization and how new tacit 
knowledge comes to arise in individual heads (Stacey, 2000).  Nonaka was also criticized 
over his conception of knowledge into the rigid tacit and explicit dichotomies (Cecez-
Kecmaovic, 2005, p. 57, Snowden, 2002; Gourlay, 2006b), without realizing that any 
“explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood” (Polanyi, 1969, p. 144).  His 
assumption that all tacit knowledge could be made explicit is also problematic (Gourlay, 
2006a, p. 1422) as it was argued that at least some tacit knowledge cannot be made explicit. 
In the healthcare field, there is a paucity of research on knowledge creation and utilization 
model; only Evans and Alleyne (2009) provided a KM model that uses a process modeling 
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approach to understand the processes involved in knowledge construction and dissemination. 
There is a need to establish more in-depth understanding of the process of knowledge 
creation and utilization by healthcare professionals. 
 
How one’s own knowledge becomes organizational is again unclear despite the conduct of 
numerous research studies in this area.   While many practitioners and scholars in the field of 
KM and organizational learning are still divided in their understanding of whether an 
organization will learn; some say yes, some think no and some believe maybe 
(Antonacopoulou, 2006b), many of them agreed that learning and knowledge creation took 
place first amongst individuals at one level and the knowledge so created is then spread to 
group and organization at another higher level (Nonaka, 1991; Kim, 1993; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Leonard & Strauss, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Garvin, 1998; Sanchez, 2006; 
Antonacopoulou, 2006a).  But Stacey (2000) argued that through complex adaptive systems, 
knowledge in an organization emerges in a self-organizing manner in the pattern of 
interaction simultaneously at the level of individuals and the organization as a whole.  There 
is no question of individuals at one level and the social at another.  Both of them are at the 
same ontological level.  This micro-macro debate concerning the link between individual and 
organizational knowledge is still going on.  An examination of this relationship is deemed 
necessary to understand the nature of organizational knowledge, knowledge creation and 
utilization, and thus the way KM can enhance the practice of EBM.  The aim of this research 
is to explore knowledge creation, sharing and utilization in healthcare organizations from an 
ontological approach - from individuals to groups and teams to the organization - and to 
construct a new KM model based on the empirical findings. 
 
This leads to the following three research questions for this thesis: 
 25 
1. How are individual and organizational knowledge created in healthcare 
organizations? 
2. How is individual knowledge linked to organizational knowledge for ultimate 
utilization in healthcare organizations? 
3. Can the process of knowledge creation and utilization as derived from the answers to 
the above two questions be conceptualized in a new KM model? 
The answers to Questions 1 and 2 will inform healthcare information professionals how to 
design products, systems and services to respond to the needs of healthcare professionals and 
facilitate knowledge creation and utilization in healthcare organizations.  The research was 
conducted in public hospitals in Hong Kong, all under the administration of the Hong Kong 
Hospital Authority (HA) (Chapter Four).  The scenarios in some private hospitals in Hong 
Kong will also be used for comparison.  Though the research is limited to the healthcare 
setting in Hong Kong, given the universal similarity in the practice of medicine, the answers 
to Questions 1 and 2 should be applicable to other healthcare settings.  The roles of 
information professionals are examined in Chapter Six.  
 
1.3 Research Framework  
In deciding the appropriate research framework for studying the knowledge creation process 
of individual healthcare professionals, I believe that it should be the one that allows research 
participants to reveal fully their own perspectives and inner experiences because knowledge 
creation is a personal and individualistic process.  A merely quantitative approach that 
focuses on hard data that is stripped of healthcare professionals’ views is deemed insufficient.  
A really user-centered research framework that enables both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis will enable healthcare professionals to “freely” speak their real-life experiences and 
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to dig deeply into different factors that enable or block their knowledge creation, sharing and 
use in different clinical situations in an undisturbed manner.   
 
In addition, the approach should also meet with my interpretation of the meaning of 
knowledge.  Chapter Two will review the literature on this concept, which is still vague and 
without a universally accepted definition.  In this thesis, knowledge is viewed not only on a 
personal context but also on a social context in relation to the organization.  There are many 
schools of social theories.  I intend not to define knowledge in the cognitive or functionalist 
perspective.   Under this perspective, knowledge is viewed as universal and an objective 
representation of the world; a stock or a thing awaiting to be discovered and can be encoded, 
stored and disseminated.  This fails to explain the behavior of the social world, which is 
determined by the meaning individuals attributed to their actions and hence does not lend 
itself to its reductionist methods.  This thesis will take the constructivist or interpretivist 
perspective, which assumes that “knowledge resides within our bodies and is closely tied to 
our senses and previous experiences; we will come to construct our knowledge in ways that 
are unique to ourselves” (Stefanelli, 2004, p. 526).  Knowledge is regarded as highly personal, 
tacit, and socially constructed.  It is the result of human action and its creation of meaning. 
 
Dervin’s (1983) Sense-Making Methodology (SMM) is one such theoretical framework that 
is truly user-centered and takes the interpretivist perspective in its understanding of 
“knowledge”.  Many of its philosophical assumptions, substantive propositions, 
methodological framings, and methods are found useful to this research.  Dervin’s SMM has 
been developed since 1972 as an approach to studying communication as communication 
rather than as mere transmission.  It conceptualizes messages not as things to be transmitted 
via channels from senders to receivers but “as constructions that are tied to the specific times, 
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places, and perspectives of their creators” (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p. 5).  Consequently, 
communication is a dynamic process aiming at understanding each other’s meaning and that 
the design of research, system and practices should be based on the realities of how 
“communicating works for living, breathing, humans who necessarily must act in their worlds 
as evolving, changing, interpreting agents and not as empty buckets into which right 
‘messages’ can be dropped” (Souto, Dervin, & Savolainen, 2008, p. 5).  This user-centered 
approach with focus on a genuine two-way dialogue and communication is what is needed in 
the practice of KM whose nature is about sharing and dialoguing.  In fact, it can be said that 
the failure of EBM is its underlying transmission principles that ignore the need for 
communicative communication. 
 
The central mandate of SMM is the study of human sense-making and sense-unmaking in its 
variant forms as an individual moves through time-space in his / her ongoing life journey.  
This mandate is exemplified in the Sense-Making metaphor which assumes that there is no 
objective reality; the reality can be both chaotic and orderly and thus continually evolving.  
Encountering “discontinuities” or “gappiness” is fundamental in the time-space movement.  
The metaphor describes the specific moment of sense-making that allows an individual to 
construct and design his / her movement through time-space.   An individual constructs or 
sees his or her own reality from his / her own “eyes” and is constrained by his / her history, 
past experience and the perception of the present situation.  A new sense must be made and 
unmade when he or she encounters a “gappy situation” which blocks his / her movement in 
time-space and is compelled to behave appropriately to bridge the gap in order to move 
forward.  Sources of inputs such as individual’s own ideas, databases, experts, media, etc. 
will be used to create the new sense and they will be constantly evaluated as helps or hurts 
when he or she is brought to a new situation with a new gap requiring another gap-bridging 
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strategy.  Sense-making is thus “situational” and anchored in a specific micro-moment of 
time-space.  According to Dervin (1998), new knowledge “is the sense made at a particular 
point in time-space by someone” (p. 36).   In other words, SMM is a methodology to study 
the creation of meaning from the ambiguous situation an individual faces by making 
references to the past experience and the current level of knowledge of the individual.  New 
sense will be made when the past experience no longer offers explanations of the present 
situation, and new knowledge is then created.  SMM has been developed as a way to explore 
information behaviour to help understand how the gaps are bridged or how knowledge is 
created.  Its applicability as an alternative approach to KM practice was also explored by 
Dervin in 1998 and many other scholars associated with her (Cheuk, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 
2010; Souto, 2007; 2008; 2010).  SMM is thus an appropriate approach for examining the 
knowledge creation process at an individual level. 
 
SMM is guided methodologically by multiple interviewing research methods which 
conceptualize all the variables in the Sense-Making metaphor. It focuses on the 
understanding of the micro sense-making and sense-unmaking moment depicted as the 
intersection of the Situation-Gap-Outcome Triangle in Figure 3.7 in Chapter Three (page 
212), which forms the foci of all SMM interviews.  SMM interviewing has been developed as 
an approach to being able to elicit and hear what people “really” want, think, need, feel, 
experience and struggle with (Dervin, 2008a, p. 14).  The Triangle will thus be used to give 
research participants time to think deeply beyond surface stereotypes about their situations 
and to share deep articulations (Dervin, Reinhard, Song, & Reed, 2006).  From this 
conceptualization a set of SMM interviewing questions and specific techniques are derived to 
inform the research design of how the research participants look at their own “situations”, 
‘gaps”, “gap-bridging” and “outcomes”.  These four elements constitute users-in-situations 
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moving through time-space.  It is one of the basic premises of SMM that these users-in-
situations would provide a better predictor of sense-making activities than the traditional 
across time-space factors such as age, gender and educational level.  Thus, these users-in-
situations will be the unit of analysis. The Micro-Moment Time-Line Interview is one such 
interviewing approach of SMM that is adopted in this research to inform data collection as 
well as analysis.  It should be noted that Dervin’s SMM offers not just a theoretical 
framework but also a set of data collection and analysis tools to tap the “situated” sense-
making and sense-unmaking moments of research participants.  The result of the research 
based on this truly user-centered approach will assist health information professionals to 
design information services more responsive to users’ needs.    
 
However, SMM has been commented as individual rather than collective understanding.  As 
a result, SMM might seem to be inadequate for explaining group and organizational 
information communication processes (Tidline, 2005, p. 114).  An attempt was made to study 
the organizational sense-making approaches of Karl Weick and David Snowden.  Since there 
are a lot of parallels as well as differences amongst the theories of these three leading 
scholars, Chapter Three compares and contrasts their commonalities and differences to derive 
a more complete theoretical framework to study knowledge creation, sharing and utilizations 
in healthcare organizations from an ontological approach.  It was found that Dervin’s SMM is 
applicable to the study of the relation between micro and macro levels.  Weick’s approach 
has certain limitations that it is not deemed appropriate for this research.  The Cynefin 
framework of Snowden is found useful to inform part of the data analysis.   
 
In sum, the objectives of this research are to find out the process of knowledge creation, 
sharing and utilization in healthcare organizations using sense-making as the theoretical lens.  
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In other words, the thesis investigates the sense-making activities of healthcare professionals 
at both micro and macro levels.  The findings from the research presented in Chapter Five are 
analyzed to derive concepts that can be added to or removed from the sense-making model of 
Dervin and build a new micro-macro sense-making model for knowledge creation, sharing 
and use.  The model forms the basis for developing factors that will facilitate or block sense-
making activities.  The role of healthcare information professionals is to design user services 
that will enable the formation of or remove barriers to sense-making in healthcare 
organizations. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Empirically, the use of sense-making approach as the theoretical framework is a break away 
from the mainstream thinking which was dominated by systems thinking such as those of 
Senge, Nonaka and Takeuchi.  The Sense-Making Methodology of Dervin has been used in 
many diverse and seemingly contrasting discourse communities including not only library 
and information science, but also journalism, media studies, cultural studies, critical theory, 
education and pedagogy, communication campaign, citizen-government communication, 
telecommunication policy, health communication and doctor-patient communication.  This 
research is one of the first few to apply SMM in a healthcare setting with participants from 
doctors and nurses and this is different from other research studies that focus on patients and 
library users.   While Dervin and Snowden have applied their sense-making theories in the 
study of KM as early as 1998 and Weick writes about organisational sense-making which 
may or may not be relevant to KM, this doctoral research is amongst the few to compare and 
contrast these sense-making theories and to derive a more complete micro-macro model for 
KM. Dervin’s approach is used mostly to inform data collection and partly on analysis but 
attempts is made to explore whether there are links with other theoretical approaches. 
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The findings that it is the gap-bridging strategies that determine whether knowledge will be 
created when facing the same knowledge-creating situation is significant to support the claim 
that gap-bridging is a strong predictor of knowledge creation.  EBM is just one of the many 
gap-bridging strategies that is more likely than others to generate new knowledge; there are 
myriads of other gap-bridging strategies that will also produce new knowledge for healthcare 
professionals.  This explains why the sole emphasis on EBM in the practice of medicine is 
not sufficient to handle all clinical situations. The research will also identify the particular 
situations in which EBM will be employed for decision making.  This will be useful to 
inform healthcare administrators some practical ways to promote EBM in the healthcare 
setting.    
 
Finally, this research also studies the enablers and blockers of knowledge creation and 
utilization.  This is rarely studied and would be useful to health information professionals in 
the design of appropriate user services to further facilitate the knowledge creation and 
utilization process. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter Two presents an overview of the current state of research in KM. The conception of 
knowledge is clarified by revisiting the epistemology of knowledge from the ancient Greek 
age to the contemporary times, and reviewing the current thinking on its nature in order to 
arrive at a working definition of knowledge.  KM is also re-defined.  The chapter also 
reviews KM practices in the healthcare field and different knowledge creation models.  The 
review of different sense-making approaches is covered in Chapter Three which forms the 
second part of the literature review.  The theories of three leading scholars, Brenda Dervin, 
Karl Weick and David Snowden are compared and contrasted to provide a theoretical basis 
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for this research. Chapter Four spells out the research methodology, which largely follows 
SSM of Dervin.  It elaborates the data collection, coding scheme and data analysis method. 
Chapter Five in Volume 2 reports the results of the research, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively to answer the three research questions.  Chapter Six discusses the findings, the 
relation between KM and EBM, the role of information professionals in KM based on the 
micro-macro model of sense-making and the methodology used in this research.  This is then 
followed by a conclusion in Chapter Seven. The interview questions and the code book are 
provided in the appendices.  A consistent citation style of Harvard APA 6th edition citation 
style is applied. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW – KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
 
There are all kinds of sources of knowledge but none has authority. 
  Karl Popper 
 
Knowing belongs to the class of achievements that are comprised by all forms of living. 
 
 Michael Polanyi 
 
 
2.1 Nature of Knowledge 
The theory of KM is drawn from many different disciplines such as management, 
organizational behavior, psychology, library science, information systems, communication, 
philosophy, economics, engineering, etc. (DiMattia & Oder, 1997; Dalkir, 2005, p. 6; Prusak, 
2001; Wiig, 2000).  There is still no commonly agreed approach in the literature.   But central 
to the understanding of this new theory is the concept of “knowledge”.  It has been said that 
its fluid and elusive nature renders it obscure and unclear to most people.  The inclusion of 
“management” into the phrase only makes the concept more confusing, if not misleading.  It 
is no wonder that they are called an odd couple (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001) or even an 
oxymoron (Skyrme, 1997b; 2003).  Mclnerney (2002) summarized the confusion exactly in 
this statement: “It is this dynamic nature of knowledge that leads to the question of how 
something in flux, in movement and in action, can be managed” (p. 1011).  It is clear that any 
study of KM should start with the nature of knowledge.  To do this, this Chapter will start 
with an overview of the epistemological origin of knowledge to serve as the background for 
the discussion of myriads of definitions on the nature and typology of knowledge including 
personal and organizational knowledge in order to arrive at a working definition for this 
research.  This will be followed by the review of the current state of research on knowledge 
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creation and utilization with particular reference to the healthcare field to identify gaps in the 
literature.   
 
2.1.1 Epistemology Revisited 
The research on KM has been plagued by the lack of consensus on how to define knowledge. 
This can be seen in the plethora of definitions of the word in the literature.  Table 2.1 
provides a snapshot of these various definitions extracted from top KM scholarly publications.  
These works are selected either because the authors are widely cited in the literature, or listed 
in the review studies of Nonaka and Peltokorpi (2006), Serenko and Bontis (2004) as well as 
a number of scholarly publications (Alvesson & Karreman, 2001, p. 997; Firestone & 
McElroy, 2003, pp. 3-5; Stenmark, 2002; Beckman, 1999, p. 3).  The list is not meant to be 
exhaustive; it just serves to show the degree of emphasis of the word in different contexts and 
for different purposes.  Knowledge is posited as about everything; it is related to truth, beliefs, 
values, judgment, data, contextual information, insights, meaning, phenomena, know-how, 
reasoning, experience, procedures, heuristics, objective artifacts, intellectual capital, sentient 
beings, action, community and society.  These definitions are mostly incommensurate with 
each other.  It is therefore hard to understand the true nature of the concept without going 
back to the discipline, philosophy, which is the most relevant discipline for its study 
(Wyssusek & Totzke, 2004).  Stemming from the Greek word episteme, meaning knowledge, 
and logos, meaning theory, epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies the 
possibility, limits, origins, structure, methods and validity of knowledge (Delanty & Strydom, 
2003, p. 5).  In the following section, there is a brief sketch of the philosophical contention 
since the ancient Greeks to bring out the concerns of KM researchers. 
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Table 2.1 Definitions of Knowledge Extracted from Top KM Scholarly Publications 
Scholarly Works Definitions of Knowledge 
Machlup (1980, p. 
58 ) 
All information, in the sense of the contents conveyed, is knowledge, 
although not all knowledge may properly be called information. 
Wiig (1993, p. 73)  Knowledge consists of truths and beliefs, perspectives and concepts, 
judgments and expectations, methodologies and know-how.  
Knowledge is accumulated, organized, and integrated and held over 
longer periods to be available to be applied to handle specific 
situations and problems. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995, p. 58) 
1. Knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs and commitment.  
Knowledge is a function of a particular stance, perspective, or 
intention 
2. Knowledge is about action. It is always knowledge “to some end”. 
3. Knowledge, like information, is about meaning.  It is context 
specific and relational. 
4. A dynamic human process of justifying personal beliefs toward 
the truth. 
Grant (1996, p. 111) Knowledge should possess the characteristics of transferability, 
capacity for aggregation and appropriability.  
Spender (1996, p. 57) Knowledge is conceived as competent goal-oriented activity rather 
than as abstract “knowledge about”. 
Allee (1997b, p. 42) Knowledge is experience that can be communicated or shared. 
Davenport, De Long 
and Beers (1998, p. 
43) 
Knowledge is information combined with experience, context, 
interpretation, and reflection. It is a high-value form of information 
that is ready to apply to decisions and actions. 
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Davenport and Prusak 
(1998, p. 5) 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information.  It 
originates and is applied in the minds of knowers.  In organizations, 
it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but 
also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms. 
Shariq (1998, p. 11) Knowledge is a human activity. 
Beckman (1999,  p. 
3) 
Knowledge is reasoning about information and data to actively 
enable performance, problem-solving, decision-making, learning and 
teaching. 
McDermott (1999, p. 
105) 
Six characteristics of knowledge distinguish it from information:  
1. Knowing is a human act 
2. Knowledge is the residue of thinking 
3. Knowledge is created in the present moment 
4. Knowledge belongs to communities 
5. Knowledge circulates through communities in many ways 
6. New knowledge is created at the boundaries of old 
Quigley and Debons 
(1999, p. 7) 
Knowledge is text that answers {how/ why} in the problem space. 
Sowa (as cited in 
Beckman, 1999,  p. 3) 
Knowledge encompasses the implicit and explicit restrictions placed 
upon objects (entities), operations, and relationships along with 
general and specific heuristics and inference procedures involved in 
a situation being modeled. 
Turban (as cited in 
Beckman, 1999,  p. 3) 
Knowledge is information that has been organized and analyzed to 
make it understandable and applicable to problem solving or 
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decision making. 
Van de Spek and 
Spijkervet (1997, p. 
36) 
Knowledge is the whole set of insights, experiences, and procedures 
that are considered correct and true and that therefore guide the 
thoughts, behaviors, and communications of people. 
Bennet and Bennet 
(2000, p. 19) 
Knowledge, while made up of data and information, can be thought 
of as much greater understanding of a situation, relationships, causal 
phenomena, and the theories and rules (both explicit and implicit) 
that underlie a given domain or problem. 
Stacey (2000) Knowledge is social acts.  Knowledge is continuously reproduced 
and potentially transformed in processes of interaction between 
people. 
Bell (as cited in 
Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2001, p. 
997) 
Knowledge is defined as that which is objectively known, an 
intellectual property, attached to a name or a group of names and 
certified by copyright or some other form of recognition (e.g. 
publication). 
Sveiby (2001b, p.  
345) 
Knowledge is a capacity to act (which may or may not be conscious) 
and the capacity can only be shown in action.  
Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou (2001, p. 
979) 
Knowledge is the individual ability to draw distinctions within a 
collective domain of action, based on an appreciation of context or 
theory, or both. 
Leonard and Sensiper 
(2002, p. 485) 
Knowledge is information that is relevant, actionable, and based at 
least partially on experience. Knowledge is a subset of information; 
it is subjective; it is linked to meaningful behavior; and it has tacit 
elements born of experience. 
Mclnerney (2002, pp. Knowledge is the awareness of what one knows through study, 
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1009-1010) reasoning, experience or association, or through various other types 
of learning.  Unlike static information that can be held in databases 
and on paper, knowledge is based in sentient beings, or emanates 
from them, and thus, it is always changing with the human 
experience. 
Argyris (as cited in 
Firestone & McElroy, 
2003, p. 5) 
Knowledge is the capacity for effective action. 
James (as cited in 
Firestone & McElroy, 
2003, p. 4) 
Knowledge is understanding based on experience. 
Choo (2006, p. 132) Information becomes knowledge when a human actor forms 
justified, true beliefs about the world (belief structuring). 
 
 
It is generally agreed that epistemological concerns about the nature and sources of 
knowledge appear to arise first in Plato and has generated intense discussions since then 
(Aarons, 2008; Kelly, 2004; Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Kouzmin, 2003; Grant & Grant, 2008; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Moser, 2010; Pappas, 1998a; Steup, 2010; Stenmark, 2002).  A 
brief sketch of the historical development of epistemology is shown in Figure 2.1.  It is 
largely divided into three main stages: the ancient Greek and Roman age from 300 B.C. to 
200 A.D., the Enlightenment and Romantics Age from the 16th to early 19th century, and the 
contemporary times from the 20th century onwards.  This division is modified after Kelly’s 
(2004) and Grant and Grant’s (2008, p. 573) works with the purpose of delineating the 
evolution of the knowledge concept.  The suggestions from Drucker (1993, p. 42) who 
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proposed three phases commencing from before 1700 A.D. to from 1881 onwards, and Allee 
(1997b, pp. 6-7) who put forward three phases from the Age of Enlightenment to the 
knowledge era, are not adopted to avoid reflecting the impact of management theories on 
epistemology and subsequently on KM at this stage.  Another purpose of the timeline is to 
address the omission problem of some essential figures like Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi 
in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995, pp. 22-27) book which covers a detailed recount of the 
evolution of knowledge from Plato to Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 20th century.  According to 
the explanation of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 91), the omission was owing to the 
relatively minor position of Polanyi in Western philosophy because of his views and 
background. This brief explanation marked in a footnote in another Chapter of their book is 
not entirely convincing given the heavy use of Polanyi’s tacit knowing concept in their book 
(Wallace, 2007, p. 31). In fact, they might be too biased on the importance of the Cartesian 
split in order to contrast it with the unity conception of the Japanese tradition.  
 
2.1.1.1 Ancient Greek and Roman Age 
The first definition of knowledge as “justified true belief” is offered by Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) 
in his Meno and Theaetetus.  He argued that knowledge should be a belief that is both “true” 
and “justified”.  It is easy to understand that a false belief can’t be knowledge.  However, 
merely a true belief is not knowledge too because it must be justified to remove any chance 
of lucky guess.  But in what way should one justify a true belief?  This question of 
justification is what epistemologists most concerned about and the main area of contention 
for thousands of years.   
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Figure 2.1 Timeline of Western Epistemology from Ancient Greek to Contemporary Times 
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In his Theaetetus, Plato further elaborated that knowledge should be a true belief bound by an 
aitias logismos, a reasoned account to affirm that knowledge must be true (Fine, 2003, p. 6).  
His way of justifying knowledge in pure reason originates also in his metaphysical view 
which is represented by his theory of “Forms”.  Forms can be interpreted as the common 
property of objects, and they are unchanging and immortal.  The physical world is merely the 
shadowy representation of perfect forms in an ideal world.  Using the allegory of the cave, 
Plato believes that “sense perception is deceitful, likened to the mere shadow of a cutout 
copy” (Ferré, 1998, p. 38).  Thus, Plato does not include sense experience as a source of 
knowledge.  Mathematics is one such discipline that cannot be apprehended by sense. He 
regards those derive from the sensory experience just mere opinion, not knowledge (Pappas, 
1998b, para. 4).  Genuine knowledge has its own metaphysical existence, a priori, that is 
innate and inborn to the human mind.  It is derived deductively from the immortal essence 
through pure reason through the method of dialectic.  
 
In contrast to the view of Plato that universal forms can exist independently apart from things, 
Aristotle (384 – 322 B.C.), the disciple of Plato, believed that universals existed only in 
particular things.  Consequently, the physical world was known to the human mind through 
perceptual experience, through what was seen and what had been proven. Perception thus 
provided the starting point of any problem investigation.  Subsequently, this would lead to 
memory, to experience, and eventually to expert understanding (Spellman, 1995, p. 69). In 
Aristotle’s definition, knowledge is a posteriori that is derived inductively from a particular 
sensory experience and observation of the physical world to grasp the universal 
characteristics, rather than by intuitive reflection on abstract ideas as Plato claims (Kelly, 
2004, p.36).  Yet, the operation of sense, memory and experience provides the necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the grasp of a universal that is expressed in concepts and beliefs 
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(Posterior Analytics II, 19; Metaphysics I, 1, as cited in Irwin, 2003, para. 2). The quest for 
full knowledge also requires reasoning and thinking in order to attribute the universal to a 
particular that we experience (Irwin, 2003, para. 2; Ferré, 1998, p. 45).  It can be said that 
Aristotle's method is both inductive and deductive. As regards justification, Aristotle argued 
that scientific truth could be justified by means of a series of syllogisms, the first of which 
was first principles or starting points of investigation. Since first principles were necessarily 
true and knowable directly, they did not require any demonstration; otherwise, there was the 
danger of falling into an infinite regress (Pappas, 1998b, para. 5).   
 
Plato and Aristotle's first attempt of inquiry into the nature of knowledge has brought out the 
difficulties of defining knowledge to certainty.  Plato’s tripartite definition has been widely 
accepted until now.  But shortly after their death, they were challenged by skepticism.  
Represented by Pyrrhus of Elis (365 – 270 B.C.) and Sextus Empiricus (160 - 210 A.D.), the 
skeptics attacked on any claims of knowledge either because of the impossibility of justifying 
belief or the fallibility of the senses to give an accurate account of the reality. In 1963, 
Edmund Gettier also called into question the definition by putting forward the famous Gettier 
problems which showed that there were situations in which a belief may be justified and true; 
and yet could not be considered to be knowledge (Steup, 2010, The Gettier Problem, para. 1).  
Being a justified true belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the definition of 
knowledge.  No one has yet succeeded in providing another definition of knowledge that will 
not fall into the trap of the Gettier examples. Skepticism is always a problem for the 
definition of knowledge.  The issue at stake is the trouble of finding the right criterion for 
knowledge.  Plato and Aristotle provide different means of justification.  Plato believes in 
reason for the claims to knowledge while Aristotle argues for sensory experience as well as 
cognitive thinking.  But both fail to prove the infallibility of these sources.  Martinich and 
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Stroll (2010) stated, “how one can know whether there is a reality that exists independently of 
sense experience, given that sense experience is ultimately the only evidence one has for the 
existence of anything, and how one can know what anything is really like, given that different 
kinds of sensory evidence often conflict with each other?” (p. 3).  If sensory experience is 
fallible, why should reason be accepted as infallible?  Martinich and Stroll (2010) quoted 
numerous examples when we would forget, miscalculate or jump too fast to conclusions.    
 
It should be stressed that the tripartite definition refers to what is known as propositional 
knowledge which means knowing that is the case.  It is different from personal knowledge 
meaning knowing a place or a person, and “knowing how” meaning the practical skill of 
doing something, which is the concern of KM practitioners (Steup, 2008, para. 1).   
Nevertheless, it is not well-justified for Aarons (2008) to claim that “traditional philosophical 
discussions about epistemology are generally limited in their application to KM” (p. 3031). 
Though Platonic and Aristotelian theories may be imperfect and sometimes problematic 
(Copleston, 2003, p. 262; Ferré, 1998, p. 23; Kreis, 2009, Aristotle, para. 5), they lay a solid 
foundation for the subsequent inquiries into central epistemological questions of “What can 
we know, and how can we know it?” which are important to the understanding of knowledge 
creation.  
 
2.1.1.2 The Enlightenment and Romantics Age 
In the backdrop of the revival of skepticism in the 16th century came the Great Enlightenment.  
The dramatic success in science and technology brought about an unprecedented optimistic 
outlook that fostered supreme confidence in the power of reasoning in acquiring absolute and 
explicit knowledge for human mankind (Mead, 2007, p. 300).  This belief in “rational 
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idealism” coupled with the need to face the skeptical challenge eventually unveiled a new era 
in epistemological thinking pioneered by the first rationalist philosopher René Descartes.   
 
René Descartes (1596 - 1650) responded to skepticism with his breakthrough thinking that 
absolute and certain knowledge was possible with a reliable method for seeking truth (Kelly, 
2004, p. 112).  This was the method of doubt, “a method wherein a proposition is considered 
false provided there is even the slightest possible ground for doubting it” (Pappas, 1998d, 
para. 3).  He advocated a theory of knowledge that was unfolded in the famous statement – “I 
think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum) – which he said was beyond any doubt as no one 
could question the existence of the thinking self.  From the proof of its own existence, 
Descartes further extends Platonian belief in the separation of mind and body and innate ideas 
in human mind to the doctrine that only the mind of the thinking self thinks.  This mind, 
endowed with faculties of deduction and intuition, can thus deduce genuine certain 
knowledge that is justified by cogito.  In Descartes’ epistemology, only thoughts and 
reasoning are sources of justification for knowledge.  Inductive knowledge from senses, the 
starting point for knowledge in Aristotelian philosophy, is refuted as knowledge because it is 
subject to error and confusion.  Only those objective primary qualities of physical objects 
such as mass, length and velocities are counted as items of knowledge as they are not subject 
to perception.  Thus, scientific knowledge has an important place in Descartes’ epistemology.   
 
This Cartesian tradition is considered critical in epistemology in the majority of the literature 
though it continues the traditional direction of finding the right justification to assure 
certainty on propositional knowledge in face of skepticism.  It has also exerted a far-reaching 
impact in many disciplines.  For instance, scientific studies follow this approach that 
everything should be measurable (Baets, 2005, p. 31).  The idea of divided man – mind and 
 45 
body – is not only debated in philosophy but also in medicine as can be seen in the concept of 
“medical model” in which the body is thought as a machine.  Clinical medicine also has the 
problem of reconciling the power of the mind with the workings of the body as reflected in 
what we call the “placebo effect” (Urquhart, personal communication, December 29, 2005).  
The deep-seated interest in this problem stimulates growing research in this area (Zubieta & 
Stohler, 2009; Colloca & Benedetti, 2005) which has found convincing evidence on the 
impact of placebo effects on changing both perceptions and actual neurobiological processes. 
It is also believed that future research will shed new light on mind-body interactions. 
 
The dominance of the rationalist thinking of Descartes and his followers Benedict Spinoza 
(1632 – 1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716) in the Continent was 
vehemently challenged by the British empiricists under the leadership of John Locke (1632 – 
1704) and his predecessors Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) and Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679). 
In direct opposition to Descartes’ “innate ideas” as the source of knowledge, Locke argued 
vigorously that the human mind was a tabula rasa at birth, a blank slate, to be filled with 
experience at a later life.  Experience, on which all knowledge was founded, could be 
acquired not just through sensation from five senses as other empiricists asserted, but also 
through reflection which was the “nonsensory awareness of the operations of our own minds” 
to gain ideas of the material world (Ferré, 1998, p. 126). This allowance for both deductive 
and inductive inferences is another marked difference with Descartes who permits deductive 
inferences only (Pappas, 1998c, para. 7).  Locke defined knowledge as the perception of 
agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas (Pappas, 1998c, para. 2).  Of the three 
different kinds of knowledge under this definition, intuitive knowledge from perception was 
regarded by Locke as the most infallible as compared to demonstrative and sensitive 
knowledge because the mind perceived the agreement or disagreement of two ideas 
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immediately by themselves.  Sensitive knowledge was the most uncertain because it was the 
knowledge of the existence of external physical objects and belonged to a kind of inferential 
knowledge. Although Locke argues that people know directly our ideas, not things, he still 
fails to close the gap between knowledge and the world left by Descartes.  
 
The loophole in empiricism was taken to the extreme by David Hume (1711 – 1776), who put 
forward the problem of inductive inferences in such a skeptical or radical empiricist’s view 
that it was regarded a reaction to the dogmatism of the followers of Newton at the high time 
of the Industrial Revolution (Kenny, 2006, p. 154; Value of knowledge, n.d., para. 47). Hume 
inherited the empiricists’ tradition of Locke in maintaining that only impressions and ideas 
gained from perception provided the foundation of knowledge.  For propositions expressing 
relations of ideas such as arithmetic and algebra, he believed that they were intuitively or 
demonstratively certain as they were derived from the mere operation of thought and did not 
exist in the universe (Value of knowledge, n.d., para. 49).  However, for propositions 
expressing matters of fact such as “bread nourishes us” that was acquired only through 
experience, he casted doubts on the certainty of knowledge that expressed their causal 
relations.  In Hume’s view, senses only observe the sequence of events but not the causal 
forces of how one event affects the occurrence of another. A classic example is our belief that 
the sun will rise tomorrow.  The belief is based on past observations and no one can know for 
sure that the sun will rise tomorrow though this has been the case for the past billions of years 
because of the rotation of the earth.  To Hume, the idea of causation derived from inductive 
reasoning is a kind of habitual thinking or association of past experience that is not grounded 
with sufficient supporting evidence to prove that things will behave in a regular manner in 
future.   
 
 47 
Hume’s extreme empiricism on the uncertainty of the external world aroused much criticism 
in the decades to follow.  He “stabs at the heart of science”, whose mission is to build causal 
laws to ensure what can be expected to happen in future (Ferré, 1998, p. 155). Yet, Hume’s 
theory has practical implications for today’s knowledge creation as he reminds us to be 
cautious of “rational certainty”, the problem of relying on past experience to project future 
occurrences and the acceptance of factual claims without inquiring into the availability of 
supporting evidence.  The rise of EBM can be said to be a response to Hume’s idea of the 
need for evidentiary warrant.  
 
The endless tug of war between rationalism and empiricism for over a century and a half on 
the unresolved overarching problem of the nature of knowledge was taken to a new level in 
the 18th century when Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) attempted to synthesize both theories in 
his “transcendental idealism”, which was concerned with the method of establishing the 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge.  Such conditions were found in the mixed 
operation of senses and the mind; the former provided the idea of the representation of 
objects to the mind, the latter applied to objects conceptual structure available in the mind or 
what Kant called a priori elements which were independent of experience and immortal such 
as space and time (Kelly, 2004, p. 118; Weber, 1908, Critique of Sensibility, or 
Transcendental Aesthetic, para. 4).  In Kant’s words, “Without sensibility no object would be 
given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content 
are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” (Buroker, 2006, p. 77).  In other words, the 
mind is not a blank slate as empiricists argue and knowledge is not produced out of cognitive 
reasoning alone as rationalists believe.  The mind with a priori provides the necessary 
condition to transform all the sensory experience into subsequent knowledge.  These two 
theses are what make possible the synthetic a priori knowledge, the third category of 
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knowledge that Kant is most concerned with and that Hume has missed.  It refers to 
knowledge that arises in the mind but can be applied to real objects in the world.   Examples 
are mathematics, physics, metaphysics and all other scientific knowledge such as the 
proposition “heat expands bodies”.  These propositions are synthetic in the sense that they 
consist of two ideas, one gained from sensation: heat, expansion, bodies, and the other from 
reasoning: the causal relations between heat and bodies (Weber, 1908, Critique of pure 
reason, para. 7).  They are a priori as they are universal and necessary; they are true forever 
and independent of experience.  Kant believes that only this kind of knowledge provides true 
objective knowledge. He thus successfully rejects Hume’s extreme empiricism and places 
scientific knowledge in a secure foothold that Hume has attacked as unreliable.   
 
Kant also argued that human knowledge was limited to what was perceived in the 
phenomenal reality.  The mind could not extend understanding to objects not perceivable 
phenomenally, the noumena or what Kant called “things-in-themselves”.  By this critical 
philosophy, Kant has successfully left aside the unknowable world. 
 
By asserting that knowledge is the product of the cooperation between senses and the intellect, 
Kant has united the conflict between rationalism and empiricism in epistemological 
phenomenalism: that knowledge is limited to the phenomena.  But he never proves the 
existence of noumena. Many of his followers regard his Copernican turn incomplete and 
there are certain contradictions in his Critique, the resolution of which is the motive force of 
German idealism and leads to the rise of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) 
(Value of Knowledge, n.d., para. 75), who is one of the first major critics of Kantianism 
though he also shares many of Kant’s beliefs. 
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Hegel is both critical of the traditional empiricists’ claim to the immediate knowledge from 
physical objects and the rationalists’ a priori concept that has been the epistemological 
emphasis from Descartes to Kant (Rockmore, 2004, p. 131).  He is also against Kant’s 
transcendental idealism to dispense with things-in-themselves and demands the unity of 
transcendentalism and empiricism.  Like Kant, he believed that the actual process of knowing 
started from sense-certainty given by physical objects. Thus, he used the term 
“phenomenology”, meaning the study of “phenomena”.  From this point onwards, Hegel 
begins to diverge radically from Kant.  He regarded the sense-data as non-knowledge because 
it was included in consciousness in a non-articulated and disordered way (Limnatis, 2008, p. 
191). He devised the theory of dialectical reasoning as the only method for progress in human 
thoughts and knowledge.  In this method, a thesis and its conflicting idea, antithesis, will 
continually evolve into a higher third view, the synthesis, until the absolute truth or 
knowledge is achieved. This is best illustrated in his conceptualization of the “Subjective 
Spirit”, the self-knowing human being, which is the synthesis of self-consciousness of the 
“Concept”- all the thoughts that come to the human mind of an individual - and the “Nature”- 
all the objects that can be studied by the human mind.  In Hegel’s theory of knowledge, the 
process of knowledge starts when the object of “perception” is compared to one’s own 
criterion of knowledge based on prior experience in a historical moment for correspondence.  
The absence of correspondence leads to a new form of consciousness, the self-consciousness, 
which will alter both of our knowledge and the object, leading to a higher level of 
consciousness. This progression from one form of consciousness to another will continue 
until absolute knowledge is achieved when there is correspondence between the object and 
the subject and the highest level of reason is reached (Dancy, 1985, p. 230). In Rockmore’s 
(2004) comments, Hegel’s claims of knowledge are “justified through their relation to spirit 
understood as an impure, situated, contextualized, historical form of reason” (p. 133).  In this 
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process, the faculty of reason plays a crucial role as it explains all reality and thus "what is 
real is rational and what is rational is real".  It provides the cognitive source for the 
interpretation of the meaning of objects (Limnatis, 2008, p. 196).  Unlike Kant, Hegel 
conceives the object and subject as a single entity in which the object is at the same time 
knowledge of the subject about the object, each defining itself in others (Limnatis, 2008, p. 
193).  By the triad of the dialectic reasoning, the Subjective Spirit will evolve into the 
Objective Spirit and finally the Absolute Spirit which represents a comprehensive world-view 
encompassing the historical development of civilization in all of its forms.   
 
Though not widely recognized until recently (Rockmore, 2004, 2005, 2006; Westphal, 2003), 
Hegel is significant in the development of epistemology.  He strongly denies if not 
successfully closes the dualist-monist of subject and object and the rationalist-empiricist gaps 
(Value of Knowledge, n.d., para. 77; Ferré, 1998, p. 169).  This also paves the way for the 
recent wave of anti-Cartesianism.  His historical process of knowledge provides an 
alternative to the ancient Greek philosophy dominated by Platonic realism to address the 
problem of knowledge (Rockmore, 2004, p. 136). His doctrine of dialectical reasoning is 
quite controversial.  Mueller (1958, p. 413) provided strong evidence to argue that dialectic is 
not the scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis imputed to Hegel and who had not carried 
out the method with absolute consistency in all cases. Yet, although Hegel does not use these 
terms himself, the method does treat skeptical challenge not as a danger to be rebutted, but as 
a source of discovery, without which there is no progression from one form of consciousness 
to another (Dancy, 1985, p. 230). Hegel’s contribution is also found in the “intersubjective 
dimension of knowledge and its inherent historicity” (Limnatis, 2008, p. 371).  He is the first 
person to limit knowledge to phenomena situated in time and space by rejecting Kant’s 
representationalism, and, by his criticism on the empiricists’ claims to knowledge on mind-
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independent objects, turns the claims to know to become contextualized and dependent on 
prevailing view, attitude, conception and perspective that are subject to change (Rockmore, 
2004, p. 134).  This absolute idealism has substantial impact on the development of analytical 
philosophy and the phenomenological movement of the 20th century.  In fact, the sense-
making approach chosen as the research methodology of this thesis has its origin in 
phenomenology.   This will be delineated in more details in the following section. 
 
2.1.1.3 Contemporary Times 
In the 20th century, the age-old problem of defining knowledge was still open to debate.  But 
some significant features of “knowledge” have been emerging that provide some food for 
thought for contemporary philosophers and also KM researchers:  
 Propositional knowledge is still the central concern of epistemologists; there is no other 
type of knowledge that had been explored.  To differentiate between true propositional 
knowledge and mere belief, epistemologists contend vehemently on the best method of 
justification. 
 There is a possibility for the theory of knowledge.  The skeptical challenge to justify 
knowledge has been used by Hegel as the tool for knowledge discovery. 
 Different methods for deriving knowledge are developed: 
a. Inductive or empirical knowledge gained from one’s senses or experience or a 
posteriori 
b. Deductive knowledge derived from reason and intuition or a priori 
c. Reflective knowledge gained from introspective attention to the content and workings 
of one’s own mind 
d. Transcendental knowledge of conditions  
e. Phenomenal knowledge from phenomena 
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 Knowledge can be gained from different sources: perception and observation through 
senses, experience, introspection or reflection, memory, reason, and phenomena. 
 Besides scientific knowledge, knowledge can be situated and contextual. 
 Problem of the Cartesian split: the relation between subjective and objective components 
of the knowledge situation and whether anything will mediate the relation (Delanty & 
Strydom, 2003, p.5). 
 There are both knowable and unknowable worlds, which place limits on knowledge. 
 
There is no one definition and justification to claims to knowledge that encompass these 
conflicting and sometimes contradictory ideas.  The attempts of Kant and Hegel to reduce the 
epistemological gap cannot command consensus too. Philosophical thinking about knowledge 
began to shift to other directions in the early 20th century when the upheavals brought about 
by the two world wars, the rise of Communism in USSR and other European countries, the 
revolutionary development in physics and mathematics, and the rapid growth of human 
sciences like psychology and sociology set forth various attempts to overthrow certainties of 
the old knowledge systems and to explore possibilities of new approaches.  Delanty and 
Strydom (2003, p. 9) pointed out that there were four major epistemic shifts: logical, 
linguistic, pragmatic, and historical-cultural.  Kelly (2004, p. 59) summarized the change as 
the impossibility of metaphysics and the impossibility of absolute or certain knowledge. 
 
The first shift to the interpretive turn was evident in the rise of “phenomenology” that was 
founded by Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) as a new school of thought that was markedly 
distinguished from the conceptions of Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Brentano, all of 
whom had practiced phenomenology to some degree.  Husserl (1913/1967, pp. 114 - 115) 
understood phenomenology as the science of the essence of consciousness. This is a complex 
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theory involving psychology, logic, ontology and epistemology.  It can be interpreted from 
three perspectives (Smith, 2007, pp. 187 - 236; 2009).  First, it is subjective in nature, 
studying different forms of conscious experience immediately given in phenomena from the 
point of view of a first-person.  Phenomena “are things as they appear” (J. Smith, 2009, para. 
9); they are not limited to sensory experience as Husserl’s predecessors assumed but 
encompass a much broader range of phenomena including concepts, imagination, desire, 
thoughts, ideas, volition and so on as we experience things in the world around us.  Second, it 
is inter-subjective when a person is conscious and aware of others’ perception or, put in 
Husserl’s words, the other is “constituted” in a subject’s empathy.  Last but not the least is 
the objective contents of experience as reflected in the concept of “intentionality” which is 
the centerpiece idea of phenomenology and is the central structure in the essence of 
consciousness.  An act of consciousness is an experience or a perception that is always 
directed towards some objects other than itself; be they real or imaginary (Follesdal, 2003, 
para. 21).  Thus, consciousness is always of or about something.  Every act of consciousness, 
performed by a subject, carries a sense or content that prescribes the various features of an 
object it intends.  What the content prescribes is in turn constrained by a horizon of 
background of the subject.  Intentionality consists in this complex relation among subject, act, 
content, object and horizon.  In sum, phenomenology is essentially concerned with describing 
structures of intentional conscious experience, mine or others, that is directed towards things 
in the world and the meaning things have for us in different forms of experience. 
 
Husserl’s theory of knowledge is built upon the above account of phenomenology.  In 
reaction against psychologism and physicalism which ground human knowledge in purely 
psychological terms and physical sciences, Husserl conceives knowledge as the accumulation 
of beliefs formed through appropriate acts of judgment in the face of evidence gained by 
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perceptual observations or other intuitive experience (Smith, 2007, p. 319). In his view, 
intuition which is the means to gain evidential experience is the sole source of knowledge to 
the knower.  He develops various forms of intuitive experience.  The first level begins with 
sensory perception that grasps the object perceived in its bodily presence.  If the intuition is 
“fulfilled” in this given self-evidence in the sense that the object gets recognized or identified 
as being (or not being) what was earlier meant or thought (Pietersma, 2000, p. 42), 
knowledge of the object will be produced.  This knowing process is not simply “seeing” how 
things are, but an act of rational judgment to give meaning to things based on prior concepts 
and beliefs in support of intuitive evidence. This kind of epistemology is in fact a synthesis of 
epistemological paradigms of both rationalism and empiricism (Smith, 2007, p. 351). From 
Husserl’s point of view, knowledge is possible because by the conception of intentionality, 
the subject or the consciousness and the objects are so interrelated that there is no gap 
between the knower and the known as had been espoused by Descartes, Locke and Kant in 
their representational theories of knowledge.  Without any presuppositions or unbridgeable 
gulf in the subject-object relation, intuition is able to provide direct knowledge of objects, 
without inference from other judgments (Smith, 2007, p. 324). The Cartesian dualism is 
revised in this new phenomenological ontology that emphasizes the interrelatedness between 
subjects and objects (Howarth, 1998, para. 1). Kant’s noumena are rejected as it is beyond 
empirical cognition.  In addition, knowledge is characterized as situated in character as what 
motivates a person to seek knowledge is a situation when he is not satisfied with his grasp of 
an object (Pietersma, 2000, p. 42).  These concepts of situated knowledge and sense of 
fulfillment are all present in Dervin’s SMM, which will be analyzed in Chapter Three. 
 
Husserl further extends intuition from seeing physical objects to having essential insight 
about essences of truths or concepts such as triangularity and to phenomenological insight 
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about the essence of consciousness.  In his view, sensory perception is certain, but inadequate 
and nonapodictic.  Absolute knowledge can only be attained by turning to transcendental 
phenomenology through practicing a series of phenomenological “reductions”; the main ones 
being “epoché” and eidetic reduction.  By epoché, all judgments positing the existence of the 
objective world and all presuppositions of everyday consciousness are “bracketed off” or 
“reduced” in a way that would allow for a pure “intuition of essence” (Wolin, 2010, p. 12).  
By eidetic reduction, the essence is abstracted or discovered in phenomenological reflection 
and free imagination to reach the transcendental subjectivity and gain intuitive knowledge of 
essences (Smith, 2007, p. 330; Harrison-Barbet, 2009, para. 23). These reductions enable 
epistemologists to return really “to the things themselves” and to focus on the realm of 
phenomena they actually experience (Martinich & Stroll, 2010, p. 43).  The implication to 
epistemology is that when our knowledge depends on our lived experience in the phenomena, 
the skeptical challenge to the problem of sensation and the necessity of justifying knowledge 
is undermined (Howarth, 1998, para. 1).  On the whole, Husserlian phenomenology will also 
inform research methodology.  Walters (1995) examined its methodological implications on 
nursing research in four aspects: epistemology versus ontology, issues relating to validity, the 
involvement of the researcher and aspects relating to interpretation. 
 
Another important concept in Husserl’s epistemology is intersubjectivity, which is the 
process we come to know other people’s experiences and of cultural objects such as tools, 
artefacts, institutions and values so as to constitute a common world which we can experience 
from different perspectives (Smith, 2007, p. 322; Follesda, 2003, para. 56). Husserl is the first 
philosopher to bring up the importance of empathy, interaction and communication in this 
process.  These concepts are of much relevance in Devin’s SMM and also today’s KM 
discussion, particularly in knowledge sharing.      
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Later in the 1930s, Husserl re-conceptualized phenomenology with a shift towards more of 
the “existential” dimension of human knowledge as a reaction against relativism and 
irrationalism of his days.  This led to the decoupling of natural sciences with the basic 
knowledge of things in everyday life.  He turned to the concept of “lifeworld”, which 
recognized that all of our knowledge, in various domains including natural sciences like 
geometry and physics, depended in certain ways on our everyday experience of the 
surrounding world that was socially, culturally, and historically constituted (Smith, 2007, p. 
353).  With this theory, Husserl’s epistemology focuses more on consciousness and meaning 
in context, rather than on pure consciousness of a transcendental ego.      
 
Husserl’s theory of lifeworld became a major source of inspiration for the existentialists, 
particularly Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976), whose theory of “being in the world” (Dasein) 
emphasized “a close relationship between knowledge and action” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, 
p. 26).  Heidegger believed that human’s fundamental relation with the external world was 
practical rather than cognitive, and they constantly interacted with things of their everyday 
world.  Knowing therefore involved action.  J. Smith (2009, para. 23) illustrated the concept 
with the example that our understanding of the being of toothbrushes was manifested in the 
capacity of using toothbrushes.  This understanding, however, is implicit in the sense that it is 
difficult for us to articulate it conceptually. According to Heidegger, the tools were just things 
we used and our knowledge of them was secondary and derivative.  He emphasized that in 
phenomenology, practical knowledge embodied in know how was prior to propositional 
knowledge embodied in know that (Howarth, 1998, para. 2). It is the first time in the history 
of epistemology that knowledge is connected to action and not solely focuses on propositions.    
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In contrast to phenomenology as a traditional philosophical discipline, analytic philosophy 
led by English philosophers Bertrand Russell (1872 - 1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 
1951) in the early 20th century marked the logical turn in epistemology as it stressed the use 
of modern formal logic and unambiguous language in the pursuit of clarity in the treatment of 
philosophical issues.  Russell espoused pluralistic realism in revolt against Kantian and 
Hegelian idealism and assumed that all human knowledge must begin with sensory 
experience.  But he also believed that “logical principles, whether deductive or inductive, are 
not known on the basis of evidence from experience and all evidence from experience 
presupposes logical principles” (Moser, 1997, p. 203).  Thus, Russell’s empirical 
epistemology allows for some kind of a priori knowledge.  He also applies analytic methods 
to his epistemology and put forward his famous distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description and between knowledge of things and knowledge 
of true propositions as a method of justification to prove the possibility of knowledge (Moser, 
2010, p. 1730).  In this method, Russell argues that each questionable entity may be reduced 
to, or defined in terms of, another entity (or class of entities) whose existence is more certain 
(Irvine, 2010, para. 20).  Sense-data that makes up the appearance of things such as their 
color, shape, hardness, smoothness and the like was one kind of such certain entity that is 
known by acquaintance through direct awareness of objects without the intermediary of any 
process of inference or any knowledge of truths.  This is knowledge of things.  Since sense 
data constitutes all features of physical objects and that which cannot be known directly 
because our state of mind is not directly aware of the object but its sense data only, it follows 
that physical objects can only be known by inferences legitimately drawn from acquaintances. 
This is knowledge by description that requires some knowledge of true propositions in order 
to connect the object with things or its sense data with which we have acquaintance.   It is on 
this basis that Russell (1912, as cited in Chrucky, 1918) wrote, “All our knowledge, both 
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knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation” 
(para. 4).   Here, another kind of non-propositional knowledge - knowledge of things – is put 
forward after Husserl.   The trend of shifting towards practical knowledge is more explicit 
with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “activist” theory of knowledge (Shiner, 1977-1978, p. 105) that 
rests on the activity-based language games and forms of life.   
 
A representative figure in the linguistic stream of analytic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1889 – 1951) believed that traditional philosophical problems could be avoided by the 
appropriate application of ordinary language.  No longer upholding his early thinking of the 
picture theory of meaning and logical atomism as appeared in his first book Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein in later years realized how misleading it was to fix the meaning of a word to the 
object it names.  He came to define the meaning of a word as its use in language and spoke of 
“language games” to show the countless ways in which language could be applied.  Language 
games were defined as "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven" (Wittgenstein, 1953, no. 7).  Wittgenstein (1953, no. 23) provided a long list of 
activities a word might be used in everyday situations such as giving orders, describing the 
appearance of an object, supplying measurements, reporting an event, and so on.  The 
functioning of this myriad of uses depended on the condition that language games must have 
social components.  It was because if the language was private, another person could not 
understand it (Wittgenstein, 1953, no. 243).  Public language endowed words with meanings 
found within the social context of a shared relation so that a set of external criteria was 
available for their correct application.  The pragmatic dimension of language games further 
reflects a specific form of life, which consists of rule-following behavior of participants of 
the language games.  Like games, language has rules and they are formulated by agreement 
from members of any community to serve their own needs on the basis of their culture, 
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history, context, etc.  The agreement that people learn through their upbringing, education or 
training is reflected not just in opinions but also in judgments in order for communication to 
happen.  Forms of life become Wittgenstein’s ultimate practical “bedrock” which cannot be 
further explained, validated or grounded (Quirk, 2000, para. 3).  
 
Wittgenstein’s epistemology is closely connected to his philosophy of language.  He is not 
intended to give any definition of knowledge. His conception of knowledge is based on 
neither foundationalism nor coherentism (Shiner, 1977-1978; Bouchard, 2003; Rasmussen, 
1974) but is “coupled with that of language-game” (Wittgenstein, 1969, no. 560).  
Accordingly, knowledge is a kind of activity shown in actions and in what is said 
(Wittgenstein, 1969, no. 431). Pulido (2009, p. 29) illustrated this with the example of caring 
of a sick man.  A person’s knowledge of his sickness is shown in doing things like sitting 
next to his bed, holding his hand, trying not to aggravate his nerves, checking his temperature, 
and going out to purchase prescription drugs on his behalf.  It is further manifested in what he 
says: “He may never recover,” or “Does he have any last requests?”  What we act and we say 
are essentially determined in a context, a language game.  Thus, knowledge is contextualized.  
In addition, in the private language argument, knowledge is also objective in nature.  
 
With regard to skepticism, Wittgenstein maintains that it belongs to the horizon of knowledge 
for if there is no doubt, there is no knowledge either.  It is impossible to have doubt on X until 
there is some knowledge of X.  Doubting, however, must be made within the system of 
language games.  It must be based on evidence that something is not following rules.  The 
possibility of errors by future events is not counted as evidence for it only means that the new 
discovery alters the language games.  Along with doubts, there must be something taken for 
certain, the epistemological yardstick to judge the truth and falsity of propositions.  But it 
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should not be confused that certitude is a ‘surer’ form of knowledge; it is just “the necessary 
backdrop against which the language game of knowing, doubting and inquiring take place” 
(Martinich & Stroll, 2010, p. 45).  Wittgenstein regards propositions like “I have hands” or 
“the earth existed a long time before my birth” as part of the “world picture” that functions 
like “hinges” or grounds in which truth and falsity can be distinguished and how unfounded 
doubt can be removed.  They themselves are not susceptible to epistemic justification and 
exempted from doubt; they stand fast for us as common-language users.  It is like the bed of a 
river, which provides the support, the context, in which claims to know various things have 
meaning but the riverbed itself is not something we can know or doubt.  To Wittgenstein 
(1969, no. 378), knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement.  The acknowledgement 
is accomplished when the truth of certain empirical propositions renders possible social 
activities of a community.  This statement well concludes Wittgenstein’s thought on 
knowledge: “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the 
end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing 
on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (Wittgenstein, 
1969, no. 204).   
 
Although epistemology is not a central tenet in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, he has firmly 
established the close ties between knowledge and action that is in line with the trend in the 
20th century.  The pragmatists, pioneered by William James (1842 - 1910) and John Dewey 
(1859 - 1952), took this view further to reject theoretical truth and insist upon practice as the 
only criterion of truth.  Dewey defined knowledge as “a process of acting and being acted 
upon” (Martinich & Stroll, 2010, p. 23).  The pragmatic epistemology implicitly assumes that 
knowledge comes from empirical data on the basis of trial and error complemented with 
some heuristics or intuition.  A contrasting view on knowledge was, however, put forward by 
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Sir Karl Raimund Popper (1902 - 1994) in the position as a prominent epistemologist though 
he himself was primarily a philosopher of science.  Popper’s thoughts were extremely 
influential in the 20th century.  His epistemological works are one of the mostly highly cited 
and also have direct pertinence to KM (Wallace, 2007, p. 22).    
 
Unlike other phenomenologists, existentialists and positivists, Popper believed that 
knowledge itself was fallible, not justifiable, therefore it was provisional, hypothetical or 
conjectural (Corvi, 1993/1997, p. 45). It was objective in nature and would grow in an 
evolutionary manner.  All these conceptions are derived from his non-inductive epistemology 
and falsifiability principle.  The fallacy of inductive reasoning that the future would be like 
the past has been found to be logically flawed by Hume already.  Popper further asserted that 
inductive logic would further lead to an infinite regress of more inductive reasoning, which 
would result in another fallacy of begging the question.  His epistemology is to do away with 
induction altogether.  
 
In Popper’s view, no scientific theory can be discovered and proved by empirical evidence 
because no matter how many number of observations can absolutely confirm what one claims 
to know is the truth, only one counter instance will suffice to disprove it.  He is thus strongly 
against logical positivism as it rests its claim of knowledge on certainty and verification. He 
argued that knowledge would result only in deductive falsification through a process of 
“conjecture and refutations” or what Corvi (1993/1997, p. 19) called the method of trial and 
error.  Experiments and observations only test theories, not produce them.  Knowledge comes 
from the generation of tentative hypothesis about the reality from people’s imagination and 
creativity.  Only the principle of falsifiability is able to demarcate true hypothesis from false; 
or good science from pseudo science or non-science.  That is, any theory of knowledge will 
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not be accepted as scientific if it is not constructed in such a way that one can deduce certain 
consequences from that theory or hypothesis that is falsifiable through testing by experience. 
He attacked Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis because both failed to adhere to the 
principle of falsifiability. The claims to knowledge will be refuted if it fails the test or being 
falsified.  Those that are retained are assumed to be corroborated for further testing and 
falsification, and it is this most easily falsifiable theory that one should rationally prefer. 
Accordingly, knowledge can never be proven and verified; we can merely provisionally 
confirm or refute them.  Popper never believes in the classical position that knowledge is 
justified true belief; instead, he holds the exact opposite view: knowledge is unjustified 
untrue unbelief (Critical rationalism, 2010, para. 6).   This new school of thought of Popper 
is known as critical rationalism.  It represents “the first nonjustificational philosophy of 
criticism in the history of philosophy” (Bartley, 1999, p. 23).     
 
Knowledge is not just fallible but also improvable in Popper’s conception. Termed 
“evolutionary epistemology”, this alternative approach to epistemology specifies that the 
growth of knowledge proceeds from our problems and our attempts to solve them. Theories 
that are proved to be false to solve the problem should be abandoned while those that have 
eliminated errors of previous theories and thus become more capable to survive all the severe 
tests will be tentatively accepted as corroborated until “proven to the contrary”.  The 
continuous process of conjectures (tentative theories) and refutation (error elimination) will 
lead to the emergence of better and improved theories fitter for the problem at hand.  They 
are better knowledge and nearer to the truth than those that have been falsified; they are in the 
state of “truthlikeness” or “verisimilitude”.  But they are not absolute truth.  They never are 
and in fact there is no absolute truth in Popper’s philosophy.  Knowledge will grow, evolve 
and advance only in this modification of earlier knowledge (Corvi, 1993/1997, p. 45) and the 
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resulting one will come closer and closer to the truth.  It is much akin to Darwinism in which 
only the fittest in certain circumstances can survive. In each selection, species will evolve and 
develop more adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of 
survival (Karl Popper, 2010, para. 10).  Although Popper’s philosophy and epistemology are 
quite controversial, it is undeniable that his emphasis on critical thinking and the avoidance 
of dogmatism in the study of science contributes substantially to scientific progress.  Trial 
and error, and learning from mistakes are effective ways of creating knowledge too.  The 
theory that knowledge will grow over time is also a convincing argument to share rather than 
hoard knowledge.  
 
The growth of human knowledge and many of Popper’s epistemological ideas are exhibited 
in his famous Three Worlds cosmology.  World 1 is the world of physical objects such as 
books, computers, rocks and trees. World 2 is the mental or psychological states or processes, 
or of subjective experiences (Popper, 1978, p. 143). It refers to the subjective realm of 
thinking, feeling, believing and knowing of an individual (Urquhart, 1998, p. 421; Bawden, 
2002, p. 52). When a book, a World 1 object, is read by a person, it will give rise to 
understanding and feeling of the reader.  Two different persons reading the same book will 
have entirely different subjective World 2 experiences.  Thus, World 1 provides the source of 
knowledge for World 2, which is subjective in nature. It is very similar to Cartesian dualism.  
 
World 3 occupies the central position in Popper’s epistemology and “a crucial concept in 
understanding the growth of knowledge” (Bawden, 2002, p. 52)  It is the world of objective 
contents of thoughts which are abstract objects such as scientific theories, conjectures, 
problems, critical arguments, languages, stories, myths, tools, ethical values, social 
institutions, and works of art.   Popper’s scientific knowledge belongs to this world.  In sharp 
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contrast with World 2 knowledge, World 3 knowledge is entirely objective in nature in the 
sense that there is no human knower.  Knowledge exists in itself and is independent of the 
individual mind.  A document, be it a book or a report “contains objective knowledge 
regardless of the way in which the document was produced or stored, and regardless of how 
the document is used or even whether it is ever used” (Wallace, 2007, p. 24). This 
autonomous nature is of decisive importance for epistemology.  World 3 knowledge is the 
products of the human mind, the linguistic expression of World 2 thought processes.  Popper 
(1978, p. 161) illustrates this with the discovery of prime numbers, which is essentially a 
human product.  Here, one can see the evolution of knowledge from World 1 to World 2 and 
to World 3.  But this is not the end.  Once created, World 3 knowledge as expressed in some 
languages can be shared with others and thus it becomes a possible object of criticism. 
Knowledge claims or conjectures are now open to falsification, selection, and gradual 
refinement over time, making them “more useful in both solving problems and in generating 
new problems that can lead to further progress than beliefs [as a World 2 object] can” 
(Firestone & McElroy, 2003, p. 9).   This is how objective knowledge is created and 
improved from the subjective thought processes.  The agent holding the latter can be an 
individual, a team or an organization.  Thus, personal and organizational knowledge are 
created in largely the same mechanism.  This is the primary concern of KM practitioners. 
  
The evolution continues with the impact of the World 3 knowledge on the changes to the 
physical World 1.  Our minds create World 3 knowledge.  But World 3 in its turn will also 
inform our minds, causing them to think and to understand the reality better.  This grasping of 
the World 3 theory will again lead to human actions in an attempt to effect changes to the 
physical environment such as the making of atomic bomb as Popper often quotes.   World 3 
can indirectly exert its causal influence on World 1 but is impossible without World 2 acting 
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as the intermediary between the two worlds.  That is, in Popper’s (1978) words, “it is the 
grasp of the world 3 object which gives world 2 the power to change world 1” (p. 156). 
Human understanding, and thus the human mind, is indispensable in this process.  This is the 
whole of the evolutionary epistemology of Popper. 
 
Many contemporary philosophers have not embraced Three World cosmology owing to its 
resemblance to Cartesian dualism. Nevertheless, they are more receptive to World 1 and 
World 2 knowledge than World 3 (Firestone & McElroy, 2003; Wallace, 2007).  As 
summarized by Bawden (2002, pp. 53-54), the main objections were that World 3 was 
unnecessary and incomprehensible; that its content could not be related to more familiar 
physical objects and marginalized human component; and that the interactions between 
worlds was unclear.  Yet the same author found the concept valid in understanding EBM 
concepts (Bawden, 2002, pp. 54-59).  In his interpretation, the burgeoning information 
products in healthcare such as books, journals, databases, internet sites, e-mails and 
multimedia materials are World 1.  The existence of tacit and personal healthcare knowledge 
that is required in the practice of EBM and the display of its highly subjective and personal 
dimension proves the subjectivity of World 2.  The great reliance of EBM on the world of 
objective clinical knowledge in which new knowledge can be discovered, and rejection of 
justification of clinical practice by reference to authority provides strong validation for the 
idea of World 3.  Urquhart (1998) as well as Bawden (2007) attributed to some extent the 
philosophical foundation of information science to Three Worlds.  On the contrary, Shahar 
(1997) was not supportive of the validity of EBM concepts.  He questioned the scientificity of 
evidence in EBM from the perspective of Popper’s theory of logic and the falsifiability 
principle. 
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Popper’s Three World ontology has great implications for KM.  Hall (2005, p. 172) opined 
that Popper extended the concepts of knowledge in ways that informed the development of 
organizational knowledge theory, and brought out the key concepts of whether knowledge 
was something that could only be held in a person or exist independently from a person.  In 
addition, his World 2 and World 3 are regarded closely akin to the respective tacit and 
explicit knowledge concepts of his contemporary, Michael Polanyi. While it is natural to 
make such a comparison, Hall (2005) warned that these two philosophers had opposing foci 
in their epistemology.  The primary emphasis of Popper was on objective or explicit 
knowledge (World 3) while Polanyi focused on personal knowledge that Popper placed in 
World 2. Viewing from the nature of scientific discovery and the role of methodology, 
Richmond (1998) did not regard Popperian and Polanyian ideas as diametrically opposing to 
each other; on the contrary, they formed complementary theories of scientific knowledge. He 
argued that Popper was too concerned about what scientists did once they created new ideas 
while Polanyi was concentrated on how scientists created those new ideas.  He thought that 
the ongoing generation of theories depended on both implicit content of Popper’s objective 
knowledge to discover the hidden problems of explicit theories and Polanyi’s tacit dimension 
to produce solutions to these problems from one’s subsidiary awareness.  Firestone and 
McElroy (2003, pp. 21-22) provided a more thorough comparison of their ideas.  They 
pointed out that there was a third category of knowledge, implicit knowledge, which was 
implicit beliefs that, while not focal or explicit, are expressible given the environmental 
conditions effective in eliciting them. This three-way classification of knowledge was then 
compared to Popper’s World 2 and World 3.  They did not deny that Popper’s World 3 was 
all about explicit knowledge, but the implicit knowledge in the World 3 sense was different 
from that in World 2.  While World 2 was all about tacit knowledge, some World 2 
phenomena might represent objects that are implicit knowledge and some are even explicit 
 67 
beliefs.  At the same time, not all explicit statements were about World 3 objects such as the 
belief in the truth of the quantum theory and not all tacit knowledge was about World 2 such 
as the subjective knowledge about World 1 or World 3 objects.  Wallace (2007, p. 24) refuted 
the view that Popper’s third world consisted entirely of explicit knowledge.  In his opinion, 
“Popper’s integrated view of knowledge…suggests that all knowledge is inherently 
embedded, that either tacit or explicit knowledge can be either embedded or embodied, and 
that the distinction between embodied and disembodied knowledge is largely immaterial” 
(Wallace, 2007, p.25).   
 
Now comes to the last but obviously not the least epistemologist of the 20th century, Michael 
Polanyi (1891 - 1976).  Though he turned to philosophy in the late years of his life, Polanyi 
expounded much more than others on the nature of knowledge and challenged much more 
than others on modern as well as post-modern understandings of human knowing (Mead, 
2007, p. 298).  Polanyi’s knowledge theory is so influential on KM practitioners that he is the 
third most frequently cited author in the KM literature (Wallace, 2007, p. 16).  His tacit 
knowledge concept is borrowed most by KM theorists and sets the foundation for much of 
the theories of KM.  Despite his significance in KM, Polanyi was rarely acknowledged in the 
fields of philosophy and epistemology.  Sheppard (1999, para. 1) guessed that it might be due 
to the failure of Polanyi to give an account of his philosophy of science which was altogether 
separate from that of his more general philosophical concerns.  Or, as Mitchell (2006, p. 19) 
said, Polanyi’s approach might be so beyond the strictures of analytic philosophy that his 
ideas were largely invisible to British philosophers.  To a large extent, the surge in the 
interests of KM in the late 20th century and subsequently the works of Nonaka and Takeuchi 
led to the widespread recognition of some ideas of Polanyi.  But ironically it is also Nonaka 
and Takeuchi and many of their followers that misinterpreted Polanyi’s original argument. In 
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this section, Polanyi’s model of knowledge will be examined.  Nonaka and Takeuchi’s KM 
model will be reviewed in section 2.2 of this Chapter. 
 
What underlies Polanyi’s theory of knowledge is his complete rejection of “objectivism”, the 
most prevailing concept in his times.  He believed that knowledge was explicitly about truth, 
but a truth claim did not necessarily lend itself to total clarity and certainty that can be 
articulated, proved or verified with indisputable method of inquiry.  The objectivists’ ideal 
rooted in the Cartesian principle of doubt that had been prominent since the Enlightenment as 
the guiding principle to knowledge was found to be self-contradictory and thus was 
unattainable.  To Polanyi, objectivism emphasizes so much the quantitative measures that the 
role played by a knower in a theory of knowledge is largely ignored.  It also fails to recognize 
that, in reality, the truth is only an assertion of what people believe to be a “universal intent” 
based on trust and faith or what Polanyi terms a “fiduciary framework”.  In fact, Polanyi is 
convinced that “scientific discovery, more often than not, required bold commitments of faith 
and highly creative leaps of the imagination in directions that even the most elaborate 
methodologies could not anticipate, let alone prescribe” (Mead, 2007, pp. 302-303).  It 
naturally occurs to him that “discovery must be arrived at by the tacit powers of the mind, 
and its content” and that there are no firm rules to account for the way a good idea is 
developed for starting an inquiry or verifying and refuting a proposed solution of a problem 
(Polanyi, 1969b, p. 138).  Polanyi called this tacit powers of the mind as tacit knowing which 
lies at the heart of his “post-critical philosophy” that was developed as an opposition to the 
prominence of critical philosophy of objectivists.   
 
Polanyi’s tacit knowing is based on the part-whole perception model derived from Gestalt 
psychology which has demonstrated the successful integration of all particulars of a pattern 
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into a single object whole for instant recognition.  Accordingly, Polanyi (1969b) takes as his 
basic assumption in scientific knowing the ‘trained perception’ of scientists in “discerning 
gestalten that indicate a true coherence in nature” (p. 138).  And fundamental to this tacit 
apprehension of coherence is two kinds of awareness: focal and subsidiary. They are 
mutually exclusive as well as mutually dependent in their operations.  Focal awareness 
constitutes the immediate conscious object of people’s attention.  This is what Grene calls 
“knowledge by attending to” (Polanyi, 1969d, p. ix).  All focal awareness is impossible 
without dwelling in subsidiary awareness which lies outside people’s immediate 
consciousness but, with the help of both subliminal and marginal clues, stands in the 
background to make attending to the focal target possible (Mitchell, 2006, p. 71). It is for this 
reason that Grene called subsidiary awareness “knowledge by relying on” (Polanyi, 1969d, p. 
ix).  Tacit knowing is the act of integration of the subsidiary and focal awareness, which 
works jointly towards the elucidation of a comprehensive entity and contributes to all kinds 
of understanding (Polanyi, 1969b, p. 140).  When a person concentrates his attention focally 
on the total image of an entity, its particulars tend to become submerged in the whole or 
become tacit.  The entity is seen because its particulars are tacitly or subsidiarily integrated 
into the coherent image (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 125).  A well-known example is the recognition 
of a human face. All the particular facial features are combined to produce a specific 
physiognomy. The particulars of the physiognomy are known only subsidiarily and this 
subsidiary awareness assists a person to focus his attention on the whole face so that it can be 
recognized immediately.   This process of tacit knowing is best summarized in the famous 
phrase “we can know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4). The person who 
recognizes the human face instantly from a specific physiognomy cannot explain how he 
knows because the subsidiary awareness of particulars may not suffice to make them 
identifiable (Polanyi, 1969b, p.142).  The same holds true for the performance of many daily 
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and professional activities.  These include acquisition of physical skills like riding a bicycle, 
playing piano, and learning medical diagnoses; use of tools like a probe for exploring the 
interior of a hidden cavity; visual perception; the pattern detection skills characteristic of 
experts; mastery of tests; the utterance of speech; and the use of language (Polanyi, 1962, p. 
49; pp. 55-56; 1969a, pp. 123-127; 1969c, pp. 182-183; 1966, pp. 3-7, Gourlay, 2002, p. 9; 
Mitchell, 2006, pp. 72-74).  Polanyi attributes this ability to the heuristic power of the mind 
in which the process of unconscious trial and error will help the person feel the way to 
success without specifically knowing how to do it. 
 
Another characteristic of tacit knowing is that the person is “projecting from and through that 
multitude of particulars to the focal image” he can explicitly recognize (Mead, 2007, p. 306).  
But he is not merely looking at the object; tacit knowing requires the person to look from the 
proximal term that defines the object to a distal term which is its meaning (Wallace, 2007, p. 
17).  Polanyi describes this tacit knowing as a from-to relationship.  If the relationship is 
reversed, that is, the attention is shift from the total image to the particulars of a 
comprehensive entity, the coherence of the image will be lost.  The result is that a pianist is 
likely to get confused and has to suspend when he becomes conscious of the specific 
movement of his figures on the keyboard instead of the music he is playing, and a speaker to 
have “stage-fright” if he just concentrates on the individual word to be told because this 
attention to the subsidiary particulars “destroys one’s sense of context which alone can 
smoothly evoke the proper sequence of words, notes, or gestures” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 56).   
 
Polanyi compares the "from-to relationship" to what a person feels between parts of his body 
and things external to the body and comes up with his view that knowing is an indwelling.  
As the body is the only thing a person never feels as an object in the process of subsidiary 
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awareness, the person must dwell in for attending focally to an object that lies outside the 
body.  In other words, we are extending from our body to outside in order to achieve the act 
of integration. The body provides the root of the proximal element for merging with the distal 
element.  Thus, in Polanyi’s (1966) view, “our body is the ultimate instrument of all our 
external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical” (p. 15).  This indwelling theory directly 
addresses the problem of Cartesian split between body and mind.  Furthermore, the from-to 
nature of tacit knowing implies the presence of a human knower who exercises his personal 
judgment to integrate both subsidiary and focal awareness to achieve the target of knowing.  
The exercise of personal judgment relies essentially on a person’s bodily sensation and is thus 
a skillful performance that “is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not 
known as such to the person following them” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 49).  Thus, for Polanyi, all 
knowing is personal knowing requiring the continued participation of the knower through 
indwelling. It is neither objective in the sense that it is guided by individual passions nor 
subjective in the sense that it submits to facts as universally valid.  In fact, it transcends the 
objective-subjective disjunction “by affirming at once both the personal element in all 
knowing and the objective reality toward which all knowledge strives” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 99).   
 
The above clearly illustrates that in Polanyi’s conception, the art of knowing and doing are so 
inextricably blended together that they cannot be exercised in isolation.  Hence, knowledge is 
defined as “an activity which would be better described as a process of knowing” (Polanyi, 
1969a, p. 132).  In fact, Polanyi speaks much more of knowing than the common term 
“knowledge”.  Gourlay (2002, p. 8) counted that he used “tacit knowing” approximately five 
times more than “tacit knowledge” in his books Knowing and Being and The Tacit Dimension.  
What Polanyi (1966) understands from Gestalt psychology about knowledge is that it is not a 
result of a passive process of integrating the subsidiary awareness with the focal awareness, 
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but “the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge” 
(p. 7).  This process view of tacit knowledge means that it covers both practical and 
theoretical knowledge; or what Gilbert Ryle (1900 – 1976) calls the “knowing how” and 
“knowing what” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 7).  Both of these two aspects of knowing share a similar 
structure of knowing - tacit integration or active shaping of experience - that comes from “the 
tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 6).   
 
At the heart of Polanyi’s knowledge theory, all knowledge falls into two classes, it is “either 
tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 1969c, p. 195), and thus our knowledge may 
“include far more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 133).  The knowledge that is “capable 
of being clearly stated” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 22) is termed “explicit knowledge” while the 
knowledge that “cannot be explicitly stated” (Polanyi, 1969b, p. 141) is known as “tacit 
knowledge”.  This criterion of articulation used by Polanyi is taken superficially by many 
KM theorists as the only means to distinguish between tacit and explicit knowledge. They fail 
to recognize their intricate relations that Polanyi (1969a) described in this statement:  
We have seen tacit knowledge to comprise two kinds of awareness, subsidiary 
awareness and focal awareness.  Now we see tacit knowledge opposed to explicit 
knowledge, but these two are not sharply divided.  While tacit knowledge can be 
possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and 
applied.  Hence all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.  A wholly 
explicit knowledge is unthinkable. (p. 144) 
Polanyi has never laid down an exact definition of “explicit knowledge”; again Gourlay 
(2002, p. 10) found that he only occasionally mentioned the term in Knowing and Being and 
The Tacit Dimension.  From these works, explicit knowledge can be referred to as a 
communication, specifically a letter, all spoken words, all formulae, all maps and graphs that 
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are arrived at by explicit inference (Polanyi, 1969c, pp. 144 - 145). Similarly, Grene (Polanyi, 
1969d) conceptualized explicit knowledge as “crystallized in the formalisms of words, 
pictures, formulae, or other articulate devices” (p. xv). Yet, the meaning behind these objects 
is still tacit.  In fact, tacit knowledge will act as the background to make possible the explicit 
dimension of human knowledge.  It is erroneous for most contemporary KM theorists to take 
the view that tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are dichotomous.  Decisions can be 
made at an explicit level, but to Polanyi (1966, p. 21), the ideal of a strictly explicit 
knowledge that would eliminate all tacit knowing is indeed self-contradictory and logically 
unsound.  Tacit knowing is fundamental to all kinds of knowledge; it “creates explicit 
knowing, lends meaning to it and controls its uses” (Polanyi, 1969b, p. 156).  Hence, explicit 
knowledge is rooted in tacit knowledge.  Without the tacit dimension of “what we cannot 
tell”, the explicit knowledge of “what we can tell” is strictly meaningless.  Since explicit 
knowledge and tacit knowledge cannot be sharply divided, they are not something amenable 
to conversion as in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s SECI model.  Yet, they can be transferred and 
some tacit knowledge can also be made more explicit through language and dialogue.  
Polanyi’s tacit and explicit knowledge as spelt out in his Personal Knowledge (pp. 87-101) 
can be conceptualized in Figure 2.2 that is drawn by Grant (2007, p. 177).   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Polanyi’s Concept of Tacit and Explicit Knowledge (Grant, 2007, p.177) 
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It is unfortunate that the intricate relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge has 
largely been lost when they are applied to the domains of KM and other related fields 
(Wallace, 2007, p. 18).  Such misunderstanding can be seen from the following long list of 
commonly perceived characteristics of tacit knowledge that were synthesized by Crowley (as 
cited in Wallace, 2007, p.19): 
- Personal in origin 
- Valuable to the possessor 
- Job specific 
- Difficult to fully articulate 
- Both known in part and unknown in part to the possessor 
- Transmitted, where transmission is possible, through interpersonal contact 
- Operative on an organizational level 
- Applied, in part, through “if-then” rules  
- Capable of becoming explicit knowledge and vice versa 
- Intertwined with explicit knowledge along unstable knowledge borders 
- Poorly reflected in contemporary knowledge literature 
Wallace (2007, pp. 19 - 21) found that most of the above characteristics were not supported 
by Polanyi’s works and those that could be supported were through inference only.  He 
provided lots of counter arguments to many of these common misconceptions and attacked 
that some were difficult to interpret such as “tacit knowledge is both known in part and 
unknown in part to the possessor”, “tacit knowledge is intertwined with explicit knowledge 
along unstable knowledge borders” and “tacit knowledge is applied in part through ‘if-then’ 
rules”.  He only admitted that tacit knowledge was context-specific but this was essentially 
trivial and that it was capable of becoming explicit knowledge but questionable on the reverse. 
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An outgrowth of Polanyi’s tacit knowing is his concept of scientific discovery.   It is often 
claimed that Polanyi’s ideas have many parallels with Wittgenstein’s theory including the 
recognition of the importance of tacit knowledge and its root in bodily activities, the stress on 
indwelling and the view on the question of skepticism (Gill, 1974, pp. 286 - 288; Gourlay, 
2000, p. 8; Gourlay, 2002, p. 8).  From my point of view, there are even more parallels with 
the theory of Dervin.  First, Dervin’s emphasis on “verbing” is similar to Polanyi’s talk of 
tacit knowing. Second, Polanyi’s ideas of problem-solving and the corresponding scientific 
discovery also share many similarities with Dervin’s SMM.  These two models are mapped in 
Figure 2.3 below to reveal their parallels. 
 
 
 
 
Polanyi named the method of discovery as sense giving and sense reading.  The terms so 
picked closely resemble that of “sense-making” and “sense-unmaking” adopted by Dervin. 
Polanyi (1969a, p.133) believed that what accounts for tacit knowing was the presence of an 
external reality with which people could establish contact and all true understanding was an 
Figure 2.3  Putting Polanyi’s Concept of Scientific Discovery in the Perspective of 
Dervin’s Sense-Making Triangle 
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intimation of such a reality.  This means that tacit knowledge is something awaiting to be 
discovered, the process of which is unspecifiable.  Polanyi (1969b, p. 143) termed this 
process as “discovery without awareness”.  Discovery takes place in four separate stages: 
preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification (Polanyi, 1962, p. 121).   
 
The first stage is the appreciation of a problematic situation.  Polanyi thinks that to see a 
problem is to see something hidden.  Whether a true problem is seen depends on how well the 
coherence of the hitherto uncomprehend particulars are intimated (Polanyi, 1966, p. 21).  In 
Dervin’s SMM, the person is facing a gappy situation that blocks his movement in time-space 
so that he needs to construct a new “reality” by taking into consideration all the constraints 
facing him.  The second stage of incubation takes the person to have “a deepened sense of the 
nature of things and an awareness of the facts that might serve as clues to a suspected 
coherence in nature” (Polanyi, 1969b, p. 143). At the same time, this is also a more relaxed 
period by not attending to the problem directly in the hope that through the work of the 
subconscious some new ideas may emerge.  A feasible solution will then be conceived in the 
third stage of illumination to cross the “logical gap” between the particulars of a problem and 
its solution.  It is like bridging the gap in Dervin’s SMM.  But for Polanyi, the strategy 
available to the knower is purely his own “intuition” or “foreknowledge”.  Intuition is “a skill 
for guessing with a reasonable chance of guessing right; a skill guided by an innate sensibility 
to coherence, improved by schooling” (Polanyi, 1997, 257).  It gives a person a deepening 
sense of coherence, which will tell him / her unconsciously where to go and where to stop.  
Although this method does not guarantee correctly all the time, Polanyi (1997) felt that “a 
method for guessing 10% above average chance on roulette would be worth millions” (p. 
258), and thus it is “different from the supreme immediate knowledge called intuition by 
Leibniz or Spinoza or Husserl” (pp. 257 - 258).  This intuition works with imagination as 
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well.  Once the problem is identified, it is the imaginative power of a knower that will be 
thrust forward to search for clues either by speculation or experimentation.  It is then 
integrated by intuition into new surmises to get the problem solved. Intuition thus stands for a 
series of integrative acts that will take place at any stage of scientific inquiry (Polanyi, 1969c, 
p. 201).  The dynamics of tacit knowing is kept moving by this combination of intuition and 
imagination.  In Dervin’s SMM, a lot more strategies can be applied to “bridge” the gap 
through sense-making and unmaking; imagination and intuition are just two of them.  Finally, 
the possible solution will be subjected to verification, which is accomplished by a random 
trial and error until a proven solution is found.  At this stage, the person will be endowed with 
new discoveries and insights, like gaining a foothold at another shore of reality (Polanyi, 
1962, p.123).  This is the outcome or uses in Dervin’s sense-making triangle.   
 
Polanyi likens the whole process of knowledge discovery to the sequential work of sense-
giving and sense-reading.  Sense-giving is to integrate and endow with meaning things of 
which we possess only subsidiary awareness while sense-reading is involved in tacit semantic 
acts (Polanyi, 1969c, p.184, 187).  We make sense of a problem through sense-reading to 
obtain clues to understand the problem and the clues are endowed with meaning by 
integrating them into a possible whole with the help of our imagination and intuition in order 
to give sense to the problem so that some feasible solutions will come up in the final stage of 
sense-reading.  Our past experience and education will help understand familiar experience 
and absorb new situations.  The close resemblance of ideas between Polanyi and Dervin 
provides another justification for the adoption of Dervin’s SMM as the research framework 
of this study.  
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The above method of knowledge discovery is closely associated with Polanyi’s view of the 
external reality, which resolves the long-standing Meno’s paradox of Plato. To Polanyi, the 
reality is full of infinite richness, which will produce unexpected manifestations of which 
people have just tacit foreknowledge.  We are able to recognize a hidden problem because of 
the appreciation of this indeterminate reality with unthinkable consequences.  The fact that 
there is undisclosed future and intuition is a skill that is liable to errors means that “knowing 
is both fallible and colored by personal experiences” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 85).   
 
Other Polanyian concepts that are relevant to KM are the method of acquiring and sharing 
knowledge.  Polanyi pointed out that subception or implicit learning is the principal 
mechanism by which tacit knowledge is acquired.  The psychological experiment of Lazarus 
and McCleary in 1949 and that of Eriksen and Kuethe in 1958 were used to illustrate that a 
person could anticipate an electric shock at the sight of the “shock syllables” or forestall the 
shock by avoiding the utterances of “shock words” without knowing how he learnt such 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1966, pp. 7 - 8).  Implicit in this “learning without awareness” is the 
need to acquire knowledge through apprenticeship and practice.  Polanyi (1962) stated,  
By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the 
apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not 
explicitly known to the master himself.  These hidden rules can be assimilated only by 
a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another.  
A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to 
tradition. (p. 53)   
In asking people to submit to the authority of a master, Polanyi confirms the importance for a 
student to indwell in a practice he does not understand at first but will gradually progress to 
clarity until he learns the trick as to what his master did.  It is much like learning 
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connoisseurship, which can only be communicated by example, not by precept.  Another 
implication is that if learning a skill requires imitating what others are practicing, it must have 
a tradition to be transmitted to and the willingness of the people belonging to that tradition to 
pass it on to others.  Here lies the importance of knowledge sharing and the underlying need 
for articulate communication.  Thus, for Polanyi, “knowing is not merely social; it is 
communal, for traditions persist only in communities that embrace, whether tacitly or 
explicitly, a particular tradition as an orthodoxy” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 68).  This concept also 
paves the way for the development of COP as one of the most popular tools of KM.  
 
Polanyi exerts a profound impact on the KM movement.  Grant and Grant (2008) commented, 
“In many ways, Polanyi can be seen as a bridge between the philosophical works on 
knowledge and the beginnings of an approach to the explicit role and use of knowledge in 
business communities” (pp. 573-574).  He is the first person to put forward in an explicit 
manner several important concepts relating to the nature of knowledge.  Echoing the thoughts 
of Ryle, Polanyi argued for the epistemological relevance of both theoretical and practical 
knowledge using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle.  He also 
followed the line of thoughts of some of his preceding epistemologists to associate 
knowledge with action and defined knowledge as a knowing process shaped by personal 
experience, which was rich in tacitness that could not be articulated in most of the time.  His 
theory on “tacit knowledge” forms an indispensable foundation for the understanding of 
clinical reasoning and the implementation of EBM, as has been clarified in Chapter One.  
 
Following Polanyi is Timothy Williamson (1955 - ) who not only acknowledges that a person 
is not in a position to know whether he knows something, but also takes a step further to 
study the relationship between evidence and knowledge.  He argues that one’s total evidence 
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is simply the totality of what one knows (E=K thesis) and subsequently develops a related 
theory of evidential probability in which the evidential probability of a hypothesis for a 
subject is its probability conditional on the subject’s knowledge (T. Williamson, 2010, p. 
201).  This means that one should proportion one’s belief in a proposition to the support it 
receives from one’s knowledge (Williamson, 2000, p. 188).  This approach is a form of 
objective Bayesianism, which holds that appropriate degrees of belief are largely, though not 
entirely, determined by the subject's evidence (J. Williamson, 2010). Since one does not 
always know what one knows, updating on new evidence because of error in prior knowledge 
permits propositions to gain as well as to lose probability, and this will not affect the E=K 
thesis. Under this model, evidence plays the role of falsification and Bayesian confirmation 
of hypothesis. Williamson also uses formal semantic theories of natural languages to argue 
against Ryle that all knowing-how is knowing-that instead of knowing-how being a species 
of knowing-that (Stanley & Williamson, 2001).  
 
Two features of Williamson’s epistemology are relevant to the implementation of EBM.  
First, the total evidence requirement points directly to the weakness of EBM to equate 
evidence solely with scientific knowledge and the increasing need for it to broaden its base of 
evidence.  Second, the practice of EBM requires making rational decisions amongst a set of 
possible actions associated with a set of possible consequences.  The Bayesian principles are 
able to provide a logical and quantitative approach to make sense of the uncertainty and 
probabilities in decision-making.   
 
To continue the trend of recognizing that knowledge is social and communal, social 
epistemology emerged in the latter half of the 20th century as an approach to epistemology 
that examines the social and interpersonal dimensions of knowledge in contrast to the 
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individualistic flavor of traditional epistemology (Goldman, 2010, p. 82).   Its origin can be 
traced back to Thomas Kuhn’s (1922 – 1996) groundbreaking works The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions in which his account of normal and revolutionary science provides 
myriads of influential examples of a social analysis of science.  It has been claimed that Kuhn 
found much of his insights from the social construction component in Polanyi’s tacit knowing 
and his works on problem solving (Henry, 2010, p. 294).   
 
There is as yet little consensus on the method of investigation of social epistemology, 
resulting in different trajectories in the field.  The more classical approach can be regarded as 
an extension of the traditional epistemology and thus it aims at studying the role of social 
processes in determining whether a person has justified belief (Goldman, 2010, para. 8). 
Another version of the classical approach calls for studying the circumstances a person is 
justified in accepting the statement and opinions of others, and the nature of collective 
knowledge.  The radical approach rejects objective norms of rationality and holds that a new 
socialized successor is needed.  It does not accept that scientific facts are out there to be 
discovered, and insists that knowledge must be socially constructed or created. This view is 
later developed into “social constructivism”, or "constructionism", which proposes new 
definitions for knowledge to form a new paradigm, based on inter-subjectivity instead of the 
classical objectivity, and on viability instead of truth.  Representing the weaker stream, Steve 
Fuller (1959 - ) is interested in understanding what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or 
that community.  He seeks to identify the social forces and influences responsible for 
knowledge production such as universities.  The new conception of knowledge brought about 
by the social epistemologists brings new awareness to KM practitioners that knowledge can 
be a social product and their attention is also shifted to the collective forces in organizations 
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and the process by which people are engaged for knowledge creation and sharing in 
organizations.  
 
To conclude, it is clear from this historical overview of the epistemology that it is impossible 
to arrive at a single unified definition of knowledge.  There was controversy between 
rationalists and empiricists; disagreement between foundationalists and coherentists; and 
argument between internalists and externalists. In the 20th century, epistemology ran into 
several lines of development. The political, social and economic upheaval of the time and the 
dramatic growth of social science all brought new thoughts and directions to epistemologists.  
The phenomenologists, existentialists, positivists, analytical philosophers, pragmatists and 
philosophers of science all have attempted to explore in-depth the stone-age problem of what 
knowledge is.  Indeed, many present-day conceptions of knowledge could attribute their 
origins to this long tradition of exploration.  Below is a summary of the philosophical 
concerns in relation to KM:    
1. Plato’s justified-true-belief definition of knowledge still holds much value in the hearts of 
most epistemologists.  Even now, most agree that knowledge is based on belief and faith, 
though they vary on the method of justification.  There is growing recognition amongst 
contemporary epistemologists that knowledge involves action and language.   
2. Apart from propositional knowledge, there are many other types of knowledge including 
tacit versus implicit versus explicit; theoretical versus practical; know-how versus know-
what (know-that); knowledge by acquaintance versus knowledge by description; personal 
versus organizational.  This represents reconciliation between natural and human sciences. 
3. Knowledge involves a relation between the subject and the world, the knower and the 
known.  It has both a subjective and an objective side.  It has long been believed that there 
is an objective reality out there.  But the role of the knower is increasingly emphasized 
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leading to personal knowledge and finally social constructivism that regards knowledge 
to be socially constructed. 
4. Besides objectivity and subjectivity, knowledge is also thought to be situational, fallible, 
provisional, conjectural, changing and relative.  It must be verified and falsified and it 
grows in an evolutionary manner.   
5. More sources of knowledge are examined.  In addition to perception, observation, 
introspection, empirical evidence, reason, memory and lived experience in the 
phenomena, there is knowledge discovery associated with problem-solving using intuition, 
imagination, insight, and trial and error as some indispensable strategies.  Knowledge can 
also be acquired through apprenticeship and practice. 
6. Although Polanyi led the way to the process of knowing, the developments in 
neuroscience such as brain imaging and the analysis of the placebo effect and later 
artificial intelligence in the 1950s that conceived the nervous system as a logical structure 
and the cognitive system as a machine for information processing probably lend more 
weight to the process of knowing and what is involved in that than on knowledge itself.  
They also exert a strong influence on organizational behavior.  
7. Knowledge is increasingly inter-subjective and socially contextualized; communication is 
essential in the process.  
 
The historical account of epistemology alone cannot provide a firm foundation for the 
theoretical development of the conception of knowledge without understanding how 
knowledge is conceptualized in the contemporary KM literature.  As can be seen in Table 2.1 
on pp. 36 – 37 above, there are fragmented as well as divergent views on the nature of 
knowledge.  In the following section, the current perspectives on knowledge and the 
respective approaches to KM in organizations will be examined using a paradigmatic 
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approach.  The review will focus primarily on the underlying assumptions and characteristics 
of each perspective and their impact on how knowledge is managed.  Finally, a working 
definition of knowledge for this study will be mapped out in the last section. 
 
2.1.2 Current Studies on the Nature of Knowledge and Approaches of KM 
The current studies on the concept of knowledge evolve around its heterogeneous and multi-
dimensional nature.  From the above epistemology review, knowledge can be personal, tacit, 
sticky, lumpy, leaky, codified, embedded, embodied, contextual, capital, competency and 
informate (Shariq, 1998, p.11).  It can also be subjective, objective or inter-subjective.  
Sometimes, it denotes an entity of justified true belief; sometimes, it refers to a process of 
knowing that underlies the need for action and language.  Besides its epistemological level, 
knowledge can be viewed from an ontological perspective.  It can reside in a person’s mind 
while at the same time get nurtured in community or social groupings, though in the realm of 
KM, the primary concern is on organizational knowledge than individual knowledge. In view 
of these myriads of understandings, various attempts had been made to establish an integrated 
framework to organize the literature for more in-depth study. 
 
One attempt takes a historical approach to divide the development of the concept of 
knowledge and KM approaches into different generations.  There are Koenig and Neveroski’s 
(2010) four-stage view of KM, Snowden’s (2007) third generation KM, Firestone and 
McElroy’s (2002) Second Generation Knowledge Management and Grant and Grant’s (2008) 
composite model of next generation KM that is derived from theories of these scholars as 
well as those of Sveiby and Wiig.  Knowledge was defined differently in these different 
historical stages.  Arguably, this generation framework provides a clear timeline for the 
understanding of the concept of knowledge and the approaches of KM.  However, there is no 
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consensus in the literature on the exact commencement of the KM movement.  Underlying 
the historical framework is an implicit assumption that the concept and the subsequent 
approaches of managing knowledge can be so easily identifiable in each of these generations 
that the evolution of KM can be neatly chopped up into different periods of time.  This is 
hardly sustainable given the fact that there is no truly one form of knowledge at any given 
time (Spender, 1998b, p. 236).  On the contrary, many competing perspectives and schools of 
thoughts may coexist simultaneously.   
 
Hazlett, McAdam and Gallagher (2005, p. 33) strongly favor undertaking a paradigmatic 
analysis to understand the myriad of perspectives associated with knowledge, generate a 
viable integrated interdisciplinary research directions and provide a basis for comparative 
analysis.  The term “paradigm” means a general perspective or way of thinking that reflects 
fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of phenomena (Kuhn, 1967, as cited in 
Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 585).  Apparently, a paradigmatic analysis that offers a generic 
approach to reveal the underlying assumptions and characteristics of knowledge is more 
compatible with the purpose of this research.   Furthermore, I also support the view of Gioia 
and Pitre (1990) that “theory building, and knowledge are essentially epistemic, in other 
words, they are paradigm-based” (p. 587). Hence, the seemingly disparate perspectives on 
knowledge will be mapped into appropriate research paradigms for analysis.   
 
Various categorizations of research paradigms were reported in the literature (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Schultze & Stabell, 2004; Hazlett, McAdam, & Gallagher, 2005; Guo & 
Sheffield, 2008; Hislop, 2009).  The first is Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) four-paradigm 
scheme comprising functionalist, interpretivist, radical structuralist, and radical humanist 
paradigms for social and organizational inquiry. These paradigms are organized along the 
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subjective-objective and regulation-radical change dimensions.  In adaptation of this model, 
Deetz (1996) adopted the dimensions of “origin of concepts and problems” (local/emergent 
versus elite/a priori) and “relation to dominant social discourse” (dissensus versus consensus) 
to classify research in organization science into four discourses instead of paradigms, namely, 
normative, interpretive, dialogic, and critical. This discourse framework was later taken up by 
Schultze and Leidner (2002) to study knowledge and KM in information systems research.  
In recognition of the weakness of applying the dimension of local/emergent versus elite/a 
priori to the study of KM, Schultze and Stabell (2004) introduced a new epistemology 
dimension of duality-dualism continuum and, in order to highlight that the epistemology 
dimension was different from that of the previous, relabeled Burrell and Morgan’s 
functionalist and interpretivist paradigms into neo-functionalist and constructivist discourses 
respectively while retaining the Deetz’s labels for the remaining two. This becomes a new 
four-discourse framework for KM research.   
 
Three major research paradigm schemes are grouped in Figure 2.4 in different text colors to 
compare the paradigms and classification dimensions used.  It is found that although different 
dimensions are adopted to categorize research paradigms, the resulting classifications are 
quite similar to each other in terms of their underlying philosophical views and assumptions.  
Yet, as Hislop (2009, pp. 16-17) discovered and showed in Table 2.2, different terminologies 
are used to describe the same paradigm. As the labels for research paradigms continue to 
evolve and the paradigms are also classified along different dimensions, it is difficult to 
verify which labels describe the paradigms more succinctly.  To avoid this terminology 
confusion, and considering that these paradigms bear very similar epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, it is more revealing to group them by their philosophical views 
instead.  Positivism and interpretivism are frequently identified in the literature as the two 
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most predominant paradigms for KM research (Guo & Sheffield, 2008, p. 675; Sheffield, 
2009; Hazlett, McAdam, & Gallagher, 2005, p. 36; Higgs & Titchen, 1995; Meyer & 
Suglyama, 2007; Venters, 2001).  Another paradigm, “critical inquiry”, is also included in 
order to illustrate the power relations problem in KM that is relevant to this research 
(Sheffield, 2009; Guo & Sheffield, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.4 Comparisons of Different Research Paradigm Schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) four-paradigm scheme 
(b) Deetz’s (1996) four discourses of organizational inquiry 
(c) Schultze and Stabell’s (2004) four discourses of KM research  
 
 
Table 2.2 Competing Epistemologies (Hislop, 2009, p. 17) 
Authors Objectivist perspective Practice-based perspective 
Schultze & Stabell (2004) Epistemology of duali[sm] Epistemology of duali[ty] 
Werr & Stjernberg (2003) Knowledge as theory Knowledge as practice 
Empson (2001) Knowledge as an asset Knowing as a process 
Cook & Brown (1999) Epistemology of possession Epistemology of practice 
McAdam & McCreedy 
(2000) 
Knowledge as truth Knowledge as socially 
constructed 
Scarbrough (1998) “Content” theory of 
knowledge 
“Relational” view of 
knowledge 
Radical Humanist  
Dialogic Discourse 
Dialogic Discourse 
Radical Structuralist 
Critical Discourse 
Critical Discourse 
Interpretivist 
Interpretive Discourse 
Constructivist  
Discourse 
Functionalist 
Normative Discourse 
Neo-Functionalist 
 Discourse 
Radical Change 
Dissensus 
Dissensus 
Subjective (a) 
Local/Emergent (b) 
Duality (c) 
Regulation 
Consensus 
Consensus 
Objective  
Elite/A Priori 
Dualism 
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2.1.2.1 Positivism 
Overview of the philosophy 
Originated in the British empiricist school of the 17th and 18th centuries, positivism is 
associated with the functionalist or neo-functionalist or cognitivist perspective owing largely 
to the influence of the cognitive revolution in the 1950s that studied human mental processes 
in the areas of artificial intelligence and computer science.  As a result, knowledge is 
regarded as universal; two cognitive systems should achieve the same representations of the 
same object or event (von Krogh, 1998, p. 134).  It believes that all true knowledge is 
scientific and there is an underlying objective reality which can be discovered (Wicks & 
Freeman, 1998, p. 125).  Thus, it assumes that the functioning of the world is governed by a 
set of laws of cause and effect, which can be discerned by scientific methods (Hislop, 2009, p. 
19), the core of which are modern logic, observation, experiments and measurements.  
Human knowledge is discovered and justified by sense experience and empirical processes, 
which are reductionist, value-free, quantifiable, objective and operationalisable (Higgs & 
Titchen, 1995, p. 523).  Deductive reasoning is only used to postulate hypotheses that can be 
further tested and verified.  In organizational management, this paradigm seeks to look for 
regularities that will lead to generalizations and universal principles; and takes the managerial 
view that an organization structure is an objective phenomenon that will shape the activities 
of its members in deterministic ways (Gio & Pitre, 1990, p. 590).   
 
Characteristics of Knowledge 
1. Knowledge as a commodity 
Called “mainstream thinking” (Stacey, 2000) which was the most predominant view in 
the KM literature especially in the 80s and early 90s, positivism has the view that 
knowledge should be defined as a commodity (Glazer, 1998, p. 176; Gibbons et al., 2000, 
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as cited in Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Kouzmin, 2003, p. 82) and as the truth (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 1996).  It is like a stock or a thing “‘out there’, for which we can gain positive 
evidence” (Spender, 1998b, p. 234).  Being an object and an entity, knowledge is 
something that can be encoded, stored, measured, transmitted easily to others and 
separated from the person who possesses and uses it (McQueen, 1998; Swan & Newell, 
2000, p. 592; Hislop, 2009, p. 9; Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006, p. 75, Spender, 1998b, p. 
234; Zack, 1998). The metaphors of drilling, mining and harvesting are often used to 
describe how these “reservoirs” of knowledge can be managed.   
 
2. Knowledge hierarchy 
Some positivists take a taxonomic view to fit knowledge in the hierarchy of data, 
information, knowledge and sometimes wisdom in an attempt to explain their differences 
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Allee, 1997b; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Dreske, 1981; 
Machlup, 1980; Nissen, 2000; Nonaka, 1994; Vance, 1997).  Yet, only data has an agreed 
definition as discrete facts; other concepts, particularly information and knowledge, are 
still loosely understood and sometimes used interchangeably.  This greatly limits the 
contribution of the hierarchy to the clarity of the notion of knowledge.  Stenmark (2002, p. 
929) summarized these definitions in Table 2.3 from a handful of KM literature to 
provide a snapshot of the situation.   
 
Stenmark objected to the commonly held view that these entities are in a linear 
relationship whereby data is transformed into information and which in turn is 
transformed into knowledge.  Nor did he concur with the view of Tuomi (1999) that the 
hierarchy is in inverse relationship in which knowledge must exist for the formulation of 
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information and data will emerge from adding value to information.  He (Stenmark, 2002) 
offered a different view on the differentiation of these concepts: 
Data and information are only two opposite ends on a continuum. We can concentrate 
our attention to certain aspects of knowledge, making it focal.  The focal knowledge 
can, sometimes and partially, be articulated and furnished with words.  I refer to this 
as information.  If the information becomes too de-contextualized, i.e. too distant 
from the knowledge required to interpret it, I shall call it data. (p. 930)   
Table 2.3 Definitions of Data, Information, and Knowledge 
Author(s) Data Information  Knowledge 
Wiig, 1993 – Facts organized to 
describe a situation or 
condition 
Truths, beliefs, 
perspectives, 
judgments, know–how 
and methodologies 
Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995 
– A flow of meaningful 
messages 
Commitments and 
beliefs created from 
these messages 
Spek & 
Spijkervet, 
1997 
Not yet interpreted 
symbols 
Data with meaning The ability to assign 
meaning 
Davenport, 
1997 
Simple observations Data with relevance 
and purpose 
Valuable information 
from the human mind 
Davenport & 
Prusak, 1998 
A set of discrete 
facts 
A message meant to 
change the receiver’s 
perception 
Experience, values, 
insights, and 
contextual information 
Quigley & 
Debons, 1999 
Text that does not 
answer questions to 
a particular problem 
Text that answers the 
questions who, when, 
what, or where 
Text that answers the 
questions why or how 
 
 
Hicks, Dattero and Galup (2007) also acknowledged the limitations of the knowledge 
hierarchy.  Davenport and Prusak (1998, pp. 4-7) arrived at a similar view too.  Data, 
information and knowledge (D-I-K) can change their states from time to time by moving 
one level up along this D-I-K value chain or moving down to return to their original states 
via de-knowledging. The difference with Stenmark (2002) is that they rather emphasize 
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the value-added processes in this transformation of states - the 5C processes of 
contextualization, categorization, calculation, correction and condensation to turn data 
into information, and 4C processes of making connection, comparison, assessment of 
consequences and conversation to transform information into knowledge. However, like 
many other theorists, they also commit the common error of defining knowledge in terms 
of information. Knowledge is defined as “a fluid mix of framed experience, values, 
contextual information, and expert insight...” (p. 5), though it has been emphasized from 
the start that knowledge is neither information nor data. 
 
3. Agency problem in KM 
In discussing the differences of knowledge with data and information, Alavi and Leidner 
(2001, p. 109) argued that the most distinguishing factor was not on content, structure, 
accuracy or utility, but the fact that “knowledge is information possessed in the mind of 
individuals: it is personalized information … related to facts, procedures, concepts, 
interpretations, ideas, observations, and judgments”.  Cook and Brown (1999, p. 384) also 
stated that knowledge is something that is held in a person’s head.  These bring about the 
agency problem (a knower) in the KM discourse.  One of the assumptions of positivists is 
that knowledge is primarily a cognitive process, both for individuals and organizations.  
Organizational knowledge is simply the summation of individual knowledge.   
 
4. Knowledge typology 
The categorization of knowledge into different typologies is derived from the either/or 
logic of the positivist’s perspective.  According to Hislop (2009, p. 23), two of the most 
common distinctions made are between tacit and explicit knowledge, and individual and 
collective knowledge.  
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Nonaka’s (1994) tacit-explicit dichotomy is the most popular. He defined explicit 
knowledge as expressible in “formal and systematic language and shared in the form of 
data, scientific formulae, specifications, manuals and such like” (Nonaka, Toyama, & 
Konno, 2000, p. 7).  As such, it can be codified and transmitted between individuals or 
embedded in documents or database repositories in organizations (Davenport & Prusak, 
1998, p. 5).  It refers to “know-what” of human knowledge. This is commensurate with 
the positivists’ view that knowledge is objective and can be easily encoded.  But the 
interpretation of tacit knowledge did not exactly follow the line of thoughts of Polanyi, 
who is in opposition to the positivist account of science.  Polanyi (1966) never clearly laid 
down the definition of tacit knowledge except as implied in the phrase “we know more 
than we can tell” (p. 4) that it is inexpressible. Nonaka follows this to define tacit 
knowledge as personal, context-specific and therefore hard to articulate in words and 
numbers.  But he further expands Polanyi’s ideas in a more practical direction.  Tacit 
knowledge is assumed to be consisted of both cognitive and technical elements. The 
cognitive elements refer to “mental models” in which “human beings form working 
models of the world by creating and manipulating analogies in their minds” (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 16).  They include schemata, paradigms, perspectives, experiences, intuition, 
beliefs, problem-solving ability and the frame of interpretation within which a judgment 
is made. The technical elements refer to know-how or craft and skills of a person.  Both 
tacit and explicit knowledge do not remain at an individual level only; it can be converted 
from one form (tacit) into the other (explicit) and contributes directly to the growth of 
organizational knowledge.  In this SECI model, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 71) 
argued that there was special knowledge content in each knowledge conversion mode and 
identified four types of knowledge, namely, “sympathized knowledge”, “conceptual 
knowledge”, “systemic knowledge” and “operational knowledge” that were associated 
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with the processes of socialization, externalization, combination and internalization 
respectively. 
 
Apart from explicit and tacit knowledge, both Spender, and Firestone and McElroy 
identified “implicit knowledge” as the third category of knowledge.  While Spender 
(1998a, p. 24) had the intention of replacing tacit knowledge with this term, Firestone and 
McElroy (2003, p. 21) defined this term as implicit beliefs “held in the form of 
conceptual framework, as expressed in our language” (Polanyi, 1962, pp. 286-287).  It is 
neither focal nor explicit, but expressible given the right environmental condition 
conducive to its expression.  But no matter it is tacit, implicit or explicit knowledge, Choo 
(2006, p. 136) believed that these various kinds of organizational knowledge must be 
built on “cultural knowledge”, which was “shared beliefs, assumptions and norms [that] 
form the framework in which organizational members understand their work and its 
purpose, perceive problems and opportunities, and assess the value and potential of new 
knowledge” (p. 144).  Blackler (1995, pp. 1023-1024) also obtained five other types of 
knowledge that were summarized from the literature.  They are embrained (conceptual 
skills and abilities), embodied (action oriented and explicit), encultured (shared 
understanding), embedded (resided in technologies and procedures) and encoded (signs 
and symbols) knowledge.  Boisot (1995, p. 186) upheld the positivists’ view that 
knowledge was a stock of usable assets.  In his I-space model, he introduced four 
categories of knowledge classified along the dimensions of codified or uncodified, 
abstract or concrete, and diffused or undiffused: personal knowledge (uncodified, 
concrete and undiffused), proprietary knowledge (codified, abstract and undiffused), 
public knowledge (codified, abstract and diffused), and common sense (uncodified, 
concrete but diffused).  
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With a view of developing a dynamic theory of firms, Spender (1998b, p. 238) adopted 
the approach of pluralist epistemology to classify organizational knowledge into four 
types based on Polanyi’s (1962) standard explicit-implicit dimension and a new 
ontological dimension of individual-social taken from Durkheim and Halbwachs.  As 
shown in Table 2.4 below, there are conscious (explicit) and automatic (implicit) 
knowledge on the individual side and objectified (explicit) and collective (implicit) 
knowledge on the social side.  Both of them are defined in as much the same way as that 
of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995).  On the individual side, conscious knowledge is acquired 
from scientific and technical training while automatic knowledge refers to the employee’s 
skilled practices, automatic skills, hunches and intuitions (Spender, 1996a, p. 51).  On the 
social side, objectified knowledge refers to a firm’s established standards and practices 
while collective knowledge is embedded in a firm’s routines, norms and culture (Spender, 
1996a. p. 52).  Spender believed that each real firm should have a mixture of these four 
types of knowledge and different strategies in making use of them. Collective knowledge 
is the most powerful strategically as it is both relatively immobile and historically 
contingent and thus relatively inimitable (Spender, 1996b, p. 73). It is also situated and 
embedded in the organization as COP (Spender, 1996b, p.75). This quadrant is where 
new knowledge is produced and Spender (1996b, p. 74) has proved empirically how 
collective knowledge is recovered through the movement of different types of knowledge 
around the matrix.  This four-fold matrix is also more extensive than the two-fold 
pluralist epistemology of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995).  
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Table 2.4 Different Types of Organizational Knowledge (Spender, 1996a, p. 52) 
-- Individual Social 
Explicit Conscious Objectified 
Implicit Automatic Collective 
 
Other typologies concerning knowledge includes declarative (know-about), procedural 
(know-how), causal (know-why), conditional (know-when), and relational (know-with) 
(Alavi & Leinder, 2001, p. 112).   
 
Approaches to KM 
The above characteristics illustrate quite clearly a mechanistic view on the nature of 
knowledge, which, as Scarbrough and Swan (2001) claimed, has much to do with the 
commercial exploitation of the ideas of KM.   In the 1990’s, in response to the growing 
globalization and knowledge-based post-industrial economy, and in recognition of the 
weakness of the Porter’s theory to focus solely on external market positioning, the 
knowledge-based view of the firm rapidly emerged as an important strand of the resource-
based view to take the interests of the firm to go beyond the notion of knowledge as entirely a 
core competence to develop knowledge as a vital asset contributing to the competitive 
advantage of the firm. Knowledge is then coined as “intellectual capital” and a firm is 
regarded as an institution for generating and applying knowledge (Grant, 2006, p. 26). This 
new knowledge-based view dominates much of the positivists’ approaches to KM.   
 
1. Intellectual capital (IC)  approach: 
It is generally agreed that the IC approach is based on Sveiby’s (1997) early works on 
“Intellectual Capital” and Edvinsson’s works at Skandia (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997), in 
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which knowledge is treated as an intangible asset of an organization to enhance and 
sustain its competitive advantage (Roos & Roos, 1997).  KM is defined as “the systematic 
underpinning, observatism, measurement and optimization of the company’s knowledge 
economies” (Demarest, 1997, p. 379).  Its role in the company is to formulate “a 
conscious strategy of getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and 
helping people share and put information into action in ways that strive to improve 
organizational performance” (O’Dell, Essaides, & Grayson, 1998, p. 6).   
 
 
 
 
The Skandia model above represents a typical IC model.  Amongst the three kinds of IC, 
namely human, structural and customer capital, human capital is the most critical. It 
includes knowledge, skills and abilities of employees; and is supported by structural and 
customer capital under the assumption that individuals, not the company, own and control 
the chief source of competitive advantages. The IC model also takes the view that 
knowledge is subjected to scientific management and vigorous measurement.  The latter 
Figure 2.5 Skandia IC Model of KM (McAdam & McCreedy, 1999a, p. 97) 
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is given strong emphasis when Skandia included IC into its annual report (McAdam & 
McCreedy, 1999a, p. 97).     
 
Much of the thinking of the IC approach is popularized in the vast array of writings of 
Nonaka (1994), Leonard-Barton (1995), Davenport and Prusak (1998), and Stewart 
(1997).  To Nonaka (1991), “The one sure source of lasting competitive advantage is 
knowledge” (p. 96).  His SCEI model takes the assumption that knowledge is an asset that 
can be converted from one form to another.  Davenport and Prusak (1998) believed in the 
power of knowledge markets and asserted that knowledge can be “exchanged, bought, 
bartered, found, generated, and applied to work” (p. 25).  The notion of sustainable 
competitive advantage is treasured in their works, especially in terms of innovation. 
Leonard-Barton (1995) valued the tacit knowledge of individuals as the “wellspring of 
innovation”.  Stewart (1991) termed knowledge as “brainpower” and the purpose of KM 
is to exploit to the full the IC of employees so that it could be captured, stored, sold and 
shared for the long-term performance of the organization.   
 
2. Process approach 
The IC approach raises the strategic importance of knowledge.  KM becomes the new 
strategic direction to pursue and is linked directly with the performance of the 
organization.  To achieve this, KM takes a process approach that involves “creating, 
capturing, and using knowledge to enhance organizational performance” (Bassi as cited in 
Scarbrough, Swan, & Preston, 1999, p. 22).  Hedlund (1994) also emphasized the way 
KM handled the creation, storage, transfer, transformation and application of 
organizational knowledge. Others such as Skyrme (2003) who defined KM as “the 
explicit and systematic management of vital knowledge and its associated processes of 
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creating, gathering, organizing, diffusion, use and exploitation” (para. 5), Hibbard (as 
cited in Beckman, 1999) who likened KM to “the process of capturing a company’s 
collective expertise wherever it resides – in databases, on paper, or in people’s head – and 
distributing it to wherever it can help produce the biggest payoff” (p. 6), and the claim of 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) that KM is the process of capturing, distributing and 
effectively using knowledge, also purport the view that KM in an ongoing process.  This 
approach also focuses on the application of expertise.  Thus, Zack (2006) proposed the 
use of a Strategic Knowledge Map to maximize an organization’s competitive position.   
 
3. Information Systems / Information Technology (IS / IT) approach:  
The dominant view of knowledge as a stock is reflected in the lavish use of technology to 
capture it in knowledge databases. In fact, as Grant and Grant (2008, p. 577) remarked, 
the proliferation of computers, the Internet, and other IT technologies in the 1990s made 
them indispensable to the codification, storage, retrieval and transmission of knowledge.  
People find it effective to use IS / IT systems to codify not only explicit knowledge that 
can be found in books, manuals, procedures and the like, but also to explicate tacit 
knowledge resided in experts’ minds with the optimism that “it is possible to convert 
much of this knowledge into an explicit form” (Hislop, 2009, p.27).  Scarbrough and 
Swan (2001, p. 7) found in their literature review of KM that the IS / IT theme accounted 
for approximately 70% of all themes discussed in the KM articles published in 1998.  
Earl’s (2001) technocratic approach to KM highlights the role played by IT systems.  
Under the so-called “codification strategy” of Hansen, Nohria, and Tierney (1999), 
various KM databases and repositories accessible by all members of an organization were 
established one after another.  Alavi and Leidner (2002, p. 114) summarized from the 
literature three main applications of IT in KM: i) the coding and sharing of best practices, 
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ii) the creation of corporate knowledge directories and iii) the creation of knowledge 
networks.  In this approach, KM is equated with data mining and knowledge as stockpiles 
that can be captured, represented, codified, transferred and exchanged.  
 
Criticism of Positivist Approach to KM 
The assumptions of the positivist approach were quickly called into doubt by scholars who 
view knowledge as a duality consisting of both hard and soft components.  They regard 
knowing as a complex process.  The mere existence of codified knowledge is thought 
insufficient to be transformed into internal knowing without taking into account political and 
social aspects of knowledge, and subjective and situational aspects of humans such as ideals, 
intuition, experience and values (Hildreth & Kimble, 2002, para. 33; McAdam & McCreedy, 
1999a, p. 97; Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006, p. 79).  Lehaney, Clarke, Coakes, and Jack (2004) 
succinctly summarized the shortcomings of the positivist approach in accommodating the 
“soft” side of knowledge: 
In the study of social systems, where the key to the functioning of the system is 
human activity, functionalist views are questioned.  Experimentation is of limited 
value in such systems: the utility of problem solving, functionalist techniques is 
diminished when dealing with ill-defined, highly complex human activity systems. (p. 
101)  
 
In addition, Swan and Newell (2000) pointed out that the commodity view of knowledge 
negated the highly inarticulate and situated nature of tacit knowledge and thus the attempt to 
abstract it from its context of application was to lose much of its intrinsic meaning.  Nonaka 
and Peltokorpi (2006, p. 78) further criticized that positivism has limited potential to explain 
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the knowledge creation process which remains a ‘black box’ because the static positivist 
ontology does not allow for processual conceptualization. 
 
As a result of these limitations, “softer” methods of approaching KM issues are seen to be of 
greater value.  The interpretive philosophies guided by sense-making, social constructionism, 
and the paradigm of critical inquiry gain growing popularity.  Some turn to a third scenario 
where multiple perspectives can co-exist.  The next two sections will review the significance 
of interpretivism and critical inquiry. 
 
2.1.2.2 Interpretivism 
Overview of the philosophy 
 
Rooted in the social thoughts of Kant and the epistemological development in the 20th 
century, interpretivism is associated with a number of different philosophical perspectives, all 
sprang from the philosophy of phenomenon to some extent. This includes hermeneutics, 
constructivism, phenomenology, pragmatism and ethnography.  All these philosophies 
emphasize subjectivity in stark contrast to objectivity of positivists.  Scholars taking this 
paradigm “do not look for cause-effect relationships or use the experimental method, rather 
they look at the whole and take account of the context of the situation, the timings, the 
subjective meanings and intention within the particular situation” (Higgs & Titchen, 1995, p. 
524).  Their goals are to understand the fundamental nature of the social world as it is at the 
level of subjective experience and seek explanation within the realm of personal 
consciousness. They tend to see from the perspective of the person experiencing the events 
and avoid a priori conceptions as far as possible in order to explore in depth the world of the 
individual involved.  Conclusions are drawn from inductive reasoning through a series of 
cyclical and iterative processes. The focus is to restore the contextual, provisional, subjective, 
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situational and interactive nature of knowledge, and to uncover the socially constructed 
meaning of realities as understood by an individual or groups (Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006, p. 
75; Guo & Shefileds, 2008, p. 676; Swan & Scarbrough, 2001, p. 916; Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 
588).   The understanding of the world in turn does not reside in people’s minds, but is 
reflected in what they practice.  Again, following Polanyi’s thoughts, they argue that while 
the metaphor of knowledge is mind, the mind understands the world through the unarticulated 
background that provides a set of subsidiary particulars for people to integrate them tacitly.  
Interestingly, these particulars reside in the social practices that people know by having been 
socialized into it by others or by participating into it.  The locus of a person’s knowing is not 
in his head but implicit in the activity he engages (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 16).  Thus, in 
interpretivism, knowledge is manifested in actions.  In short, the interpretivist research 
framework emphasizes understanding, communication and action.  
 
Characteristics of Knowledge 
Hislop (2009, p. 34) summarized six different characteristics of knowledge from the literature: 
embedded in practice, inseparability of tacit and explicit knowledge, embodied in people, 
socially constructed, culturally embedded and contestable.   But some of them are duplicated 
with each other, thus, they are re-categorized as follows: 
 
1. Knowledge is a social construct 
To social constructionists, knowledge is “an internal construction or an attempt to impose 
meaning and significance on events and ideas” (Higgs & Titchen, 1995, p. 524). They 
believe that the world is ‘out there’ but there is no one truly objective account of the 
situation.  Instead, the reality is socially constructed depending on how people make 
sense of their worlds on the basis of their idiosyncratic experiences and how to create a 
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system of meanings in dialectical interaction with society at any time. As a result, all facts 
about the world are subjected to personal interpretation and narratives that are embedded 
in individual experience, language and culture. Human knowledge is a way of “enacting 
reality, giving existence to things and events, and organizing the world” (Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2001, p. 916). It is situated in a particular social and historical context (Fuller, 
2002).  Its production and interpretation, as Hislop (2009, p.40) remarked, required the 
two processes of sense-giving and sense-reading of Polanyi, or perspective-making and 
perspective-taking of Boland and Tenkasi (1995).  With this fluid, inter-subjective and 
social character, Pan and Scarbrough (1999) defined knowledge in a more holistic sense 
as “multi-layered and multi-faceted, comprising cognition, actions and resources. It is 
socially constructed and embedded in social networks and communities of practice” (p. 
360).   
 
2. Knowledge is a flow 
Closely associated with the characteristics of meaning construction is the definition of 
knowledge not as a “thing” but also as a “flow”.  This notion of flow was deliberated in 
Fahey and Prusak’s (1998, p. 266) paper which described knowledge as in constant flux 
and change, created individually, self-generating and inseparable from the individuals 
who developed, transmitted and leveraged it.  This concept was later taken up by Brenda 
Dervin and David Snowden, the leading authorities in sense-making theories.  Dervin’s 
(1998) definition of knowledge as “the sense made at a particular point in time-space by 
someone” (p. 36) clearly illustrates the “flow” concept from a user-centered perspective.  
Knowledge is considered as sometimes objective, sometimes subjective; sometimes it is a 
fact; and sometimes it is a piece of information; and in some other time-space, it can be 
fleeting and unexpressed. In her view, sense-making and sense-unmaking are the mandate 
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of human condition.  They are the means for a person to move through gappy situations at 
any given time-space.  They are thus knowledge, and which is activities embedded in 
time space.  In short, knowledge is treated as a communicative practice that requires 
interrogation and interpretation, and Dervin’s (1998, p. 39) approach is to find out what 
users really think, feel, want and dream – a phenomenologist approach that defies 
codification as the only strategy of KM.   
 
The flow concept is more evident in the sense-making theory of Snowden (2000; 2002) 
who broadens the definition of knowledge to being a thing and a flow.  His Cynefin 
model tends to look at the knowledge space an organization is situated, namely “known”, 
“knowable”, “complex” and “chaotic”, and its evolution from one place to another in 
making sense of the ambiguities, uncertainties and diversities of the society it is living.  
Detailed comparison of the sense-making theories will be covered in Chapter Three.  
Here it is suffice to conclude that knowledge as a flow concept is attracting increasing 
attention.   
 
3. Knowledge is practice-based 
Another distinguished view on organizational knowledge in interpretivist paradigm is to 
assume that knowledge is inseparable from practice and action.  Brown and Duguid (2001) 
proposed to look at knowledge through the prism of practice as it was only through 
learning by doing that knowledge was created.  A number of examples abound in the 
literature to illustrate the perspective of knowledge as a practice.  Orlikowski (2002) drew 
on her empirical study of the success of a global product development organization to 
highlight the importance of enacting collective capability of its members in organizing 
that is grounded in everyday practice – “situated and ongoing accomplishment that 
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emerges from people's everyday actions” (p. 269). She argued strongly that all knowing 
was doing and the human agency was critical in knowledgeable performance.  Patriotta’s 
study further demonstrated the fact that knowledge was embedded in the narratives 
possessed by workers, and DeFillippi and Arthur’s study of film production illustrated the 
essential role of learning by watching (Hislop, 2009, p. 36).  
 
4. Tacit and explicit knowledge are inseparable   
The practice-based perspective discussed above strongly implies an important assumption 
in the interpretivist camp that tacit and explicit knowledge are inseparable.  In congruence 
with the line of thought of Polanyi on tacit knowing, it is argued that tacit and explicit 
knowledge are mutually constituted and tacit knowledge is the component of all 
knowledge (Tsoukas, 1996; Orlikowski, 2002; Schultze & Stabell, 2004).  Similarly, 
individual knowledge and social knowledge are mutually defined; the former is not 
simply the aggregation of the latter as the positivists have assumed.  This will be further 
deliberated in Section 2.2. In short, in the discourse of the constructionists, there is no 
knowledge typology or dichotomy.  
 
Approaches to KM 
1.  Communities of Practice (COP) and sharing of knowledge 
The constitutive view of knowledge is best reflected in the COP approach to KM.  The 
KM literature vastly acknowledges the importance of cultivating COPs for sharing of 
organizational knowledge.  Lave and Wenger’s book (1991) is generally regarded as the 
origin of the idea, though Wallace (2007) argued that this concept has been prevalent in 
medicine, law, psychology, education, and theology for quite some time since as early as 
1864.  In fact, he was critical that Lave and Wenger’s book (1991) provided just 10 
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references to the term and thus it becomes peripheral to the major discussion (Wallace, 
2007, p. 57).  Instead, Wenger (2000; 2006; Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Wenger, 
McDermott, & Snyder, 2002) is the authority in the COP research.  According to his 
perspectives, COPs are defined as “groups of people who share a concern or a passion for 
something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” (Wenger, 2006, 
para 1).  They must be consisted of the following three crucial characteristics:  
a). domain – an identity defined by a shared domain of interest, which implies a 
commitment to the domain, and therefore a shared competence that distinguishes 
members from other people 
b).  the community – members engage in  joint activities and discussion, help each other 
share information, interact and learn together 
c). the practice – not a community of interest, but a community of practitioners that join 
together to develop a shared repertoire of resources such as experience, stories, tools 
or in other words, a shared practice, that takes time and sustained interaction, and that 
may be more or less self-conscious.  Examples include nurses who meet regularly for 
lunch in a hospital cafeteria and thus may unconsciously indulge in discussions that 
will develop into rich sources of knowledge about how to care for patients. 
 
The COP approach to KM is valuable in its capacity to create, accumulate and diffuse 
knowledge in an organization.  By allowing members in a COP to share and exchange 
experience and knowledge in a free and creative way, COPs are privileged sites for a tight 
and effective loop of insight, problem identification, learning and knowledge production 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001, pp. 202 - 203). Informal COPs have more power than the 
conventional organization to link working, learning, and innovation more closely, more 
realistically and more reflectively to achieve successful synergy to bring improvement to 
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all three (Brown & Duguid, 1991).  The broad spectrum of membership with a key 
domain of interests facilitates active learning from peers and, by means of active 
participation, fosters the development of professional competencies and preserves tacit 
aspects of knowledge that other systems cannot capture (Wenger, 2000, p. 214; Wenger 
& Snyder, 2000, p. 141).  They thus provide significant repositories for the development, 
maintenance, and reproduction of knowledge.  They are also helpful to recruit and retain 
talents for an organization.  Most important of all, the emphasis of COPs on relationships, 
shared understandings and attitudes to knowledge formation and sharing makes them an 
ideal forum for the transfer of best practices, tips, lessons learned and feedback (Swan & 
Newell, 2000; Wenger, 2000, p. 213; Wenger & Snyder, 2000, p. 141).  The resulting 
improvement in organizational performance will directly or indirectly drive business 
strategy. 
 
In a nutshell, COPs are regarded as the Holy Grail of KM (Wenger, 2000, p. 223), the 
most appropriate avenue for the selection and application of explicit knowledge alongside 
the locally situated, contextually specific and often tacit knowledge about organizational 
practices and processes.  Cultivating COPs in strategic areas thus becomes a practical way 
to manage knowledge.  Swan and Newell (2000) put the emphasis on establishing shared 
values, trust and understanding that are essential for the creation and application of 
knowledge in ways that are locally meaningful and relevant.  Wenger and Snyder (2000, 
p. 144) suggested identifying potential COPs that will enhance the company’s strategic 
capabilities; providing the infrastructure and necessary resources to support such COPs  
such as giving members time and sponsorship to enable them to apply their expertise 
effectively; and using non-traditional methods to assess the value of the company’s COPs 
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such as listening to members’ stories, which can clarify the complex relationships among 
activities, knowledge and performance. 
 
Learning is the key to the success of COPs.  Lave and Wenger (1991) were the pioneers 
in exploring the model of workplace learning in COPs by extending the concept of 
apprenticeship to a more general theory of situated learning as the means to build 
legitimate peripheral participation (LPP) in COPs.  In the foreword in Lave and Wenger’s 
book (1991, p. 14), W.F. Hanks elucidated that this model of LPP and situated learning 
did not take into account formal education and schooling but focused on the relationship 
between learning and social situations in which it occurs.  It explores the situated 
character of human understanding and communication, a point shared by Dervin as well.  
Learning is situated in certain forms of social co-participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 
14).  Individual learners are not receivers of explicit and abstract knowledge from 
someone who knows it but “construct their understanding out of a wide range of materials 
that include ambient social and physical circumstances and the histories and social 
relations of the people involved” (Brown & Duguid, 1991, p. 47).  Under LPP, learning is 
a peripheral activity that requires learners to be enculturated and engaged in the process to 
acquire the knowledge and skills that are needed to behave as community members.  
Learners are to become practitioners rather than to learn about the practice.  As they 
actually participate in the practice of their community, they will move gradually from a 
partially peripheral role to a fundamental central role (Wallace, 2007, p. 55). 
 
It is worth noting that LPP is a kind of workplace learning that is highly situated in the 
practices and communities in which knowledge occurs.  It shares many concepts of 
Dervin’s Sense-Making theory.  Should it be successfully formulated into a complete 
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theory of workplace learning, it can be taken as the research model of this research.  
However, as Wallace (2007) commented, though the model provided important insights 
into the nature of apprenticeship and workplace learning more generally, it also had a 
number of limitations to make it into a learning theory.  As he rightly pointed out, “case 
study research into complex institutional settings suggests that patterns and forms of 
participation are highly diverse.  Further in-depth studies of workplace learning in a wide 
range of contexts are required if all the issues affecting learning and their inter-
relationship are to be fully understood and theorized.” (p. 62).  This partly explains why 
there is a need for this research to study knowledge creation and utilization in healthcare 
organizations. 
 
2.  People-Centric strategy 
Hansen, Nohria, and Tierney (1999) put forward two contrasting strategies for managing 
knowledge.  Positivists are in favor of “codification strategy” which widely employs 
technology to codify and store knowledge in databases.  Interpretivists, while not 
rejecting the value of technology, find that this overly techno-centric emphasis has not 
paid due concern to social networks of people and the contextual nature of knowledge 
(Hazlett, McAdam, & Gallagpher, 2005, p. 37).  They advocate “personalization strategy” 
as the alternative to shift the focus to improving social processes for knowledge sharing, 
which support their assumptions that knowledge is closely tied to the person who 
develops it and the primary mode of knowledge transfer is direct interaction among 
people; computers are to facilitate people to communicate knowledge, not to store it 
(Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999, p. 107).  It also bears close resemblance to Sveiby’s 
(2001a) people-track management, which is concerned with maximizing the ability of an 
organization’s members to create new knowledge and build environments conducive to 
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the sharing of knowledge.  Ashby’s (1956) law of requisite variety and later Espejo’s 
(1993) paper on requisite variety also emphasized the importance of providing KM 
solutions that focused upon human action as well as the provision of information, 
pointing out clearly that as an individual’s knowledge will become outdated quickly, it is 
more crucial to provide the structure to support a member of an organization to respond to 
changing environment than to merely provide the information itself (Venters, 2001). 
 
3. Reflective practice 
Reflective practice follows on the practice-based perspective on knowledge, but further 
claims that new understanding only comes from reflection.  Schon (1982, pp. 15-16) 
studied professional practice and asserted that the situations of practice were not problems 
to be solved as positivists think but problematic situations characterized by uncertainty, 
disorder and indeterminacy.  He developed “reflective practice” to address these 
situations.  It consists of two key concepts: 
 Reflection-in-action: refers to the reflective thinking one is doing while one is doing 
the action. This applies in familiar situations and has many parallels with Polanyi’s 
tacit knowing. 
 Reflection-on-action: occurs in new and unfamiliar situations which require one to 
make sense of the situation, reflect upon what one is doing, make new sense of the 
uniqueness of the situation, and to consider or improvise new ways of handling the 
situation (Teekman, 2000; Venters, 2001) 
 
Reflection-on-action requires one to have a certain level of experience to enable him or 
her to step back to shift the focus from doing the action to how the action is done 
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(Stenmark, 2002, p. 934).  Finally, new heuristic knowledge may emerge. This has many 
parallels with Dervin’s SMM.     
 
4.   Dialogue and Storytelling 
The interpretivists’ understanding of knowledge suggests that it is fragmented and 
dispersed in an organization.  Knowledge sharing thus depends on interpersonal 
communication rather than the transmitter-receiver model espoused by positivists in order 
to develop a perspective from different interpretations of organizational members. This 
communicative approach to KM is in fact the central idea of Dervin’ SMM (1998).   
Dialogue and language are keys to this process to enable the exchange and evaluation of 
knowledge.  Again, Snowden (2002), another leading authority in sense-making theories, 
put narratives and storytelling at the centre of knowledge transfer.  He argues that stories 
serve as effective agents through whom people can present events in the form of a plot to 
pass on their experience and the embedded meaning in the way they wish and the listener 
to digest and create their own meaning.      
 
2.1.2.3 Critical Inquiry 
A third perspective on organizational knowledge is concerned with conflicts and power 
relations at work.  It assumes that the society is stratified and made up of antagonistic 
factions: a powerful group versus a powerless group that illustrates an ongoing contradictions 
and exploitations.  Applying to an organization, knowledge is regarded as an object that can 
be sold, owned and employed to dominate over others or to empower people to change the 
world and to emancipate the abused and mistreated (Schultze & Stabell, 2004, pp. 558 - 559).  
In other words, KM cannot be separated from politics.  A good KM practice must resolve 
organizational members’ competing values, mutually supportive interpersonal relationships 
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and access to power.  Guo and Sheffield (2008, p. 674)  quoted Pozzebon and Pinsonneault’s 
research to show the way the conflicting views of clients and consultants evolve through 
mediation in the customization of complex software artifacts.   Supporters of this paradigm 
see knowledge creation as a dialectical process in which the deeply-held beliefs and 
commitments of individuals are dynamically created out of contradictions and whereby 
individuals confront their own most cherished assumptions and a synthesis of different 
perspectives emerges (Sheffield, 2009, p. 391).  They find that it is not sufficient for 
interpretivists to move away from the mechanistic view of positivists; KM still needs to 
confront the conflicts and the relations to power that are inherent in knowledge creation 
(Sheffield, 2009, p. 391).  Frederick Taylor’s scientific management is exemplary of this 
perspective (Schultze & Stabell, 2004, p. 559).  The use of emancipatory knowledge in 
clinical reasoning is another area that employs this paradigm in managing knowledge (Higgs 
& Titchen, 1995, p. 524).   
 
2.1.3 Working Definition of Knowledge 
The above literature review clearly illustrates the limitations of the positivistic approach in 
the understanding of knowledge.  The interpretive philosophy also has its own inadequacies 
to explain the relationship between knowledge and performance, and how knowledge that 
stays within a person’s own mind can be extended to the whole organization to become 
organizational knowledge (Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006, p.80).  Weicks and Freeman (1998, p. 
128) further emphasized that interpretivists failed to provide concrete meaning to their 
meaning-creating activities.  Soute (2007, p. 69) rejected both philosophies arguing that their 
different ways of understanding knowledge generated contradictions: “KM results were 
required based on an interpretivist understanding of knowledge (i.e., where the social and 
human nature are emphasized), but conversely, KM was made operative by a functionalist 
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perspective (i.e., which is embedded in its concepts, practices, methods and tools)”. Some 
proposed a synthesis of both positivistic and interpretive philosophies (Hildreth & Kimble, 
2002; Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006; Spender, 1996b).  Sheffield (2009, p. 393) suggested 
combining some elements of the three paradigms of positivism, interpretivism and critical 
inquiry to become a Habermasian inquiry system that established relevance to the framework 
of KM through three intersecting knowledge domains of knowledge application, knowledge 
normalization and knowledge creation respectively.  Schultze and Stabell (2004, p. 568) 
advised that, even though cross-paradigm dialogue for KM research was recommended, it 
was hard for a single piece of research to take on multiple perspectives.  For the purpose of 
this research, I will adopt the interpretive stance with consideration of a critical inquiry 
perspective. 
 
First, it is clear from the above historical review of epistemology that with the pragmatist turn 
in the 20th century, propositional and explicit knowledge are no longer regarded as the sole 
basis of knowledge and the shift of focus to interpretive philosophies is strongly evident.  
Second, the interpretivist dialectic perspective on tacit knowledge that does not separate 
knowledge from action is much more in line with Polanyi’s (1966) original meaning of tacit 
knowing (Schltze & Stabelll, 2004, p. 563).  It is crucial to acknowledge this action 
component in knowledge.  Imagine a red light on the dashboard can mean a low oil level, a 
low petrol level, or a warning that a brake is not functioning.   Knowledge about the car is to 
enable an individual to choose the right action at the right time.  The problem of the positivist 
approach lies in its inability to explain the behavior of the social world, which is determined 
by the meaning attributed by individuals to their actions.  Third, the stronger emphasis of an 
interpretivist view to call for meaning and understanding is what is needed in knowledge 
creation, which underlines a dynamic process of sense making rather than being restricted 
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solely to the assimilation of a body of facts (MaAdam & McCreedy, 2000, p. 159).   Fourth, 
any social relationship that underpins work will inevitably involve power and conflicts.  It is 
impossible to approach knowledge at work without acknowledging the existence of power 
relations.  The approach of critical inquiry “enables us to understand better not only particular 
bodies of knowledge but also why certain kinds of knowledge are more privileged over 
others” (Tsoukas & Mylonopoulos, 2004, p. S3).  This is particularly relevant to the 
healthcare field. 
 
Amongst myriads of interpretive philosophies, sense-making theories stand out as the most 
sensible and appropriate approach for this research.  As aforementioned, Dervin’s SMM 
contains many parallels with the problem-solving and the corresponding scientific discovery 
theory of Polanyi.   The theories are concerned with how people respond to or interpret 
stimuli in an equivocal situation at a particular point in time-space.  They encompass many 
social constructionist views and also emphasize the importance of power in social 
relationships. In this regard, I would take the following components of knowledge from the 
centerpiece of sense-making theories (Evans & Alleyne, 2009, p. 148; McAdam & McCreedy 
2000, p. 156; du Toit, 2002; Cheuk & Dervin, 2010) and from Section 2.1.2.2 as the working 
definition of knowledge for this research:  
(1) Knowledge is the product of the interaction between the individuals within the 
organization as part of a socially created process of sense making. 
(2) Knowledge is situated within a particular domain.  It is not just facts, but also direction, 
ideas, support, confirmation and connection with other people. 
(3) Knowledge is created, interpreted, disseminated, and displayed through activity. 
(4) Knowledge is personal and bounded by developmental capacity. 
(5) Knowledge is concerned with emancipation. 
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(6) Knowledge pays attention to the analysis of power relations. 
 
This is not to refute wholly the value of the positivistic approach.  But it is not much help to 
this research if the usual treatment on knowledge as vague and hard to pin down is still used. 
In view of the literature review of epistemology, the complex nature of knowledge, the 
limitations of positivism and the needs of this research to investigate knowledge creation, 
sharing and utilization in the healthcare field, an interpretive approach supplemented by 
critical injury to explore power relationships is deemed appropriate.  
 
2.1.4 Definition of Knowledge Management 
KM is often claimed as an oxymoron (Skyrme, 1997b; 2003) and knowledge and 
management are odd couples that should not be put together (Alevsson & Karreman, 2001).  
This alludes to whether knowledge is manageable.  Wilson (2002) concluded from his 
voluminous literature review that knowledge cannot be managed and KM is a “nonsense” 
concept.  In the positivistic approach, it has been clarified above that various ICT tools such 
as networks and databases are available to manage codifiable knowledge (Sutton, 2001).  KM 
is not an oxymoron in this regard.  On the contrary, in the constructionist / critical inquiry 
perspective, the answer to the question depends on how the term “management” is defined.  
If it is defined in the traditional or stronger sense to mean planning, organizing, leading and 
controlling, then knowledge is not manageable because to the constructionists, knowledge is 
highly personal and sometimes we do not know what we know.  On the contrary, if a weaker 
form of management is taken such as the one suggested by Alevsson and Karreman (2001), 
which stresses more on coordination and facilitation, then KM is again not an oxymoron. In 
fact, the shift to this weaker form of management not only recognizes the fluid and tacit 
nature of knowledge which cannot be captured in any concrete sense but also the importance 
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of nurturing an environment to allow knowledge to grow and flourish.  This meaning of 
management makes KM more sensible and thus it is adopted in this research.  KM is 
henceforth defined as any activity to provide an environment conducive to or to facilitate the 
creation, sharing and utilization of knowledge at both individual and organizational levels.   
 
In sum, the fuzziness and ambiguity of the concept of knowledge is acknowledged in the 
review of epistemology.  From a mainly propositional concept in the Greek age, the 
knowledge concept has evolved gradually into many different faces and dimensions in 
contemporary times with the addition of elements of interaction, communication, action, and 
subjectivity.  It is increasingly popular to favor the interpretive and critical inquiry 
perspectives to study and explore the characteristics of knowledge which is more widely 
recognized to be highly personal, contextualized, social, and situated in a particular time 
space.  The sense-making theories that encompass myriads of interpretive and critical inquiry 
thinking stand out as the most appropriate approach to derive the main components of 
knowledge and the definition of KM.  It should also be noted that though knowledge is not to 
be managed in the traditional sense, understanding how it is created at different ontological 
levels is still the first step in enabling the concept to blossom in organizations. The next two 
sections are a review of the major knowledge creation models based on the same interpretive 
and critical inquiry perspectives and how individual knowledge is linked with the 
organizational knowledge.    
 
2.2 Review of Knowledge Creation Models 
There is a rich collection of literature on knowledge creation models (Abou-Zeid, 2002; 
Dalkir, 2010; Despres & Chauvel, 2000; Jerram, 2004; Kim, 2001; McAdam & McCreedy, 
1999a; 1999b; 2000; Wickramasinghe, 2008).  As early as 1991, Nonaka (1991) has put 
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forward his famous SECI model of knowledge creation.  Thereafter, it has become the 
mainstream theory in the literature; many others just model after it though some take a 
different approach (Hedlund, 1994; Boisot, 1995; Choo, 1998; Carayannis, 1999; Inukshuk, 
2005). However, none of these models formulate a complete theory to fully explain the 
process of knowledge creation in organizations.  This section will go through these major 
models with particular reference to their problems.  The gaps in the research will then be 
identified.    
 
2.2.1 Nonaka’s SECI Model 
The knowledge creation theory espoused by Nonaka in 1991 as the strategy for KM and the 
famous knowledge creation model announced in 1995 (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) with 
subsequent modifications contributed by his close allies (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka, 
Toyama & Konno, 2000; von Krogh, Ishijo & Nonaka, 2000; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003; 
Nonaka, Toyama & Hirata, 2008), are best exemplified in the SECI framework in Figure 2.6 
below. Its core concept is that “knowledge creation is a synthesizing process through which 
an organization interacts with individuals and the environment to transcend emerging 
contradictions that the organization faces. This interconnection between agents and the 
structure makes the knowledge process occur as a dynamic and inter-linked interaction from 
an individual-to-societal level” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003, p. 3).    
 
The model rests on the premise of two dimensions of knowledge, one is epistemological and 
one is ontological.  On the epistemological dimension, it is assumed that new knowledge is 
created from continuous social interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge resulting in four 
different modes of knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 61; Nonaka, Toyama 
& Hirata, 2008, p.18). As reiterated in previous sections of this Chapter, Nonaka’s definitions  
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Figure 2.6 The Knowledge-creating Process: SECI model (Nonaka, Toyama & Hirata, 
2008, p. 19) 
 
of tacit and explicit knowledge are taken from Polanyi, yet without providing any explanation, 
he added a practical direction to expand Polanyi’s tacit knowledge conception to include 
cognitive and technical elements.  He further assumed tacit and explicit knowledge are two 
separate types of knowledge and entities. On the ontological dimension, Nonka (1998) said, 
“New knowledge always begins with the individual” and “making personal knowledge 
available to others is the central activity of the knowledge-creating company” (p. 26).  That is, 
the micro (individual) and the macro (environment) interact with each other, and changes 
occur at both levels so that the firm as a whole is capable of creating new knowledge, 
disseminating it throughout the whole organization and embodying it in products, services 
and systems (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p.3; Nonaka, Toyama & Konno, 2000, p. 8).  
Together with the epistemological dimension, organizational knowledge is created in four 
modes of knowledge conversion in an evolving Ba: socialization (S), externalization (E), 
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combination (C) and internalization (I).  The process begins with socialization in which an 
individual’s tacit knowledge (micro level) is shared with other individuals (micro level) in the 
same organization through shared experience in day-to-day social interaction to create new 
tacit knowledge.  These shared direct experiences can be acquired through the traditional 
apprenticeship where apprentices learn through observation, imitation and practice.  This is 
followed by articulating tacit knowledge of individuals (micro level) into explicit knowledge 
for the group (macro level) through the process of externalization.  Here, dialectical dialogue 
taking the mode of metaphors, analogies, concepts, hypotheses or models is a powerful 
method to convert one’s tacit knowledge that is difficult to express into the formal language 
of explicit knowledge.  Through dialogues among individuals, contradictions between one’s 
tacit knowledge and the structure, or contradictions among tacit knowledge of individuals are 
made explicit and synthesized (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003, p. 5).  Explicit knowledge collected 
within the group (macro level) is then combined or processed into more complex and 
systematic sets of explicit knowledge that permeates over the whole organization (macro 
level).  This stage is assisted by the creative use of computerized communication, networks 
and large-scale databases to capture externalized knowledge; disseminate it to the 
organization through presentations or meetings and edit it to turn it into reports or market 
data so that they are more usable (Nonaka & Konno, 1998, p. 45).   Formal education and 
training at schools are also included.  Finally, the explicit knowledge of the organization 
(macro level) in the combination stage is internalized into an individual’s own tacit 
knowledge (micro level) when the explicit knowledge is actualized through action, practice 
and reflection.  One often used example is learning by doing.  Training programs can help 
trainees understand an organization and themselves.  By reading documents or manuals, 
trainees can also internalize the explicit knowledge embedded in those documents.  In a 
nutshell, through the continuous dynamic interactions between tacit and explicit knowledge 
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in the above four modes, knowledge is moved back and forth through the subjective (tacit 
knowledge) to the objective (explicit knowledge) to synthesize the contradictions revealed to 
form a spiral that will move upward from the micro individual level to the collective group 
level and then to the macro organizational level to create organizational knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 20). The spiral will become larger in scale and faster in speed as more actors in and 
around the organization become involved.   
 
To enable the knowledge spiral to function effectively in a knowledge-creating firm, Nonaka, 
Toyama and Hirata (2008) had developed a new process model as shown in Figure 2.7 after 
years of theoretical exploration and empirical examination.  Inspired by the process 
philosophy of Whitehead (1925), these scholars believe that knowledge is process-relational.  
Every world experience is momentary that occurs at a particular time and space.  Knowledge 
is not just about knowing but also affects and is affected by the environment at all times 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 113).  Therefore, the human is always in the state of becoming.  Applying 
to organizational knowledge creation, it means that firms are in the constant state of 
becoming.  They will synthesize the past and present events to transcend their own 
boundaries and realize their vision of the future.  As a result, they change themselves and 
others, the organization and the environment (Nonaka, Toyama & Hirata, 2008, p. 11).  In 
this model, firms have to realize their own business ecosystem at a particular time-space to 
put forward appropriate knowledge vision and driving objectives as the direction and energy 
for the SECI process to create, share and utilize knowledge in the shared context of Ba which 
evolves with the organization.   The firm in turn needs an effective knowledge strategy to 
manage this complex nature of knowledge. Nonaka encourages the cultivation of phronesis 
or practical ability to make timely value judgments in each particular situation at every level 
of the organization to provide distributed leadership that accelerates knowledge creation. 
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Figure 2.7 A Process Model of the Knowledge-based Firm (Nonaka, Toyama & Hirata, 
2008, p. 27) 
 
Despite its widespread influence and impact on the KM circle, the SECI model contains a 
number of pitfalls that prevent its efforts to become a fully dynamic and comprehensive 
framework. Nonaka’s view of knowledge is criticized as erroneous and often called into 
question (Tsoukas, 1996; Cook & Brown, 1999; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001).  On the one 
hand, the view that knowledge is subjective, dynamic to be created in social interactions 
amongst individuals and organizations, and context-specific depending on a particular time 
and space, corresponds to the interpretivist’s line of thoughts and my view on characteristics 
of knowledge (Nonaka, Toyama & Konno, 2000, p. 7).  On the other hand, his definitions of 
tacit and explicit knowledge reveal many traces of positivism that are in stark contrast to that 
of Polanyi, who has not treated tacit and explicit knowledge as two separate entities.  Though 
this was later clarified that tacit and explicit knowledge exist in a continuum in a mutually 
complementary manner and their relations are similar to the visible and submerged portions 
of an iceberg (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009), this has not changed the assumptions of his 
theory much.  The contradiction of employing a mixed ontology, trying to be both a 
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constructivist and a positivist, as Yolles (2000, p. 1215) commented, is where he diverges 
from Polanyi.  Stenmark (2002, p. 932) even asserted that should Nonaka use the term 
implicit knowledge instead of tacit knowledge, there would be less confusion.  A similar 
remark was also raised by Wallace (2007) who said, “Their use of tacit knowledge and 
explicit knowledge is so divergent from the views of Polanyi that the use of those terms is 
more a distraction than a strength” (p. 33).  A number of other scholars directly pointed out 
that the knowledge conversion matrix was ultimately flawed in its present form (Gourlay, 
2000; Gourlay & Nurse, 2005; Hildreth & Kimble, 2002).  On the one hand, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) admitted that tacit knowledge is created through interpersonal interaction 
and thus is not transmissible through words. On the other hand, they also explained that the 
transfer of tacit knowledge can be accomplished by other different processes such as talking 
and reading (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.9).  This implies that at least one form of tacit 
knowledge, the cognitive form, can be articulated but this already renders it as explicit, not 
tacit, knowledge.  The ambiguity of concept lies in the fact that once it was agreed that tacit 
knowledge is by definition not expressible in words and is an irreducible aspect of all 
knowing, the tacit to tacit knowledge transfer through words becomes questionable (Gourlay, 
2000).  Furthermore, if tacit knowledge is inarticulable, it also makes the tacit to explicit 
conversion not workable at all.  Yet, ironically, the primary KM approach to managing 'less-
structured' knowledge is to try to make tacit knowledge explicit (Hildreth & Kimble, 2002).  
The whole idea to portray relationship of tacit and explicit knowledge through a matrix or to 
describe them as an interaction between opposite poles simply does not make any sense 
(Gourlay & Nurse, 2005, p. 303) 
 
Another hotly debated issue is whether the four modes of knowledge conversion are 
sustainable. Gourlay (2003; 2006) argued ferociously that Nonaka’s proposition of 
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knowledge being created through the four modes of knowledge conversion is flawed 
empirically and conceptually.  Empirically, no unambiguous evidence was found to support 
all four modes of operation.  The case studies only provided tentative support for 
externalization; combination and internalization have not been clearly described, and 
socialization was not realistic as people can learn new skills without direct personal contact. 
Much of the 1993 survey data and case studies used by Nonaka actually came from earlier 
studies of semantic information creation, thus his theory so developed was at best be regarded 
as information creation rather than knowledge creation (Gourlay, 2003; Gourlay & Nurse, 
2005).  Even so, it only provides support for socialization and combination but the latter is 
conceptually incoherent.  Conceptually, it is not clear enough to explain why knowledge 
creation has to begin with socialization, as it is always possible for new tacit knowledge to be 
created by internalization such as reading the documents of the company.  This is exactly 
what is stated in Figure 2.6 that tacit knowledge can be created in both socialization and 
internalization modes.  In fact, combination and externalization could also be the starting 
point of knowledge creation since “all that is required is that some ‘source’ activity, and thus 
associated tacit knowledge, already exists” (p. 1421).  In addition, as identified by Stacey 
(2001, p. 18), the focus of the socialization mode is on transferring tacit knowledge from one 
person to another; it does not explain completely how new tacit knowledge comes to arise in 
individual heads.  The failure to explain why the cycle starts from the point where some 
individuals already possess important tacit knowledge is the chief limitation of Nonaka’s 
approach.  This was echoed by Bereiter (2002, pp. 175 – 179) who also pointed out the fact 
that Nonaka’s model does not explain how new ideas are produced, or how depth of 
understanding (necessary for expertise) develops. 
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Other scholars (McAdam & McCreedy, 1999a; 1999b; Griffin, Shaw, & Stacey, 1999; 
Venters, 2001) thought that the SECI approach failed to capture the complexity and 
convolution inherent in knowledge creation process.  The problem lies in Nonaka’s 
interpretation of self-organization.  He argues that knowledge is created and expanded 
through the social interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge, and the knowledge spiral 
is driven by organizational intention, which is defined as an organization's aspiration to its 
goals.  But he fails to take up Polanyi’s concept to describe the interrelatedness of the tacit 
and explicit from within the act of meaning.  Instead, he “subordinated both Polanyi's concept 
of tacit knowledge as a theory of practice and the principle of self-organization to a theory of 
strategic management as an objective science, whereby there is no discussion of the self-
organization that gave rise to explicitly stated overriding goals” (Griffin, Shaw & Stacey, 
1999, p. 300).  As a result, he separated organizational intention from the relational context of 
self-organization.  Without appreciating human organizations as complex network of 
relationships, Griffin, Shaw, and Stacey (1999, p. 295) criticized that he simply espoused a 
concept of leadership that stressed a desire to use or manage self-organizing processes as an 
instrument for gaining competitive advantage; and a desire to subsume the potentially more 
radical implications of self-organization and emergence within the current paradigm of 
objective management foresight and control.   
 
Another major shortcoming of the SECI model is its weakness in illustrating how individual 
knowledge could become organizational.  Despite the argument of the spiral theory that is 
supposed to move individual knowledge to the organizational level if individuals act upon 
their knowledge, Jakubik (2007, p. 9) found that it was still unknown how this was happening.  
McLean (2004) also concurred that owing to the highly abstract nature of the subject matter, 
the concepts presented in the SECI model lack explicit and testable hypotheses to show how 
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they relate to each other or operationalized.  How one’s knowledge can permeate the whole 
organization is the crux of the organizational knowledge creation theory.  The SECI model 
fails itself in its inability to provide a clear and workable mechanism.  
 
Finally, scholars are concerned about the limited applicability of the SECI model because it is 
based upon social and organizational characteristics that are specific to Japan and thus may 
not transfer to other contexts.  For instance, the operation of the socialization model relies on 
a strong personal commitment to the organization and externalization mode is characterized 
by a Japanese group orientation (Dalkir, 2010, p. 3140).  Since different countries and 
different industries have their own unique working culture, there is no assurance that the 
SECI model that may work effectively in a Japanese company can still be successful in a 
Chinese firm or another industry such as the healthcare sector. 
 
Nonaka humbly admits that his theory “was not yet fully developed as a dynamic and 
comprehensive framework for managing the knowledge-based firm because we had not yet 
fully understood the characteristics of knowledge as a resource” (Nonaka, Toyama & Hirata, 
2008, p. 241).  Obviously, some important questions are still left unanswered.  The model 
does not cover how individuals actually generate tacit knowledge (Spender, 1996a, p. 51); it 
concentrates on the transfer of tacit knowledge.  The relationship between individual and 
organizational knowledge is still unclear (Jakubik, 2007, p. 9).  These two questions are 
particularly important to this research and will be explored later.  Chen and Huang (2012) 
further pointed out that the issues of how knowledge creation takes place in different contexts, 
such as the newly start-up or the small and medium firms, and how the individual building 
blocks presented in Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2000) and Nonaka and Toyama (2003, 
2005) can be quantified and analyzed, still await further examining.  Nonetheless, the model 
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does contribute to the advancement of KM theory.  It is the first framework to focus on 
organizational knowledge creation by bringing in epistemological and ontological dimensions 
of knowledge, though the question of how individual knowledge is linked to organizational 
knowledge is still found wanting.  His concept of tacit knowledge is tightly linked to 
phenomenological epistemology (Nishitani, 1991).  It is contradictory to readers to find 
positivistic ideas such as categorization of knowledge in this major interpretivistic stance.  It 
is also notable that there are some traces of sense-making theories of Dervin and Weick in 
Nonaka’s ideas.  The most obvious of which is Nonaka’s emphasis on the process-relational 
characteristic of knowledge and that every world experience is momentary, that occurs at a 
particular time and space.  Knowledge becomes a flow rather than a stock.  The essence of 
the environment, the particular context of Ba, and past events and future vision of the 
organization on knowledge creation are also similar to Weick’s.   
 
2.2.2 Hedlund’s N-Form Organization 
Hedlund’s N-Form model was proposed in 1994, right after his work with Nonaka (Hedlund 
& Nonaka, 1993) and well before Nonaka and Takeuchi’s works (1995). While it is generally 
said that the N-Form model is a more elaborate version of Nonaka’s (McAdam & McCreedy, 
1999a; Haslinda & Sarinah, 2009), it is not a reaction to Nonaka’s KM spiral though some 
similar traces of ideas can be identified. In the words of Hedlund (1994, p. 82), the model is 
to capture “important differences between Western and Japanese approaches to knowledge 
management in large firms” in order to present the most possible and desirable framework for 
the process of knowledge storage, transfer and transformation in organizations. It is argued 
that it needs to go beyond the traditional M-Form (multidivisional form) hierarchical 
corporation to build on the interplay between two different types of knowledge: articulated 
and tacit, at four different levels of carriers of knowledge:  the individual, the small group, 
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the organization and the interorganizational domain, under three sets of dynamic processes: 
articulation and internalization, the interaction of which is called reflection; extension and 
appropriation, the interaction of which is dialogue; and assimilation and dissemination.   
These elements are all displayed in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.8 below to clarify how inputs of 
knowledge (can be both articulated and tacit) are injected into the organization (assimilation) 
to invoke different processes (articulation, internalization, reflection, extension, appropriation, 
dialogue) to transfer and transform its nature in a dynamic way from the lowest individual to 
the highest interorganizational domain level to become outputs (can be both articulated and 
tacit) that can be disseminated to the environment (dissemination).  Of these different 
processes, reflection is considered the primary source of knowledge creation. 
 
Table 2.5 Types, Forms and Levels of Knowledge (Hedlund, 1994, p. 75) 
 Individual Group Organization Interorganizational 
Domain 
Articulated Knowledge 
/ Information 
Cognitive 
Skills 
Embodied 
Knowledge 
calculus 
Quality circle’s 
documental 
analysis of its 
performance 
Organization 
chart 
Suppliers’ patents 
and documented 
practices 
Tacit knowledge / 
Information 
Cognitive 
Skills 
Embodied 
Cross-
cultural 
negotiation 
skills 
Team 
coordination in 
complex work 
Corporate 
culture 
Customers’ attitudes 
to products and 
expectations 
 
Figure 2.8 Hedlund’s N-Form Organization and Transformation Processes (Hedlund, 
1994, p. 77) 
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It is undeniable that the model is more sophisticated than the SECI model in capturing the 
complexity of knowledge transfer and transformation in organizations.  However, it remains 
problematic (albeit limited) in that it assumes the carriers, like the knowledge, can be simply 
segregated and related with the limited types of knowledge (Table 2.5), which is consistent 
with Nonaka’s externalization and combination KM process (McAdam & McCreedy, 1999a, 
p. 96; Haslinda & Sarinah, p. 2009, p. 190).  Besides having the same typological 
categorizations as Nonaka’s, Hedlund’s model is never a knowledge creation model.  He did 
give a few examples of reflection such as writing a good scientific paper, but he never went 
beyond that to elaborate clearly what the process is.  It is more a knowledge transfer and 
transformation model than one for knowledge creation. 
 
2.2.3 Boisot’s I-Space Model 
Boisot’s (1998) I-Space model is built on his perspectives on the relations amongst data, 
information and knowledge.  Data is something out there that an observer notices.  
Information is what is extracted from data when incoming data can be related in a meaningful 
way to an observer’s prior expectations.  Knowledge is what the observer believes that 
dispose him or her to act on the receipt of new information and it is subject to modification 
by information extracted from data (Boisot & Griffiths, 2001, p. 214).  In other words, in 
Boisot’s model, it is only data, instead of information or knowledge as Nonaka claimed, that 
will flow within an organization, but one will come to sense the presence of knowledge by 
tracking the flow of physical data.  The question then becomes how data is moved in the I-
Space.   
 
As shown in Figure 2.9 below, the I-Space model is presented as a three-dimensional cube 
with three axes: codification, abstraction and diffusion. The basic tenet of the model is “The 
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more codified and abstract an item of information becomes, then, other things being equal, 
the larger the percentage of a given population it will be able to reach in a given period of 
time” (Boisot, 1998, p. 55). Codification refers to the creation of content categories to which 
data can be readily assigned for further processing (Boisot & Griffiths, 2001, p. 215).  It is 
similar to the tacit-explicit dichotomy of Nonaka’s SECI model in that knowledge is either 
codified or uncodified.  But Boisot brings in an extra dimension of abstraction to the SECI 
model to explain the mechanism of knowledge sharing.  Abstraction is the process that 
minimizes the number of cognitive categories an agent needs to make sense of events. The 
fewer the categories an agent needs to understand the events, the more abstract the data is.  
Since codification lend structure and order to the process of abstraction, which in turn, by 
establishing categories that are relevant to an agent’s purpose, channels efforts at codification 
into useful, meaningful areas, both processes work together to speed up the diffusion of data 
within an organization (Boisot & Griffiths, 2001, p. 215).  And the more easily the data can 
be diffused, the more amenable they are to sharing.  Rather than restricting the acquisition of 
shared experience through apprenticeship as espoused in the socialization mode of Nonaka, 
Boisot emphasizes the need for a common context for knowledge sharing to take place.  
                  
Figure 2.9 Boisot’s I-Space Model (Adapted from Boisot & Griffiths, 2001, p. 217) 
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Another new concept explicit in the I-Space is the element of learning in the generation of 
new knowledge.  This has not been directly addressed by other knowledge creation models.  
Boisot calls the most discernible flow pattern of data as the Social Learning Cycle (SLC) that 
moves data clockwise cyclically in the I-Space in the consecutive order of the following six 
phases (Figure 2.9).  This reflects not only the creation, distribution, and absorption of new 
knowledge but also the learning processes of a given population (Boisot, 1995, p. 187).   
 Scanning: insights are gained from generally available (diffused) data 
 Problem-Solving: problems are solved giving structure and coherence to these insights 
(knowledge becomes codified) 
 Abstraction: the newly codified insights are generalized to a wide range of situations 
(knowledge becomes more abstract) 
 Diffusion: the new insights are shared with a target population in a codified and abstract 
form (knowledge becomes diffused) 
 Absorption: the newly codified insights are applied to a variety of situations producing 
new learning experiences (knowledge is absorbed and produces learnt behavior and so 
becomes uncodified, or tacit) 
 Impacting: abstract knowledge becomes embedded in concrete practices, for example in 
artifacts, rules or behavior patterns (knowledge becomes concrete) 
 
Following Polanyi and Dervin, Boisot is another scholar to put forward learning as the means 
to acquire new knowledge or drop old knowledge in its SLC.  Starting from the fuzzy 
“personal knowledge” which is highly uncodified, concrete and therefore hard to be diffused, 
people in the organization need to extract novel pattern from the data before moving the cycle 
upwards towards more codified and abstract to become “proprietary knowledge”.  Here, 
Boisot introduces the processes of scanning, problem-solving and abstraction as knowledge 
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creation activities.  People have to make use of their own imagination and independent 
thought to identify any new pattern from the data.  The findings must be subject to further 
testing for their robustness.  Boisot calls this process problem-solving, which may include 
alternatives identification, scientific discovery, assimilation, accommodation and heuristic 
problem-solving.  After rigorous testing and selecting the best fit, the data pattern will 
gradually become more codified and articulated, and thus can be generalized to different 
situations. This process of abstraction “produces a richer scheme allowing the flow and 
transformation of knowledge to be analyzed in a greater detail” (Haggie & Kingston, 2003).  
This first part of SLC gives a clearer picture of how new knowledge is created by the process 
of learning and how tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge. 
 
The second part of SLC covers knowledge sharing.  Proprietary knowledge can be regarded 
as explicit knowledge in the SECI model.  Being more codified and abstract, it is ready for 
more widespread diffusion and sharing by more people with the help of ICTs to become 
“public knowledge”.  At the same time, people will absorb external knowledge and get 
assimilated with their internal schema.  Boisot (2002, p. 73) states that it is a process of 
internalization and sensemaking in which new information is integrated with an existing 
knowledge base. Finally, such knowledge will be embedded in practice to become “common 
sense” in which knowledge will move back to its uncodified and concrete state.    
 
Many valuable insights are offered by Boisot’s model. It recognizes the elusive and dynamic 
nature of knowledge. Knowledge is not a thing out there, but an extraction from relevant 
information and meaningful data. Consequently, we are told that knowledge can be applied in 
diverse situations.  It is the first model that incorporates learning as the key factor 
contributing to the creation and transmission of knowledge within an organization.  This 
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provides an important direction for future research.  As Dalkir (2005, p. 66) commented, the 
SLC serves to link content, information, and KM in a very effective way - the codification 
dimension is linked to categorization and classification; the abstraction dimension is linked to 
knowledge creation, and the diffusion dimension is linked to information access and transfer. 
Therefore, the model presents much potential to be used to manage an organization’s 
knowledge assets.  It is also the first time to see notions of problem-solving and sensemaking 
in a knowledge creation model.  More sensemaking knowledge creation models are 
developed thereafter and will be reviewed later.  Yet, the I-Space model has many 
shortcomings too that need further elaboration before they can be applied in this research.  
McAdam and McCreedy (1999a, p. 97) pointed out it suffers from the same limitations as 
Nonaka’s SECI model in that knowledge is categorized into discrete types and is thus more 
consistent with the positivistic approach. The idea of diffused knowledge is also rather 
general and lack clarity if it includes incorporating knowledge within the organization or the 
idea of spreading it.   In addition, the paths, media as well as the diffusion process are still left 
unexplored.  Dalkir (2005, pp. 66 – 67) summarized that the model is so narrowly 
implemented that more extensive field-testing of its applicability is required.  
           
2.2.4 Demerest’s Knowledge Construction Model 
Adapted from Clarke and Staunton’s (1989) model of KM, Demerest’s model lays emphasis 
on the social construction of knowledge.  As seen from Figure 2.10 below, the constructed 
knowledge is then embodied within the organization through a process of social interchange.  
This is then followed by dissemination and being put to economic use.  There is also bi-
directional flow of knowledge amongst these processes.  McAdam and McCreedy (1999a; 
1999b; 2000) commented that as compared to knowledge categorization models, Demerest’s 
model takes a more holistic approach to knowledge construction rather than assuming any 
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given definition of knowledge.  It is intrinsically linked to the social and learning processes 
within the organization.  It is also similar to other models which include knowledge 
acquisition, problem solving, dissemination, ownership, storage, knowledge policy, systems 
knowledge and communities of practice.  However, the model implies a simplistic procedural 
and mechanistic approach; it ignores the fact that the flow of knowledge in organizations is 
extremely complex, rapid and circulatory, as in the case of action learning.  Moreover, there 
is no detailed mechanism of how knowledge is actually constructed or created.   
 
Figure 2.10 Demerest’s Knowledge Construction Model (McAdam & McCreedy, 2000, 
p. 157) 
 
2.2.5 Choo’s Sense-Making Model 
The concept of sensemaking is formally introduced in Choo’s (1998; 2006) KM model. In 
addition to the component of sensemaking, it also includes two other processes of knowledge 
creating and decision making.  Huotari (2010) provided a succinct review of Choo’s model: 
Chun Wei Choo has applied Taylor’s model of information use environments, 
Dervin’s situation-gap-model of sense-making, and Kuhlthau’s information search 
process, which includes the affective dimension, to a general model of information 
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use within organizational settings… He presents three platforms, where organizations 
use information: to make sense of the environment in which they operate, to create or 
generate new knowledge through organizational learning, and to make decisions on 
the basis on the principle of bounded rationality. These interconnected processes 
shape a holistic view of organizational information use, and integration of the three 
platforms constitutes a knowing organization.  (pp. 3109- 3310) 
The central idea behind Choo’s model shown in Figure 2.11 below is to “present an 
information-based view of organizations, a model of how organizations use information to 
adapt to external change and to foster internal growth” (Choo, 2006, p. 1).  Sense-making is 
triggered by a change in the external environment.  In response to the change, members of the 
organization have to make sense of the new information flow from the environment in order 
to construct shared meanings that define the organization’s purpose and frame the perception 
of problems or opportunities that the organization can work on, and which also provide a 
shared context for creating new knowledge and making decisions for actions (Choo, 2002, p. 
79).  How sensemaking is performed is based on Weick’s (1995; 2001) model of 
organizational sensemaking, which is built on four interconnected processes of ecological 
change, enactment, selection and retention.  Ecological change refers to changes in the 
environment that create discontinuity in the experience of the organizational members who 
then need to find ways to interpret or make sense of the information to reduce its equivocality 
so as to derive shared meanings.  Enactment is such a process to construct the environment 
by bracketing experiences and creating new features in the environment so as to form a 
smaller set of equivocal data to be interpreted.  Based on organizational members’ past 
interpretations that worked well before in explaining similar or related situations with the 
equivocal data, the one that provides the most sensible cause-effect explanation of what the 
current situation is selected.  In retention, all successful sensmaking experience will be 
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retained to create an organizational memory that can be retrieved for future cycles of 
enactment and selection.  
 
 
Figure 2.11 Choo’s Sensemaking Model (Choo, 2006, p. 250) 
 
The above sensemaking activities are affected by organizational members’ beliefs and actions.  
Both combine to determine how people select, highlight and connect events, and enact new 
features to help them understand the environment (Choo, 2006, p. 18).  As said, the outcome 
of sensemaking is a shared context for knowledge creating and decision making.  Knowledge 
creation can be perceived as a transformation of personal experiences into knowledge through 
dialogue, discourse, sharing and storytelling. It occurs when the organization faces a new 
problem situation that has never been encountered before and, in order to close the 
knowledge gap that exists, it needs to embark on knowledge creation to generate the 
knowledge it is lacking to solve the problem. While sensemaking is information 
interpretation, knowledge creation is information conversion.  In Choo’s view, there are three 
types of knowledge.  They are tacit, explicit and cultural. Knowledge creation incorporates 
the SECI knowledge conversion model of Nonaka, the knowledge building of Leonard-
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Barton (1995) and knowledge-linking of Normann and Ramirez (1994).  Through these 
processes, Choo argues that the organization will continuously create new knowledge by 
converting tacit to explicit knowledge; building up knowledge through shared problem 
solving, experimenting and prototyping that in the end will strengthen the organization’s 
distinctive core capabilities; and transferring knowledge across its own boundaries to form 
close learning alliance with other organizations.  The result of knowledge creation can be 
new capabilities or innovations that give more options for the organization to make more 
informed decisions.  
 
The strength of Choo’s model is in taking a holistic approach towards key processes of KM 
with extension to organizational decision making, which is often lacking in many other KM 
models (Dalkir, 2005, p. 61; 2010, p. 3141; Huotari, 2010, p. 3112).  It also includes many 
useful concepts such as knowledge building methods of problem-solving and improvisations 
which can be further developed.  The model is also valuable in its incorporation of the 
concept of “sensemaking”, focusing on how individuals must make sense, or develop 
understanding, of the knowledge that is available in the organization. It lays down clearly that 
sensemaking plays an important role in facilitating the creation of organizational knowledge 
and decision-making.   
 
However, the focus of the model is on information management, not KM.  As sensemaking is 
obviously an interpretivist’s concept, it is contradictory for Choo to adopt the positivist’s 
approach to categorize knowledge into discrete types.  In addition, some also comment that 
the assumption of the model that organizations can learn and acquire knowledge is not 
tenable; only humans working in organizations are capable of learning and knowing (Wilson, 
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2007).  Although this is a very good and comprehensive model with numerous valuable 
concepts, further modification is still needed.   
 
2.2.6 Cecez-Keemanovic’s Sensemaking model 
The sensemaking concept is more fully adopted in Cecez-Kecmanovic’s (2002; 2004) model.  
Drawing on Wiley’s (1988)’s micro-macro social theory, Weick’s (1995; 2001) sensemaking 
model and Tsoukas’s (1996) view of firms as distributed knowledge systems, Cecez-
Kecmanovic’s (2004) sensemaking view of organizations “focuses on how people construct 
sense of their worlds and how they use and create knowledge in the process of sensemaking” 
(p. 157).  Similar to Dervin’s SMM, the process starts from encountering a puzzling or 
incomprehensible situation in which an individual has to interpret and assign meaning to it by 
drawing upon his or her own experience as well as his or her own background knowledge of 
a context within which the event occurred.  New knowledge is thus created in this process of 
making sense by seeking and exchanging information, ascribing meaning, interpreting and 
explaining situations and determining an action. Cecez-Kecmanovic believed that 
organizations were described by Wiley (1988)’s four mutually interrelated levels of 
sensemaking: intrasubjective, intersubjective, generic subjective, and extrasubjective.  
Therefore, in his view, sensemaking process was carried out by different entities in these four 
levels creating different types of knowledge, namely, individual, inter-subjective or 
collective, organizational and cultural.  These knowledge types are simultaneously created, 
transformed and applied in social practices and in permanent flux, influencing and 
reconstituting each other.  They are graphically presented in Figure 2.12 below. 
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Figure 2.12 The Sensemaking Model of KM in Organization (Cecez-Kecmanovic & 
Jerram, 2002, p. 897) 
 
Cecez-Kecmanovic has a similar view to Weick (1995) in that sensemaking is drawn from 
and based on knowledge, but also creates new knowledge.  He also shares with Dervin’s 
theory that the reality is socially constructed and whether individuals alone or in groups will 
achieve the same understanding and interpretation of an event or a situation, triggering a 
collective action.  He thought it was important to distinguish and analyze different types of 
knowledge at a particular sensemaking level.  It was also equally crucial to investigate the 
impacts of one level on the other such as the ways actors interact are determined by patterns 
of communication and organizational rules as part of social structure.  He concluded that the 
sensemaking model of knowledge may assist organizations in understanding better their 
knowledge resources and problems associated with knowledge creation, sharing and 
deployment.  However, he is not very specific of how knowledge is created in the 
sensemaking process in each level. For instance, the following is what Cecez-Kecmanovic 
(2004) described of the intra-subjective sensemaking: 
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At the basic intra-subjective sensemaking level, it is an individual who observes and 
interprets situations and events, makes sense of them and performs tasks by applying 
his/her experience, judgment and skills, that is, previously acquired knowledge.  As a 
result, the individual learns and creates new knowledge. (p. 158) 
Though some key concepts are raised such as individual observation, perception and 
interpretation, individual cognitive characteristics, individual training, he still fails to portray 
any specific process or mechanism for knowledge creation.  Again, like many other 
knowledge creation models, the question of how individuals create knowledge is still left 
unanswered (Spender, 1996a, p. 51).   
 
To conclude, I concur with the view of Evans and Alleyne (2009) that today, there is no 
known model that provides a comprehensive view of the elements and processes involved in 
knowledge creation, and “existing models of the knowledge domain attempt to model only 
parts of the environment (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI Model; Boisot’s (1998) 
Data, Information, Knowledge; and Reilly’s (2008) Relational Knowledge Domain Model)” 
(p. 148).  What emerges from these models is the clear interpretivist stance they take in 
recognizing the social character of knowledge though it is also contradictory for them to 
categorize knowledge into different entities and mistaken for them to use tacit and explicit 
knowledge in the belief that they are separate entities.  But one important characteristic 
emerged from these models is the variation of traces of sensemaking theories.  The claims 
abound that knowledge is usually created under turbulent change of the environment or when 
a puzzling situation is encountered.  The critical importance of time-space concept and the 
situational character of knowledge are highlighted.  In fact, Choo’s and Cecez-Kecmanovic’s 
models are based on Weick’s sensemaking theory and also draw on some of Dervin’s SMM.  
Souto, Dervin, and Savolainen (2012) directly pointed out the need to have designs that allow 
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the knowing workers to focus not just on delivering knowledge but also on communicating 
knowledge that will be contributive to intended users and supportive of the ways in which 
they create new knowledge.  They provided an exemplar using Dervin's SMM as an approach 
to focus on how knowledge workers navigate complex and elusive situations and, in particular, 
on their knowing actions in specific moments of time-space within their situations, an approach 
that can attend systematically to time-space bound patterns of user knowings.  
 
An ontological dimension can also be commonly found in nearly all models reviewed.  It is 
argued that individual knowledge must spread around to the organization and even beyond its 
own organization through different ontological levels and in each of the stage, knowledge 
will be transformed.  But the link between individual and organizational knowledge is not 
thoroughly studied and it is unclear about the micro-macro relationship in knowledge creation 
and sharing.  Spencer’s (2008) view below succinctly pinpointed the importance of 
conducting further research into these topics: 
I strongly believe that the management and organization studies must begin to 
develop an understanding of the meta-cognitive and micro-interactional processes 
involved in these absolutely important phenomena. Without these understandings, 
practicing managers, the ultimate target of our knowledge building enterprise in the 
discipline, are less likely be able to make sense of their learning and knowledge 
building processes. … I do not see these issues being holistically addressed in our 
journals and conferences, and one would certainly never find them addressed in any 
of our management textbooks.  (p. 466)  
The next section will review the current studies on the relationship between individual and 
organizational knowledge. 
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2.3 The Link between Individual and Organizational Knowledge 
How individual knowledge is linked to organizational knowledge is concerned with the 
century-old question of whether individuals, groups, organizations or institutions are the 
cognizing entities.   There are various schools of thoughts in the literature.  The cognitive 
theory based on the positivist epistemology assumes that organizations are able to learn, 
either through individual members of the organization or by assuming that the organization 
has the same cognitive capacities as its members (Cybert & March, 1963; March & Olsen, 
1975; Hedberg, 1981; Cohen, 1991; Simon, 1991; Dodgson, 1993; Kim, 1993).  
Organizational learning is thus linked to individual learning theories which are based on 
behaviorism or cognitivism. Behaviorism emphasizes the stimulus-response relationship that 
was espoused in Hedberg’s (1981) model.  Cognitivism assumes that the human mind 
functions like a computer.  Kim’s (1993) model that links individual and organizational 
learning through mental models has obviously taken the cognitive stance.   Like learning, 
knowledge is regarded as a commodity that can be handled individually. Organizational 
knowledge is defined as the sum of individual knowledge or individual knowledge shared by 
all members of an organization.  Grant’s (1996) resource-based theory, Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) evolutionary theory and Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI model are all regarded 
to have embraced the cognitive perspectives (Chiva & Alegre, 2006).   
 
While many of the contemporary research on organizational learning and knowledge is 
basically positivistic (Spender, 1996b), they fail to provide “convincing explanations for the 
transition of the learning from an individual state to an organizational state” (Magalhaes, 
1998, p. 111) and thus the link with organizational knowledge development.  There are 
doubts over the beliefs that individuals and organizations were ontologically similar and the 
assumption that organization can learn and act like human beings (Cook & Yanow, 1996).  
 141 
Hence, many theorists still believe that only individuals can think and learn.  There is a lack 
of clarity about the relationship between thought and action, and thus about the dynamics of 
learning and forgetting at the organizational level (Spender, 1998a; Magalhaes, 1998).  
Another critical deficiency in this school of thought is the assumption that there is only one 
type of objective knowledge, effectively ignoring the fact that organizations are more likely 
than individuals to retrieve tacit components of knowledge in their daily social interaction 
(Spender, 1998a).    
 
A gradual paradigm shift away from the positivist epistemologies to the interpretivist 
perspective is evident in an expanding body of research that takes a communicative approach 
in the understanding of individual and organizational knowledge.  Peter Drucker (1954) was 
one of the first to regard communication as one of the key features of a Management-by- 
Objectives organization.  Duncan and Weiss (1979) echoed this when arguing that 
organizational learning is a process of knowledge development and organizational knowledge 
emerges out of the social process of interaction of organizational members.  This line of 
thought was developed further by Daft and Weick (1984) who viewed organizations as 
interpretation systems.  They stated, “The distinctive feature of organization level 
information activity is sharing.  A piece of data, a perception, a cognitive map is shared 
among managers who constitute the interpretation system” (Daft & Weick, 1984, p. 285).  
Weick and Roberts (1993)’s concept of collective mind further takes communication 
processes into the centre of the formation of group mind.  Collective mind “is conceptualized 
as a pattern of heedful interrelations of actions in a social system. Actors in the system 
construct their actions (contributions), understanding that the system consists of connected 
actions by themselves and others (representation), and interrelate their actions within the 
system (subordination)” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 357).  Collective knowledge as derived 
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from collective mind is understood as an emergent capacity to act collectively, “involves 
continuous co-creation of inter-subjective meanings and mutual understanding through 
‘heedful interrelating’” (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2004, p. 158).  It is different from individual 
knowledge in that it resides between rather than within individuals.  Social interactions and 
patterns of interlocking behaviors among organizational members were placed as the key to 
link to organizational knowledge.   
 
Weick and Roberts’ thoughts found a number of parallels in Maturana and Varela’s (1992) 
theory of autopoiesis, which also forms the basis of von Krogh and Roos (1996)’s self-
referential epistemology.  Autopoietic theory has its origin in biology to differentiate living 
from non-living organisms.  Living systems are those that are capable of self-producing its 
own components in a bounded system in an autonomous manner.  In other words, the self-
produced components are necessary and sufficient to produce the system continuously and 
this auto-organization is “operationally closed” so that the system is also self-referential: it 
produces its own rules of existence and therefore has a particular type of “biological” 
coherence (Luisi, 2003; Hall, 2005; Hall & Nousala, 2010; Magalhães, 1998; Kay & Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2002; 2003).  Drawing on Darwin’s concept of natural drift and the notions of 
structural coupling and structural determinism, the theory is applied to the understanding of 
cognition and organizational knowledge.  Maturana (1970) defined “cognition” as the 
operation of organizationally closed network of processes:  
A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in 
which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of 
cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in this domain. Cognition in a 
self-sustaining system thus comprises homeostatic processes within the system 
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responding to perturbations in order to maintain the entity’s capacity for self-
maintenance and self-sustainment. (p.13)   
When an individual interacts with the environment which only serves as the trigger for 
change or perturbation, his or her response is determined by particular states of his or her 
nervous system activity in a closed cycle or what is called structural determinism (Maturana 
& Varela, 1980).  The person will experience the phenomenon of natural drift in which the 
person’s behavior will change as the structure of his or her nervous system gradually changes 
to adapt to the change in the environment.   The way an individual’s behavior is changed is 
not only unique to that person but also is defined by that person’s own history of interactions 
with the environment.  In addition, both the person and the environment co-adapt to each 
other in the course of evolution (Maturana & Varela, 1992).  By this notion of structural 
coupling in which there is mutual co-evolution of the environment and the person (enacting, 
or co-emergence) in a history of evolutionary transformation, it gives rise to the process of 
life, and simultaneously to the process of cognition (Luisi, 2003; Proulx, 2008).  Kay and 
Cecez-Kecmanovic (2002) argued that this individual cognition is linked to organization 
knowledge through the concepts of structural coupling and consensual domains.  When two 
or more autopoietic entities interact with each other in an organization and become recurrent, 
they are so structurally coupled that they become second-order autopoietic entities that 
exhibit a degree of structural congruence developed through their common experiences.  The 
gradual structural coupling of two or more second-order autopoietic entities will establish a 
third-order social system (Maturana & Varela, 1980) and produces sets of contextual 
interlocking behaviors that will enable two individuals to observe the attribution of meaning 
to common events and experience that are extremely similar for both parties (Kay & Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2002, p. 385). These sets of interlocking behaviors is referred to as “consensul 
domains” or “coordinated behavior”, which, according to Maturana and Varela (1992), is also 
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a kind of communicative behavior as “communication takes place each time there is 
coordinated behavior in a realm of structural coupling” (p. 196).  Language is an example of 
this consensual domain. Based on the above premise, Magalhães (1998) argued that the 
autopoietic view of language use is one of the missing links between individual and 
organizational knowledge (p. 112). 
 
The above co-ontogenous view of communication also denotes Maturana and Varela’s view 
on organizational knowledge.  Taking the view that organizational knowledge exists through 
the development of consensual domains, and the view that cognition is not a representation of 
the pre-existing world, Maturana and Varela (1992) assert that there is an intimate 
relationship between human knowledge and human experience.  Hence, “to live is to know” 
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 174) and that “every act of knowing brings forth a world … 
[such that] All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing” (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 26). 
They pointed out that a person’s knowledge is inseparable from how the world appears to 
him or her.  Therefore, knowledge is context-dependent, is closely linked to observation, is 
not abstract, is effective action, is found in the mind, body and in the social system, and is 
shared through communication.  It is clear that similar to the idea expressed in collective 
mind, autopoietic theory also recognizes the importance of interactions and activity in the 
development of coordinated behaviors.   
 
Under the influence of Maturana and Varela, von Krogh and Roos (1995a) also argued that 
the bridge between individualized and socialized knowledge is achieved by means of 
language.  In their view, while knowledge construction is a personal experience according to 
the theory of autopoiesis, how this individualized knowledge becomes socialized or 
organizational can be explained by the theory of scaling.  Scaling implies self-similarity.  
 145 
Applying to the emergence of organization knowledge, it means that “the way new 
knowledge is produced at the individual level is similar to the way new knowledge is 
produced at the group, the department and the organization levels” (Magalhães, 1998, p. 109).  
And behind the whole engine of this conversion is again language.  The function of language 
is to allow action to be coordinated in the organization, and such coordination is achieved 
through organizational members making useful distinctions about the organization (an 
important form of organizational learning) (Magalhães & Sanchez, 2009, p. 9). 
 
Although the theory of autopoiesis is applied in the understanding of social systems and 
organization science, it does not have a profound influence as the theory itself is not 
developed to account for social behaviors.  Unlike von Krogh and Roos (1996), Goldspink 
and Kay (2004) did not consider social systems to be autopoietic.  Instead, they found the 
theory useful for understanding the characteristics of the micro-level agents that make up 
social systems – human individuals and how social behavior can arise from, and is 
constrained by, the characteristics of human individuals (Goldspink & Kay, 2004, pp. 599 - 
602).  But this is not sufficient enough to explain the macro-level behavior.  To them, a more 
complete framework that links both the constitutive (micro) and emergent (macro) 
dimensions of social organizations is the synthesis between autopoietic and complexity 
theory.  Complexity theory provides a basis for understanding the range and type of dynamics 
possible at macro-level if individuals that make up the organization are brought together and 
begin to act in coordinated ways (Goldspink & Kay, 2004).   The two theories are seen as 
compatible to each other for they present common epistemological and ontological roots in 
epistemological relativism and ontological realism which are consistent with the philosophy 
of critical realism.  Complexity theory is later incorporated in Stacy’s (2001) complex 
response processes in organizations and forms the basis of Snowden’s (2000; 2002) Cynefin 
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model.  The shift towards a communicative approach to link individual and organizational 
knowledge is so obvious that this thesis also adopts this kind of theory as the research lens.  
 
Taking the above perspective of knowledge as a process and socially constructed, both 
Spender and Tsoukas lay more emphasis on the role of activity in organizations.  In 
recognition of the weakness of Weick and Roberts’s (1993) collective mind analysis in 
clarifying the relationship between the individual and collective mind, the source of 
knowledge received and how the collective learns (Spender, 1998a, pp. 20-21), Spender 
(1996b) attempted to develop a more comprehensive theory that covers a theory of learning, 
of memory and of knowledge application in the workplace.  He looked to the actor network 
theory of Callon (1986) and Latour (1986), the activity theory of Vygotsky (1962) and the 
analysis of Reber (1993) to derive his conception of individual and social knowledge using 
explicit / implicit distinction in a two-by-two matrix (see Table 2.4 in p. 95 above).  Each 
quadrant represents different types of organizational knowledge, learning and memory 
processes. They interact with each other dialectically to form an organic system with 
knowledge both at the level of the system and at the level of the individuals it embraces.  
Rather than as a system of tradable resources, the organization is re-conceptualized as a 
community of practice with situated and embedded knowledge and institutional dimensions 
that give these practices meaning.  It presages the change of paradigm to those that focus on 
the social nature of meaning and practice and the resulting model is an organization with a 
dynamic and self-referring system (Spender, 1996b, p. 75).  However, Spender (1998a) 
emphasizes that his model still awaits further testing for its validity and utility.   
 
Drawing mainly from Polanyi’s exposition that all knowledge is personal and Wittgenstein’s 
theory that all knowledge is collective, Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) defined individual 
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knowledge as the “individual ability to draw distinctions within a collective domain of action, 
based on an appreciation of context or theory, or both” (p. 979), and organizational 
knowledge as “the capability members of an organization have developed to draw 
distinctions in the process of carrying out their work, in particular concrete contexts, by 
enacting sets of generalizations (propositional statements) whose application depends on 
historically evolved collective understandings and experiences” (p. 983).  In their beliefs, 
knowledge starts with action.  In order to know how to act, an individual must be able to 
exercise judgment or draw distinctions based on an appreciation of contexts acquired through 
past socializations within a form of life, a practice, a horizon of meaning or a consensual 
domain in which particular criteria of evaluation hold (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 977; 
Tsoukas, 2000, p. 105).   It requires the individual to engage in discursive practice which 
allows one to be socialized to obtain not only a stock of experience informing what works 
and what doesn’t but also the practical skills through on-the-job training to undertake the 
tasks within the practice.   
 
Personal knowledge becomes organizational when members of an organization draw 
distinctions in the course of their work, by taking into account not only the situatedness of 
their actions but also the generalization provided to them by the organization in the form of 
generic rules, and “the proper application of a rule is not an individual accomplishment but is 
fundamentally predicated on collectively shared meanings” (Tsoukas, 2000, pp. 108-9).  An 
organization acts like a community of practice in which members share their stories and 
artifacts that constitute a type of knowledge called heuristic knowledge “that has been 
historically generated in response to remarkable [past] events” (Tsoukas, 2000, p. 107).  This 
shared sense of interpretation informs members what a rule means and under what 
circumstances should they be applied.  This is what Tsoukas called “dispositions or 
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improvisation” that is acquired from past socializations in contexts outside the firm and 
largely determines how they see the world and behave in face of a particular situation in time-
space.  In a particular interactive situation, an individual will select out, on the one hand, 
what he or she understands to be the relevant aspects of both his or her role-related normative 
expectations in the organization and his or her set of dispositions, and, on the other hand, 
those relevant aspects of the local conditions within which his or her actions take place; and 
tries to fit the two together (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 19).  Because of this, Tsoukas and Vladimirou 
(2001) reminded that “abstract generalizations are in themselves incomplete to capture the 
totality of organizational knowledge.  In action, an improvisational element always follows it 
like shadow follows an object” (p. 988). In short, it can be said that heuristic knowledge that 
resides both in individuals’ mind and in the community of practice serves to link personal and 
organizational knowledge.  
 
In sum, the dynamic interaction between individual and organizational knowledge remains 
largely unresolved (Nonaka & Peltokorpi, 2006, p. 77; Spender, 1996a, p. 51).  The 
positivists’ view that an organization is able to learn either through its members or by 
assuming that it has the same learning capacity as humans is not convincing in providing 
explanation for the transition of learning from an individual to the organization.  The various 
communicative approaches taken by the interpretivists also require further empirical testing.  
But it is worth noting that language use, social practices and the personal sense-making 
judgment to apply role-expected norms to local situations are possible keys to bridge the 
micro and macro level of behavior.   
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2.4 Knowledge Management in Healthcare 
It has been argued in Chapter One that KM is directly relevant to the practice of EBM.  
However, research on knowledge creation and utilization model in the healthcare field is still 
wanting. In the early days, there was a clear stance of the influence of positivist ideology on 
KM in healthcare field.  Knowledge was equated with information and an IS / IT approach 
was advocated to the management of data and information in response to the call for 
managing information explosion facing clinicians, which gave rise to clinical informatics 
(Heathfield & Louw, 1999; Jackson, 2000).  Wyatt (2001) provided many different ways of 
how explicit and tacit knowledge based on Nonaka’s classification can be managed using 
Hansen (1999)’s codification and personalization strategies such as the implementation of 
practice guidelines, the development of decision support systems (DSS), and the 
establishment of clinical governance.  Nicolini, Powell, Conville and Martinez-Solano (2008, 
p. 250) quoted numerous examples to highlight the central role of electronic libraries and 
repositories of scientific information in the form of articles, guidelines and clinical protocols 
in the support of EBM. IT-based KM tools become the focus of the literature. Pedersen and 
Larsen (2001) presented a distributed health knowledge management model that structures 
DSS based on product state models and proved that the model enhanced the operational 
efficiency in healthcare administration.  Chae, Kim, Tark, Park and Ho (2003) presented an 
analysis of healthcare quality indicators using data mining and DSS for developing quality 
improvement strategies.  Abidi, Cheah and Curran (2005) advocated the use of data-mining 
techniques for the operational management of healthcare enterprises.  Similarly, 
Wickramasinghe (2006; 2008) introduced the enabling role of data mining for realizing the 
knowledge spiral in a meta-framework.  In addition, he also illustrated how e-mails can be 
used to support knowledge creation (Wickramasinghe & Lichtenstein, 2006).  In fact, Sharma, 
Wickramasinghe and Gupta (2005) reiterated the need for the incorporation of people, 
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processes and technologies to improve the efficiency in healthcare delivery.  The application 
of intelligence continuum model is one such example (Wickramasinghe, 2007). Besides e-
mails, other web-based tools such as the Application Service Provider model were also 
examined to discover in what ways they can assist healthcare practitioner in information 
management (Cruz, Rodriguex, & Sanchez, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Model of Knowledge Management in Primary Care (De Lusignan, 
Pritchard, & Chan, 2002, p. 301) 
 
There are not many KM models for healthcare. De Lusignan, Pritchard and Chan (2002) put 
forward the first KM model for primary care practitioners to support the practice of EBM.  
Building on Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)’s SECI model, the model in Figure 2.13 above 
seeks to balance the need for both explicit as well as tacit knowledge using both the 
“information-centered” and “learner-centered” styles.  Four prototypical activities on learning 
types are proposed: practice of evidence-based care, the use of Intranets, clinical audit 
learning activities and the person-to-person mentorship program. It provides a framework of 
how the set of knowledge activities for primary care practitioners might be made up and what 
the place of information technologies might be within the model.  Dwivedi, Bali and Naguib 
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(2003) introduced Organization Current Knowledge Design (OCKD) as another KM 
framework which was claimed as more holistic to support the designing, building, and 
maintenance of a knowledge-sharing platform both from an IT and organizational perspective.   
However, these models are far from useful in unlocking the mystery of knowledge creation, 
sharing and utilization in the healthcare field. 
 
Realizing the marginal impact of IT-based KM tools on the outcomes of heathcare, the 
interpretivistic approach began to proliferate in the literature.  Liebowitz (2007) and Zhu 
(2007) took the view that healthcare knowledge was socially constructed and argued that 
social network analysis and knowledge audits could be combined to address the problem of 
knowledge dissemination across different functional silos in healthcare organizations.  This 
was echoed in the concept of “mindlines” that Gabbay and le May (2004) developed as 
socially constituted tacit knowledge on which clinicians rely to inform their day-to-day 
practice.  These mindlines were constructed not only from brief reading but also the 
clinicians’ own and their colleagues’ experience, their interactions with each other and with 
opinion leaders, patients and pharmaceutical representatives, and other sources of largely 
tacit knowledge.  Ryu, Ho, and Han (2003) used the theory of reasoned action and planned 
behavior to investigate factors affecting physicians’ knowledge sharing behavior in hospitals.  
Lee and Foo (2007) further advocated narratives and discussed the role of three different 
types of narratives in healthcare organizations.    
 
More and more discussion was found in the literature on the important role of informal 
networks and COPs in conveying evidence to healthcare personnel.  Gabbay et al. (2003) 
revealed in their studies that KM and collective sense-making processes did occur in two 
multi-agency COPs and suggested ways in which evidence-based policy development in the 
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health and social services might be strengthened.  The experience of NHS in UK further 
proved that COPs are effective means to spread the best practice to improve health (Sandars 
&Heller, 2006). In the review of Barwick, Peters, and Boydell (2009), COPs were shown to 
transcend the barriers and limitations inherent in traditional continuing medical education; 
have positive effects on the acquisition and maintenance of knowledge in cardiovascular care; 
reduce time to treatment, improve waiting times, and increase patient and staff satisfaction in 
emergency care; and improve operating-room practices and effective techniques among 
leading heart surgeons resulting in a twenty-four percent drop in overall mortality rate for 
coronary bypass surgery.  Successful COP attempts to bridge the research-practice gap in 
EBM include the Caledonian Development Model (Tolson, Booth, & Lowndes, 2008), 
CHAIN (Russell, Greenhalgh, Boynton, & Rigby, 2004), the COPs in Ontario’s children’s 
mental health sector (Barwick, Peters, & Boydell, 2009).  However, there were also studies 
that point to the contrary.  For instance, Addicott, McGivern and Ferlie (2006) found that 
while networks were supposed to have a greater capacity for the transfer of evidence-based 
practices across the network and accelerated organizational learning, the KM role in NHS 
cancer networks remained marginal as they were hampered by the political constraints 
imposed on these networks.  Li et al. (2009) also warned that amongst all the 13 papers 
related to the COPs in the healthcare sector, none of them met the eligibility criteria for the 
quantitative analysis and thus the effectiveness of COPs in this sector remained unclear. 
 
The only model that is based entirely on a social construction view of knowledge is the 
Knowledge Domain Process (KDP) model developed by Evans and Alleyne (2009).   Taking 
a process modeling approach, the model aims to present a multi-dimensional abstraction of 
the environment and processes involved in knowledge creation and dissemination.  As 
illustrated in Fig. 2.14 below, the model consists of six layered but distinct components: 
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events, knowledge artifacts, individual knowledge process, group influence, organizational 
context and temporal cycles of time.  An event will trigger the attention of an individual, who 
by taking reference to knowledge artifacts present in the organization such as best practices, 
policies and procedures, will create knowledge through the three stages of filtering, applying 
human judgment and constructing new knowledge. This largely captures the essence of 
Tsoukas’ (1996; 2000) conception of knowledge creation.  Knowledge is created not just at 
individual level but also at group level simultaneously.  The group influence is represented by 
individuals that overlap along the Z-axis in the model as a group or community to reflect the 
social construction of knowledge.  Here, the knowledge concept is taken from Vygotsky 
(1962) and his activity theory colleagues. It emphasizes that group members simultaneously 
influence and are influenced by individual cognitive processes by factors such as shared 
values, norms, practices, and group culture.  Organizational context is to help individuals and 
group members understand the organization’s KM initiatives and practices.  The concept of 
time is to indicate the past and future knowledge states.  Although the model is not meant to 
create a complete epistemological or ontological view of all knowledge processes, it 
synthesized the works of many interpretivists and is by far the most comprehensive KM 
model identified in the literature that finds its application in an inter-professional care setting 
within healthcare to illustrate how knowledge is constructed, shared and used across 
numerous healthcare communities. Unfortunately, it is a work-in-progress and is still under 
development. Otherwise, it will be very useful to this research.  This also points to the 
necessity of further research into knowledge creation activity in the heathcare field.  
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Figure 2.14 Knowledge Domain Process (KDP) Model (Evans & Alleyne, 2009, p. 150) 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion – Research Gaps 
This voluminous literature review of the nature of knowledge from the Greek age to the 
contemporary times including the current approaches to KM illustrates very clearly that 
knowledge is an extremely fuzzy and ambiguous concept containing so many socially 
constructed elements that sense-making theories stand out as the most sensible and 
appropriate research lens for KM amongst myriads of interpretive and critical inquiry 
philosophies.  A working definition of knowledge comprising six components and KM are 
thus derived from the centerpiece of sense-making theories.  Knowledge is thought to be 
situated within a particular domain and KM is to create an environment conducive to 
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knowledge creation, sharing and utilization at both individual and organizational levels. 
Understanding knowledge construction is thus fundamental to the overall concept of the KM 
process, in regard to theory and practice. In addition to being of crucial importance, 
knowledge construction was also found to be the most difficult aspect of KM, from either a 
theoretical or a practical viewpoint. The review of various knowledge creation models 
indicated that the research and practice gap still exists and no known model has been 
developed so far to provide a comprehensive view of the elements and processes involved in 
knowledge creation. What is commonly found is the incorporation of both epistemological 
and ontological dimensions, but how knowledge is actually created in individual heads in 
these processes is not pinned down with firm theoretical and empirical support. In addition to 
the mystery of knowledge creation by individuals, it is also an unknown of how knowledge of 
an individual is linked to that of the organization. The discovery by the research of Maturana, 
Varela, von Krogh, Roos, Spender and Tsoukas that language use, social practices and the 
personal sense-making judgment may provide possible links between individual and 
organizational knowledge still awaits further empirical testing. With these unknowns, there is 
a lack of knowledge creation models and research in the healthcare field; only KDP model is 
more promising.  This research is to fill these missing gaps in the literature.     
 
Sense-making theories have been identified as the research lens for this research.  We can 
also discern many traces of sense-making theories in the review of knowledge creation model 
and the link between individual and organizational knowledge such as the time-space concept, 
the triggering effect of a puzzling event or situation, the way the puzzling situation is handled, 
and the influence of the environmental change.  The next chapter will review the leading 
sense-making theories before explaining the research methodology in full details in Chapter 
Four. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW – SENSE-MAKING THEORIES AS THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Knowledge made today is rarely perfectly suited to application tomorrow, and in some cases 
becomes tomorrow’s gap. 
Brenda Dervin 
 
How can I know what I think until I see what I say. 
Karl Weick 
 
We always know more than we can say, we will always say more than we can write down. 
 
 David Snowden 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter Two illustrates a clear trend towards a communicative 
approach to study KM, and sense-making theory stands out as the most appropriate research 
lens for this thesis.  Extending from the literary meaning of making use of five senses to 
perceive and understand the world, sense-making has been gradually evolving into broader 
theories focusing on user-oriented research.  Recently, five schools of theories that receive 
increasing attention in different fields of studies have emerged (Dervin & Naumer, 2009; 
2010).  Three out of these have more applications in KM research than others and thus are 
selected to form the focus of this review.  They are the audience and user studies of Brenda 
Dervin’s Sense-Making Methodology (SMM); organizational studies or organizational 
communication of Karl Weick’s sensemaking; and knowledge management of David 
Snowden’s sense-making.   Besides bearing the same label though in different grammatical 
forms, these three leading sense-making theories share many commonalities as well as 
differences.  Dervin’s SMM is widely recognized for research in understanding individual 
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sense-making and communication.  Weick’s and Snowden’s theories are known for research 
in organizational sense-making.  To what extent these theories complement each other to 
serve as the research lens for this thesis requires a critical review and comparison.  There are 
some reviews of these theories in the literature (Dervin & Naumer, 2009; 2010; Browning & 
Boudès, 2005), but in-depth comparison of these three leading authorities in sense-making is 
still lacking.  This Chapter aims to compare and contrast their parallels and differences with 
reference to knowledge creation, sharing and utilization in order to derive a complete 
theoretical framework from a micro to a macro level to guide this research.  In order to 
differentiate clearly what is being discussed, I will use the term “sense-making” to refer to the 
general discussion of the concept and use the specific term adopted by individual author to 
refer to their specific approaches.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Origins of Sense-making Theories 
All sense-making theories in this review share the same philosophical roots in 
phenomenology of the 20th century and constructionism.  However, the discourse 
communities are quite different though related to some extent.  Dervin’s SSM has been 
developed since 1972 with the concerted efforts of herself and her colleagues, and was first 
articulated as Sense-Making in 1983 (Dervin, 2005b, p. 26).  Dervin’s background is in 
communication.  Until 2012, she has been the Professor of Communication, and Joan N. 
Huber Faculty Fellow in Social and Behavioral Sciences in the School of Communication at 
Ohio State University where she previously served as the Department chairperson.  She 
received a bachelor degree in home economics with an emphasis in journalism from Cornell 
University in 1960.  She developed interests in communication when she worked as a public 
relations assistant for the American Home Economics Association from 1961 to 1962 and as 
a communication specialist at the University of Wisconsin focusing on communicating with 
 158 
the urban poor from 1963 to 1965 (Barbato, 1996).  Her growing interests in communication 
took her to study and earn her MA and PhD in Communication Research at Michigan State 
University in 1968 and 1971 respectively.  Since 1972, her growing concern for the urban 
poor has led her to expand her study to information poverty that impacts all citizens.  She 
found that the traditional mode of communication that categorizes users in terms of 
demographics, psychological traits and geography will only exacerbate the existing 
disparities in communication between haves and have-nots.  She saw a pressing need to 
explore an alternative way to bridge the information / knowledge gap (Dervin, 2003m, p.48; 
Barbato, 1996, p. 107).  SMM was developed to this end as a methodological approach to 
studying information needs, seeking and use communicatively, and has been gradually 
“evolved into a generalized communication–based methodology useful for the study of 
human sense-making (and sense-unmaking)” (Dervin, 1979, p. 729) that embraces “a set of 
assumptions, a theoretic perspective, a methodological approach, a set of research methods, 
and a set of communication practices” (Dervin, 2003c, p. 331), all oriented to systematically 
giving voice to the unvoiced, or hearing users / audience on their own terms.  
 
Dervin openly acknowledged that her SMM drew primarily on the intersections of the 
writings of American and European theorists in the fields of philosophy, sociology, 
psychology, education, cultural studies, communication, and feminist, cultural, and 
postmodern studies espousing theories often seen as competing: chaos, complexity, 
deconstruction, cultural studies, pragmatism, phenomenology, critical, administrative (Dervin, 
2005b, p. 26-27; Dervin, 2008a, p.3).  Amongst these, the influence of phenomenology is the 
most obvious. Dervin (1999a) admitted that she particularly owed debt to the following 
philosophers whose teachings informed her thoughts on the development of her Sense-
Making theory: Richard F. Carter, Jerome Bruner, Paulo Freire, William McGuire, Raymond 
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A. Morrow, Graham Murdock, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Jurgen Habermas, the latter four of whom had ties with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Gross, 2010, p. 18). Wilson (2003) also echoed by arguing that Blumer’s social 
interactionism which is one of the sources of Dervin’s ideas on Sense-Making had links to 
and is much in common with phenomenology.  He stated that George Herbert Mead, 
Blumer's teacher, studied in Freiberg, and must have come into contact with the ideas that led 
Husserl to develop phenomenology as a philosophical discipline in the same institution.  
Dervin’s (1999a) statement that the term sense-making was emerged in the early years of the 
phenomenological tradition provides further proof that Dervin’s SMM has historical roots in 
the phenomenology of the 20th century.   
 
Another philosophical root of SMM is social constructivism.  Social constructivism espouses 
the view that individuals construct their worlds through their own actions and perceptions. To 
Dervin, sense-making means “how people make sense of their worlds” (Dervin, 2003b, p. 
223).  She considers that the world is “sense-made” with individuals experiencing, 
interpreting, identifying choices, and otherwise enacting their sense-making processes 
throughout the course of their lives (Dervin, 2003k).  In fact, her definition of sense-making 
as “behavior, both internal (i.e. cognitive) and external (i.e. procedural) which allows the 
individual to construct and design his / her movement through time-space” and in particular, 
how he or she constructs information needs and uses in the process of sense-making denotes 
explicitly that the theory’s philosophical foundation rests on constructivist assumptions with 
a critical stance towards objectivism and positivism (Dervin, 1983; Dervin & Frenette, 2003, 
p. 239; Savolainen, 1993, p. 16).  Dervin (1983) also described that SMM was evolved from 
a constructivist approach at the beginning into a post-constructivist, or postmodern modernist 
approach in a later stage and finally into a communitarian approach in 1994 (Dervin, 2003i) 
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and a verbing approach in 1997 (still current) (Dervin, 2010b).   SMM also borrows from the 
critical theory of Gramsci, Foucault and Freire, and presents a method for understanding 
power relations in a dialogic “surround” (Anonymous, 2010).   
 
Karl Weick’s sensemaking theory shares the same constructivist root as Dervin’s SMM.  He 
earned his bachelor's degree at Wittenberg College in Springfield, Ohio and his PhD in 
organizational psychology from Ohio State University in 1962, nearly the same year that 
Dervin developed interests in communication.  From Ohio State, his work turned increasingly 
towards social psychology and he received several academic appointments at different 
universities until he finally settled down at the Ross School of Business at the University of 
Michigan in 1988 as the Professor of Organizational Behavior and Psychology (Miner, 2006, 
p. 91).  He began to focus on sensemaking in the early 1970s. Although his sensemaking is an 
organizational theory and reflects most his social psychology background in themes like 
threat-rigidity, commitment-de-commitment, doubt-self-fulfilling prophecies, and 
dissonance-assurance, it does have many traces of organizational studies and communication 
theory similar to Dervin’s (Browning & Boudès, 2005, p. 32; Dervin & Naumer, 2009).  
Dervin (1999a) refuted some of the links and stated, “There are many uses of the term sense-
making as phenomena in the literature (spelled myriad different ways) which have no 
relationship to Sense-Making Methodology. For example Weick’s (1995) Sensemaking in 
organizations proposed looking at organizational life by examining the phenomenon – 
sensemaking” (p. 729).  She only acknowledged that both have many parallel approaches 
(Dervin et al., 2005).  The theory’s roots of constructivism and interpretivism are revealed 
clearly in the rich and diverse influence of a multitude of thinkers spreading from 
psychologists (e.g. James), pragmatists (e.g. Dewey, Mead), organizational researchers (e.g. 
Selznick, Festinger), systems theorists (e.g. Boulding), phenomenologists (e.g. Schutz) to 
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social scientists (e.g. Berger, Luckmann, Blumer, Garfinkel) on the conceptualization of 
sensemaking as “a central activity in the construction of both the organization and the 
environments it confronts” (Weick, 1995, p. 69).  In Weick’s (1995, p. 4) view, sensemaking 
simply means making of sense or structure the unknown. The central question is how people 
construct what they construct, why and with what effects.  Thus, he argued that sensemaking 
is “about such things as placement of items into frameworks, comprehending, redressing 
surprise, construct meaning, interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding, and patterning” 
(Weick, 1995, p. 6).  By placing emphasis on actions, Weick argues that sensemaking is a 
shared and communal activity that produces knowledge appropriate for action; it is a process 
that is highly collaborative and dependent on interpretation. In his view, there is no such 
thing as organization, there is only organizing and the emphasis is on “process of becoming” 
rather than the “states of being”.  Organizing and organization come alive in the ways they 
construct themselves and in the ways those of us who study them construct them (Gioia, 2006, 
p. 1711).   This strikingly reveals evidence of constructivism in Weick’s theory.   
 
Coming from the management science background, the origins of David Snowden’s theory is 
significantly different from those of Weick and Dervin who are academics, except for the 
influence of phenomenology.  Snowden developed his ideas on sense-making while working 
in IBM as the Director of the Institution for Knowledge Management.  Subsequently, he 
founded the Cynefin Center for Organizational Complexity and is now the Founder and Chief 
Scientific Officer of Cognitive Edge, which is a network that focuses “on rejuvenating 
management practices to better equip organizations when addressing intractable problems or 
seizing new opportunities in uncertain, unpredictable and complex situations, especially 
where traditional approaches have failed” (“Cognitive Edge Network”, 2014).  His interest is 
in applying humanistic approach to KM to help organizations improve decision-making.  He 
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calls his approach as “naturalizing sense-making”, which seeks to apply social science 
research and practice in the natural science on a foundation of cognitive science, semiotics 
and epistemological pragmatics to sense-making in organizations (“Dave Snowden,” 2008).  
Thus, he makes frequent references to literary and science fictions (Browning & Boudès, 
2005, p. 32).  Besides being a practitioner, Snowden also holds a variety of concurrent 
academic positions in many countries.  His research reflects both his practitioner and 
academic perspectives.  Snowden also attempts to bring complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
theory and narrative into his sense-making theory.  His Cynefin framework “has been 
acknowledged as one of the first practical applications of complexity theory to management 
science” (Chowdary, 2008) and has outgrown its application in KM to other areas of 
consultancy, strategy development, management training, policy-making, product 
development, market creation, branding and leadership (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 467).  
 
The present research focuses on investigating how an individual creates knowledge and how 
an individual knowledge is linked to that of the organization.  It takes an interpretivist stance 
to define knowledge as a socially created process of sense-making.  Thus, the research lens 
should also have interpretive perspective to enable deep understanding of users in terms of 
their processes of creating and sharing knowledge.  With deep roots in phenomenology, 
social constructivism, and communication, Dervin’s SMM is deemed more appropriate for 
this research than the other two sense-making theories.   The applicability of SSM to design 
KM practices was introduced by Dervin in 1998 and she called for alternative KM practices.  
She suggested that KM practitioners are struggling with issues which she and colleagues have 
been zeroing in on since 1972 (Cheuk & Dervin, 2010b, p. 202).  Cheuk (2007a; 2007b; 
2008a; 2008b; Cheuk & Dervin, 2010a; 2010b) and Souto (2007; 2008; 2010) have been 
applying SMM into their KM research.  It also has wide applicability in health 
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communication (Song, 2007; Teekman, 2000) with papers winning three top papers awards in 
1980 and 1981 from the International Communication Association (Dervin, 1995).  In fact, 
the approach is widely adopted in the field of library and information science.   
 
3.3 Situations for Knowledge Creation 
Dervin’s Sense-Making theory is built on a number of metatheoretical assumptions about the 
nature of human beings that are necessarily related to assumptions about the nature of reality 
(ontology) and the nature of knowing (epistemology) (Dervin, 2003k, p. 139).  What then is 
the nature of reality?  To Dervin (1983), one of the fundamental aspects of the reality is that it 
is neither complete nor constant but rather filled with fundamental and pervasive 
discontinuities or gaps. She was agonized by the polarized approaches that divided the 
research genres in all fields of social sciences and applied sciences – order versus chaos, 
diversity versus solipsism, authority versus tyranny, cognitive versus emotional, information 
versus entertainment, mind versus body, conscious versus unconscious, global versus local, 
structure versus agency, individual versus community, nature versus nurture, qualitative 
versus quantitative, administrative versus critical, and theory-driven versus applied (Dervin, 
2010a; 2003f). Such polarizations had impeded research, practice and design of information 
systems to such a great extent that she finds it necessary to adopt pluralism and the “in-
between” approach so as to study communication communicatively.  Her SMM is to thrust 
“itself between chaos and order, structure and person, facts and illusions, external worlds and 
inner, universals and particulars” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 730).   It goes without saying that both 
the reality and humans are considered as sometimes orderly, sometimes chaotic, sometimes 
decentered, sometimes centered, and sometimes fluid, sometimes rigid (Foreman-Wernet, 
2003, p. 7; Dervin, 2003k, p. 141).  Under the influence of Carter’s discontinuity model, 
Dervin stresses that discontinuities or gappiness are found in all existence, for example, 
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“between entities, between times, and between spaces, between reality and human sensors, 
between human sensors and the mind, between mind and tongue, between tongue and 
message created, between message created and channel, between human at time one and 
human at time two, between human one at time one and human two at time one, between 
human and culture, between human and institution, between institution and institution, 
between nation and nation, so on” (Dervin, 2003f, pp. 270-271).  These gaps can be cognitive, 
emotional, physical and spiritual.  They are also changeable across time-space because of 
differences across time (for example, self today vs. self yesterday and different persons at 
different times view the gap differently), differences across space (for example, the 
experience of a particular condition in differing cultures, contexts, communities and material 
circumstances will affect how the gap is interpreted), and differences in how humans see the 
reality arising from their differing anchorings in time-space.  This implies that the reality is 
also subject to multiple interpretations in Dervin’s view and different persons will construct 
different pictures of the reality in different time-space.  
 
How can an individual overcome these gaps in life?  Dervin illustrated this process with the 
metaphor of journey shown in Figure 3.1 below.  The metaphor depicts a running squiggly 
human, a body-mind-heart-spirit living in a time-space, who moves through time-space by 
using whatever sense he or she has already constructed based on past experiences.  When a 
situation is encountered that blocks his or her movement, implying the running out of old 
sense or the available sense, he or she has no choice but to make new sense of the gaps and 
build interpretive bridges over these gaps in order to keep moving.  “Sense is not seen as 
being ‘out there’ but rather as being something that the individual constructs” (Dervin, 2003d, 
p. 43).  Sense-making refers to this particular point of need that requires constructing a new 
sense and building a new bridge across the gap.  Sense-making is in fact gap-facing and gap-
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bridging and in different time-space, humans need to construct different interpretive bridges 
over a gappy reality (Dervin, 1999a, p. 730). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Gap-bridging in the making (Savolainen, 2006, p. 1122) 
 
In this metaphor, the sense-maker has to “move” from a “situation” to cross a “gap” using a 
“bridge” that leads in time-space to “outcomes” (Dervin, Reinhard, Song & Reed, 2006).  In 
Dervin’s conception, situations consist of the time-space contexts in which sense is 
constructed.  Gaps are where the individual sees something missing in his or her sense. This 
very moment of being stopped in a problematic situation also originates the most important 
questions (Savolainen, 1993, p. 17).  New sense is created when the individual sees a gap as 
bridged.  Uses or helps are the ways in which the individual puts the newly created sense to 
work in guiding his or her behavior (Dervin, 2003a, p. 256; 1983).  What is key to this central 
metaphor is the facing of gaps and building of bridges.  It is conceptualized as step-takings 
that human beings undertake to construct sense of their worlds as a mandate of the human 
condition.  Dervin (2003f) further pointed out that “These step-takings, or communicatings, 
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involve both internal behaviours (comparings, categorizings, likings, dislikings, polarizings, 
stereotypings, etc.) and external behaviors (shoutings, ignorings, agreeings, disagreeings, 
attendings, listenings, etc.)” (p. 273).  What kind of study is concerned with internal and 
external behaviors?  Again, Dervin (2003f, p. 271) refers it to information or knowledge 
management, design, and practice.  For her, sense-making has been about knowledge 
management from its inception (Dervin, 1998, p. 37).  She emphasized that we must “look to 
the gap: this is where you will find the action in sense making and sense-unmaking making; 
in communicating; and, in the creating, seeking, using and rejecting of information and 
knowledge” (Dervin, 1998, p. 39) (Emphasis added).  It means that sense-making is about 
gap-bridging, and knowledge is created, shared or used when gaps are bridged.   
 
Furthermore, gap-bridging is characterized as situational and will be predicted by situational 
conditions (Dervin, 2003a, p. 256).  Building on the assumption that the reality is both 
orderly and chaotic and the conceptualization of humans as both centered and decentered 
(Dervin, 2003c, p.332), gaps are changeable across time-space and are perceived differently 
by different or the same individual in different or the same time-space.  Gap-bridging is 
therefore tentative and experimental in nature.  Each step-taking to bridge gaps is a new step 
that occurs in a new moment in time-space and cannot be fully instructed or determined a 
prior.  “Even if the next step (the next moment) is in conformity, it is a step made anew by 
the individual” (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p. 8).  It is highly likely that “today’s knowledge 
often becomes tomorrow’s struggle” (Dervin, 1998, p. 40).  The whole idea is to anchor gap-
bridging in its own time and space with particular situational conditions.  This is what Dervin 
and Frenette (2003, p. 239) characterize it “situated communicative practices”.  How the gap 
is bridged or how knowledge is created depends on how the situation is defined, how the gap 
is conceptualized, what kind of bridge can be built and how he or she can proceed with the 
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journey after crossing the gap over the bridge.  Any given movement can be interpreted as an 
individual is confronted by the need for some form of guidance; that is, when they need to 
know something.  The gaps can be bridged by thinking up of an answer, asking for help, 
looking for useful information, or by any other measure that enables the individual to 
continue moving.  This situational characteristics of gap-bridging that renders it as 
“responsive to and mandated by changing situational conditions” (Dervin, 2003a, p. 255) 
“provide the basis for developing a coherent approach to situationality” (Dervin, 2003d, p. 
43).  This characteristic also enables us to study knowledge creation systematically by using a 
situational approach.   
 
There is no other sense-making theory that states as explicitly as SMM about the situation 
under which knowledge creation occurs and how they can be studied.  As this research is to 
study the process of knowledge creation, sharing and utilization in healthcare organizations 
and the way it will contribute to the bridging of the implementation gap of EBM, the concept 
of gap-bridging in SMM is found highly relevant.     
 
The situationally-bound approach provides the fodder for a new kind of prediction – the 
prediction of information seeking and use.  Since SSM assumes that sense-making behavior 
is situationally and contextually bound, and is rooted in past (histories, memories, and 
narratives), present (current conditions, material and experiential) and future (hopes, dreams, 
plans, and trajectories) time-space (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 239), it posits that “sense-
making behavior can be predicted more successfully within the framework of a model which 
focuses on changing situations as predictors rather than such constant across time-space 
attributes as so-called personal characteristics or demography” (Dervin, 1983). The 
traditional information seeking and use studies that attempt to characterize users as constant 
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across time-space with static demographic and personality traits or assume situations to be 
static to those in different domains or tasks tend to predict behavior based on these traits 
regardless of time, space or change. Dervin (2005b, p. 28) did not find this straightforward, 
unchanging and mechanistic process wrong but rather “not enough”.  Her position is best 
illustrated in the following statement:  
Sense-Making mandates attention to information seeking and use as both potentially 
constant and potentially changeable across time-space. Likewise, it mandates 
attention to the conditions under which one would expect one or the other or both.  As 
a methodological frame, then, Sense-Making proposes to provide an avenue for 
pursuing traditional studies of information seeking use and simultaneously opening up 
alternatives.  The mandate to study time, space, and movement, for example, allows 
for the possibility of conceptualizing information seeking and use as habitually 
patterned and / or situationally / temporally patterned. (Dervin, 2005b, p. 28) 
The traditional trait approach can be a subset of human possibilities.  In Dervin’s world of 
diversity where there are both chaos / change and order / stability inherent in human sense-
making and unmaking, she found it more important to “mandate empirical attention to 
conditions which foster flexibility, fluidity, and change as well as those that foster rigidity” 
(Dervin, 1999a, p. 731).  These conditions are the situationally-bound predictors manifested 
in the human mandate to move through time-space.  The movement metaphor in Figure 3.1 
suggests that situations, gaps and uses constitute the universals of sense-making variables that 
allow for successful prediction.   Numerous SMM studies in the literature (Dervin, Jacobson 
& Nilan, 1982; Dervin, 2003d, pp. 40-44; Cheuk, 2000; Dervin, 2006; Dervin & Reinhard, 
2007; Song, 2007; Souto, 2012) have proved that a shift from cross-situational predictors to 
situationally-bound predictors has greatly improved the prediction.   
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The above ideal is implemented in SMM’s interviewing approach and analysis method which 
focus on individual-in-situation and the specific micro-moment to identify a host of 
situational factors that impact on sense-making and sense-unmaking instead of studying 
socio-demographic factors such as personality, experience, educational background, domain 
knowledge, etc.  The more microscopically is the analysis, the closer it is possible to get to 
the moment that these processes take place in time and space (Souto, 2010, p. 146).  In other 
words, SMM is interested to study the whys and hows of sense-making instead of whats.  It 
assumes that “there is something systematic about individual behavior when the individual is 
reconceptualized not as an entity but as an entity behaving at a moment in time-space” 
(Dervin, 2003f, p. 274).  This research adopts the same approach to analyze the situations 
facing the informants into knowledge-creating and non-knowledge creating situations and to 
study in what ways knowledge is created or in what manner knowledge-creation is hindered.  
This will be further elaborated in Chapter Four. 
 
The above Sense-Making methodology also brings about another characteristic of gap-
bridging applicable to KM – the diversity of situations under which gap-bridging occurs.  
Dervin (1998) acknowledged that KM is a field “on the precipice of chaos, reaching for a 
means of emphasizing diversity, complexity and people over centrality, simplicity and 
technology.  Sense-making, as an approach, is described as a methodology disciplining the 
cacophony of diversity and complexity without homogenizing it” (p. 36).  Being a “situated 
communicative practice”, gap-bridging or sense-making incorporates both order and chaos as 
ontological and epistemological assumptions.  There is no one single perspective; a person 
can be situated in an orderly reality or facing chaos or both.  A utopian perspective is 
cherished as an alternative to attend to both human possibilities of rigidity and flexibility, 
diversity and complexity.  The essence is to encompass all perspectives to get a more 
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comprehensive, albeit always in flux, incomplete, discontinuous and elusive picture of the 
reality, and to look beyond hegemony and habitus to redesign communication and 
information systems that can be more responsive to human needs” (Dervin, 2003i, p. 93; 
2008, p. 6).   The means is through the interviewing interface that allows systematic address 
of the gaps and to codify sense-making moments based on the universals of time-space 
movement categories.   It should be noted here that gap-bridging is not regarded a problem-
solving activity though it can be one of its subset, but rather a mandate of the human 
condition. 
 
Dervin’s SMM shares some ideas in common with Weick’s sensemaking theory. Both refer 
sense-making to a worldview and a mandate that research attends to internal and external 
sense-making and sense-unmaking.  Both also acknowledge that sense-making is invoked not 
as a problem-solving approach, but to handle the unknown world particularly when people 
are faced with complex and ambiguous or chaotic environments.   
 
Though Weick’s sensemaking is an organizational theory, he has no intention to tie his theory 
to the generation of organizational knowledge as Kolko (2010) remarked. But actually his 
sensemaking model, which consists of the four processes of ecological change, enactment, 
selection and retention as shown in Figure 3.2 below, can be applied to explicate the creation 
of organizational knowledge.   The model is built on the central argument that an 
organization should be defined in terms of organizing and organizing is to resolve 
equivocality in an enacted environment by means of interlocked behaviors embedded in 
conditionally related processes (Weick, 1979, p. 91). Assembly rules (set procedures) and 
communication cycles are used in each of these phases to ascertain the level of equivocality 
and process the information. 
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Figure 3.2 Weick’s Sensemaking Model 
 
Sensemaking begins when changes in the environment induce disturbance and discontinuity 
in the flow of information to its organizational members. These discontinuities constitute the 
raw data or information inputs that have to be made sense of.  This leads to the second stage 
of enactment in which organizational members reconstruct and configure their environment 
through a two-step decoding process.  “First, portions of the field of experience are bracketed 
and singled out for closer attention on the basis of preconceptions.  Second, people act within 
the context of these bracketed elements, under the guidance of preconceptions, and often 
shape these elements in the direction of preconceptions” (Weick, 2001, p. 226).  By 
bracketing, labeling and noticing portions of the experience, organizational members 
highlight information they wish to focus based on their own knowledge or previous 
successful sensemaking experience.   Appropriate assembly rules and communication cycles 
are identified to assign a new meaning or interpretation to them.  It involves doing, acting and 
performing.  The result is an enacted environment which is “an orderly, material, social 
construction that is subject to multiple interpretations” (Weick, 2001, p. 226).  It is still 
equivocal but the number of possibilities has been greatly reduced so that a plausible story 
that is able to stabilize the streaming experience begins to emerge.  This phase also witnesses 
the feedback to the environment in terms of new messages or actions to help members make 
sense of the environment.  Thus, enactment is in a reciprocal relationship with the external 
environment (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414).   
 
Ecological 
Change 
 
Enactment 
 
Selection 
 
Retention 
 172 
In the selection process, the number of possible meanings continued to be reduced when 
additional rules and cycles are adopted to apply previous interpretations to the newly enacted 
information until they have selected a reasonable interpretation that provide the best fit with 
past understandings.  The outcome is “a set of cause-and-effect explanations that render the 
environment understandable and meaningful.  These explanations have to be plausible, but 
they need not be the most accurate nor the most complete” (Choo, 2006, p. 7).  Finally, in the 
last retention stage, the most plausible story that proves successful to cope with equivocal 
situations is retained and remembered as organization memory and narratives. It feeds the 
future retention and selection processes with a source of guidance to “interpret new changes 
and to stabilize individual interpretations into a coherent organizational view of events and 
actions” (Dalkir, 2011, p. 74). This organizational memory can be taken as a form of 
organizational knowledge as there is a new level of understanding distributed across the 
organization.   
 
This sensemaking model is basically a matter of information processing. It bears resemblance 
with Dervin’s SMM in many ways.  Environmental scanning can be viewed as the context 
and power issue that impact an individual’s perception of the situation, gaps, gap-bridging 
strategies and helps.  Enactment refers to action taken in response to the environmental 
scanning.  It is similar to the gap-bridging strategies taken to close the gap encountered by an 
individual.  The helps got after crossing the gap will form the experience of the individual 
and would be remembered and selected in future when they face similar gapping situations.  
This is in fact the selection stage in Weick’s model.  Finally, retention is the knowledge 
gained.  Dervin’s SMM lays emphasis on the gap and the action needed to close the gap.  
Dervin also suggested a number of gap-bridging strategies.   Weick, however, emphasizes 
more on the process of gap-bridging.  The enactment stage is in fact the reasoning process.  It 
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is very similar to gap-defining.  It brackets those information that people in the organization 
think they could work on and then select from past experience those actions that had been 
proved successful to handle the problems arisen from that bracketed information (gap-
bridging) they are facing now.  There is no elaboration on the actions to be taken as it is 
assumed that the action taken is based on the causal relationships they built in the selection 
process.  Weick's approach is thus a thinking process.  It never touches on any specific action 
or strategy as Devin does.  Choo (2006) also concurred that Weick's approach is information 
interpretation only.  Its underlying spirit is drastically different from Dervin’s.  The 
difference also explains why his model is not useful to this research.   
 
Another difference is that while Dervin takes a utopian approach to accommodate diversity 
and complexity of the reality without taking any stand in order to allow diverse voices to be 
heard, Weick adopts a more restrictive approach.  He acknowledges that organizations need 
to operate diverse informational inputs in a complex environment but conversely 
sensemaking aims to enable individuals in organizations to remove equivocality from the 
information environment and to reduce the number of possible outcomes so as to create order 
and establish a workable level of certainty (Weick, 1969, p. 40).  He further described 
sensemaking as “the reciprocal interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription, and 
action” (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993, p. 240) so that organizational members create shared 
awareness and common understandings out of different individuals' perspectives to give 
meaning, purpose and direction to the organization. Ambiguity and uncertainty are 
recognized as the occasions for sensemaking, and the purpose of sensemaking is to impose 
order and stability on the chaos, not to accommodate it as one of the human possibilities as 
Dervin does (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 411). Another major difference with 
Dervin is that Weick’s sensemaking is grounded at organizational level that involves both 
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individual and social activities. He states that sensemaking occurs when the current state of 
the world is perceived as different from the expected state or the environment is perceived as 
uncertain and ambiguous (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409; Weick, 1993).  This is 
opposed to Dervin who focuses on human conditions though it can also be applied to both 
individuals and collectives.   
 
Weick’s sensemaking is retrospective in nature.  This is not simply to draw on past 
experience as Dervin said.  The key idea is that “people can know what they are doing only 
after they have done it” (Weick, 1995, p. 24).  People act first and examine reflectively their 
own actions in order to discover what they’ve done and what the meaning of those actions is 
in order to rationalize them (Weick, 2001, p. 182).  This is illustrated in his famous phrase, 
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say” (Weick, 1995, p. 12).  What concerns 
Weick is “meaningful lived experience” (Weick, 1995, p. 24).  To create meaning or 
knowledge of these experiences, Weick argues that it is an attentional process and it is only 
possible to direct attention to what exists or what had already happened.  He remarked, “An 
action can become an object of attention only after it has occurred” (Weick, 1995, p. 26).  
When people act, they are guided by their own pre-judgments already formed during 
socialization.   The outcome can be in great discrepancies with the expectation.  With the 
benefits of hindsight, organizational members have the opportunity to explore the situation, to 
discover their preferences, to elicit reasoning that informed the action and thus 
retrospectively construct the values and beliefs that make sense out of that outcome.  With 
this reasoning, an organization is able to stabilize the environments and make them more 
predictable, and obtain information so produced for the design of future actions.  This 
explains Weick’s view that action guides understanding and “the basic idea of sensemaking is 
that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make 
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retrospective sense of what occurs” (Weick, 1993, p. 635).  It can be seen that Dervin’s SMM 
is forward-looking, while Weick’s sensemaking is backward-looking.     
 
The problem underlying this retrospective characteristic of sensemaking is the apparent 
impossibility for people to make sense about what has not yet been said or done (Marshall, 
2011).  Or it is unlikely to have prospective sensemaking as Gioia and Mehra (1996, as cited 
in Gioia, 2006, p. 1718) suggested.  Mills (2003) further criticized that “…Sensemaking lacks 
the ability to explain why and how some ‘inventions’ come to be developed in the first place, 
or how and why these ‘inventions’ are mediated through a series of ongoing interactions that 
are guided by rules of behavior” (p. 139).  Another handicap is Weick’s narrower view to 
place too much attention on the imposition of order on various interpretations of situation and 
the establishment of certainty.  There are many other ways for the creation of organizational 
knowledge, there is no need to synthesize all possible meanings.  This is in marked contrast 
to the approach of Dervin who urges for a system than can open up multiple perspectives and 
not to be addicted to best practices.  This is also echoed by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) who 
regarded “Weick’s view is still passive and lacks a proactive view of organization that 
includes a notion of “creative chaos” that is critical to the process of organizational 
knowledge creation” (p.40).  This is particularly true in crisis situation in which sensemaking 
appears to be ineffective.  Finally, Miners (2006) casted doubts on the testability of Weick’s 
theory.   He found that only Weick’s paper in 1977 (Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977) was 
a quantitative study; all other studies afterwards are not subject to any quantitative testing. 
The lack of empirical data is the most critical limitation and it invalidates many Weick’s 
conclusions.  Miners (2006, p. 103) did not find Weick’s (1993) interpretation on the cause of 
death of the firefighters in the Mann Gulch disaster more compelling than those that might 
have been derived from other competing theories.    
 176 
Dervin found that Snowden’s ideas bear more resemblance to Weick’s ideas.  But Snowden 
thought the otherwise.  He said, “I drew on both [Weick and Dervin], but principally Dervin, 
in some of the key development of Cognitive Edge theory and practice” (Snowden, 2006a).  
Like Weick, he is interested in organizational sense-making and the importance of dealing 
with complexity and ambiguity in organizations, but his sense-making framework is used 
more for improving organizational decision-making as his “naturalizing sense-making” 
theory is derived from cognitive behavior in making decisions and in complex systems.  He 
defines sense-making as “the way that people choose between multiple possible explanations 
of sensory and other input as they seek to conform the phenomenological with the real in 
order to act in such a way as to determine or respond to the world around them” (Snowden, 
2006) or simply “How do we make sense of the world so we can act in it" (Snowden, 2008).   
Reflected in KM, his focus is not on knowledge creation process but on supporting decision-
making and innovation.  He (Snowden, 2009) said,     
The purpose of knowledge management is to provide support for improved decision 
making and innovation throughout the organization. This is achieved through the 
effective management of human intuition and experience augmented by the provision 
of information, processes and technology together with training and mentoring 
programmes. 
Both Snowden and Weick emphasize the ecological environment and its impact on 
organizational sense-making, but Snowden aims to bring about the ontological diversity and 
the various approaches to KM rather than establishing order.  Like Dervin, he accepts making 
use of diverse inputs in responding to complexity (Browning & Boudès, 2005, p. 34).  In fact, 
he challenges the assumptions of order, of rational choice and of intent in organizational 
decision support (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  This underlying ideology is more in line with 
Dervin than Weick.  He is also the first one to introduce CAS theory into his sense-making 
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framework known as the Cynefin framework as shown in Figure 3.3 below.  It has evolved 
from Figure 3.4 which was first developed in 1999 with inspiration from Boisot (1995)’s I-
Space model in the context of KM to understand the ecology of knowledge.  It has undergone 
a series of evolution before it comes to its current state.   
 
Figure 3.3 The Current Cynefin Framework (Adapted from Snowden, 2010) 
                       
Figure 3.4 The Cynefin Framework Developed in 1999 (Snowden, 2002) 
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At first, as shown in Figure 3.4, it started with a vertical axis based on the balance between 
low and restricted level of abstraction and the horizontal axis between teaching and learning 
cultures (Snowden, 2010).  Cynefin is a Welsh word, which is more properly understood as 
“the place of our multiple affiliations” such as cultural, religious, geographic, tribal, etc., and 
“all human interactions are strongly influenced and frequently determined by the patterns of 
our multiple experiences, both through the direct influence of personal experience and 
through collective experience expressed as stories” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 467).   It is 
also different from the concept of Ba of Nonaka and Konno (1998) in that it links a 
community to its shared history rather than just a shared space for emerging relationships 
(Snowden, 2000, p. 237). At that time, it was not an actual Cynefin model.  It is the means to 
distinguish between formal and informal communities derived from multiple histories of all 
the players in the knowledge system, and the interaction both with structured processes and 
uncertain conditions.  By 2002, Snowden brought into play the CAS theory and the multi-
ontology approach to decision-making to turn it into a real Cynefin framework - a framework 
not so much for logical arguments or empirical verifications but for collective sense-making 
and decision-making to give decision makers new constructs to make sense of unspecified 
problems, to help people consider intractable problems in new ways and to allow the 
emergence of shared understandings (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  Sturmberg (2008) combined 
the past and current Cynefin frameworks into Figure 3.5 in p. 183 to discuss the generation of 
medical knowledge.  This approach proves useful to understand Snowden’s view on KM 
through the sense-making process. 
 
The framework organizes knowledge into five domains derived from three ontologies, 
namely ordered, complex and chaotic, with the ordered ontology further divided into known 
and unknown and is now replaced by simple and complicated respectively.  Ontology means 
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the nature of things and is used to determine the way we know things.  Sturmberg and Miles 
(2013) interpret the right hand side as what is already known and thus can be taught.  The left 
hand side is what is not yet known and thus needs to be learnt.  The bottom half is concerned 
with content, whereas the top half deals with context. Each domain “recognizes the causal 
differences that exist between system types” (Nilsen, 2013) and “requires a different 
approach to analysis, interpretation, intervention and management” (Snowden, 2005a, p. 49).    
 
(1) The Simple / Known Domain 
This domain belongs to the ordered system where the cause and effect relationship is linear 
and empirical, and can be applied repeatedly and predictably. Knowledge in this domain is 
regarded as a thing and explicit that can be captured and embedded in structured processes to 
ensure consistency (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003, p. 468).   This forms the legitimate best 
practice of the company.  The managerial approach is to sense the incoming data, categorize 
them on the basis of past experience and respond in accordance with best practice.  EBM is 
quoted as an example in medicine that resides in this domain. 
 
(2) The Complicated / Knowable Domain 
This domain is another type of ordered system that contains stable cause and effect 
relationship.  But the relationship is not fully known, and needs analysis of the presenting 
data in light of known facts and application of expert knowledge.  Knowledge is gained from 
methods like scientific experiments, expert opinion, fact-finding and scenario planning and is 
established as the good practice of the organization. In medicine, structured techniques are 
developed and codified in the form of guidelines and decision trees.  This breeds 
communities of practice and learning organizations, and thus appropriate for knowledge 
transfer and communication. The risk is that the application of knowledge relies on trust 
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between expert advisor and the decision-maker. The high dependency on experts will also 
easily lead to entrainment in thinking, which may bring catastrophic consequences to the 
organization.  Expertise in this domain “is both an enabler and blocker to knowledge creation 
and from time to time context must be removed to allow the emergence of new meaning” 
(Snowden, 2002, p. 107).  The best approach managers can take in this domain is to sense the 
incoming data, analyze them on the basis of expert advice and respond with good practice.  
 
(3) The Complex Domain 
Knowledge creation starts in the complex domain.  The ontology is un-ordered, which means 
that “we cannot look at the system without changing it in some ways; we are either managing 
or creating patterns” (Snowden, 2005a, p. 50).  This is also the domain of complexity theory 
in which cause and effect relationships are so complex that they cannot be clearly defined or 
predicted but can only be understood in retrospect.  Knowledge is gained from sensing the 
emerging relationship patterns between many different agents.  But since these patterns are 
not predictable, it is futile to rely on past experience or historically entrained patterns to 
formulate the response.   All the techniques in the simple and complicated domains such as 
good or best practices could no longer apply as complex problems are not subject to 
categorization or analysis.  The best approach is to probe the space to make the pattern more 
visible, then sense the patterns and respond by stabilizing those desirable patterns and 
destabilizing those unwanted.  Snowden (2006b) suggested creating safe to fail experiments 
so that people can learn from planned failure. Imposed order would not work.  Learning is 
thus informal and interdependent.  Encompassing multiple perspectives by increasing 
information flow, variety and connectiveness to break down existing pattern and gain new 
insights become far more important.  Sense-making in this domain requires people to act to 
stimulate evolution of the system and the subsequent monitoring of emergent patterns so that 
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desired patterns can be supported and undesired patterns disrupted, ultimately allowing the 
organization to evolve to a future that was unknowable in advance, but is more contextually 
appropriate when discovered (Kurtz & Snowden, 2007, p. 122).  Snowden (2002) advocated 
utilizing narrative techniques as stories will easily facilitate understanding of context and thus 
trigger new ideas, concepts and insights.   
 
(4) The Chaotic Domain 
This is another un-ordered ontology with no apparent cause and effect relationships.  The 
organization is in such a chaotic situation that requires speedy action on the part of the 
management to stabilize the position first to reduce the turbulence before they have time to 
investigate change.  The next step is to sense its result and respond accordingly. In the 
Cynefin Framework, the simple domain lies adjacent to the chaotic because it is very often 
for the success in the simple domain to breed complacency that leads to catastrophic failure 
and collapse into chaos. To Snowden (2002), this provides exactly the ultimate learning 
environment for managers to handle brand new and critical situations.  An authoritarian 
approach can be taken to bring the space back to the simple or complicated domains.  Or 
multiple interventions may be used to create novel practices and shift the situation to the 
complex domain.  Thus, the chaotic domain is most useful and always offers opportunities for 
innovation to take place and entrainment of thinking to disrupt. A medical emergency 
situation or the SARS Crisis in Hong Kong in 2003 falls into this category (Lee, 2003).   
 
(5) The Disordered Domain 
The central disordered domain denotes the state of uncertainty or not knowing the domain the 
organization is in as there are “conflicting views reside resulting from different perspectives 
on the same issue” (Strumberg & Miles, 2013, p. 41).  Individuals in this domain will 
 182 
compete to interpret and assess the situation based on their personal preference for action, 
and bring the space back to their preferred comfort zones in the framework. This domain is 
not related to any KM activities. 
 
Instead of placing emphasis on the actual process of creating knowledge, the quadrants in the 
Cynefin framework focus on formative idea generation and support the creation of mental 
models that can be used to think of problems and solutions in new ways (Kolko, 2010).  This 
approach bears some resemblance to that of Weick.  Both acknowledge that complexity and 
ambiguity of the environment provides the conditions for knowledge generation.  But 
Snowden’s ideas are more than that.  The framework actually focuses on diversity and 
different states of knowledge, which is more in line with Dervin’s approach.  To Snowden, 
knowledge is not only a static known fact, but also a flow which can be illustrated through 
the boundary concept presented in the Cynefin framework.  Snowden (2000) argues that the 
value of the Cynefin framework is “in its ability to assist in descriptive self-awareness within 
an organization and to understand the flow of knowledge”.   The boundary between different 
domains allows the organization to recognize the danger of a single model which will lead to 
the destruction of requisite variety in ecology, and to appreciate diversity as the key to 
adaptability (Snowden, 2002, p. 107).  Snowden (2005a, p. 51) identified 16 different types 
of dynamic patterns where knowledge flows from one domain to another and being 
transformed from one state to another in different times by deploying different techniques.  
For instance, in times requiring innovation, there is a need to shift the entrained expert 
knowledge in complicated domain to the chaotic by exposing experts to radically different 
fields and showing them the invalidity of old patterns so that a new kind of knowledge can be 
formed by taking them to the complex environment.  By making use of Figure 3.6 below, 
Sturmberg and Miles (2013, pp. 44-59) argued that the strict adherence of EBM to its 
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hierarchy of knowledge and scientific data made its practitioners blind to other sources of 
clinical knowledge. EBM as unthinkingly applied may even reside in the simple domain.  
However, many diseases like cardiovascular diseases have so many complex inter-connected 
evidences pointing to many different directions that a different approach needs to be pursued.  
The Cynefin Framework provides the decision tool for clinicians to make sense of the 
available information in the context of the patient at hand and to determine the appropriate 
action.  It will not provide them with the right answer, but by considering all the available 
knowledge in the context of achieving the best practice, the Cynefin Framework illustrates to 
clinicians the inherent failure of EBM to assimilate the humanistic dimension of clinical 
practice and to realize that a context-driven flexible approach can be enacted.  This approach 
is more important than focusing on what constitutes the right kind of knowledge.  In a 
nutshell, “the framework not only tells us how to approach a set of different situations, but 
the characteristics also explain enough to help us recognize the situation in which we 
currently reside” (Anderson, 2013).  This emphasis on situations for different kinds of 
knowledge and the value of chaos shares much in common with Dervin. 
 
Figure 3.5 Flow of Knowledge in the Cynefin Framework (Sturmberg, 2008, p. 769) 
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To summarize, Dervin’s SMM is found most appropriate for this research.  It asks us to focus 
on the gap which is central in SMM and is where action takes place in the creating of 
knowledge.  Gap-bridging is a kind of situated communicating behavior that will generate 
direction for the understanding of knowledge creation.  It is user-oriented, changing, forward-
looking, disciplining the cacophony of diversity and complexity without homogenizing it, 
and occurring at the intersection of situation, gap and uses in the horizons of past, present and 
future enabling more accurate prediction of information seeking and use. There are numerous 
strategies for bridging gaps. This research is to explore these gap-bridging strategies in order 
to study the process of knowledge creation in healthcare organizations.   The next few 
sections will turn to the nature of knowing and the verbing and process approach that 
addresses the hows of knowledge creation.    Weick’s model is quite limited to provide much 
useful reference.  The Cynefine Framework will be useful for the conceptualization of the 
flow of knowledge in the macro environment and the limitation of EBM practice. 
 
3.4 Nature of Knowledge and Knowing 
Dervin alone amongst the three elaborates much on the nature of knowledge and knowing.  
Snowden shares some of Dervin’s concepts.  Weick wrote nothing on this.  Dervin makes no 
distinction between knowledge, information and even data because in SMM these concepts 
“are system distinctions of no meaning to lived experience and movement through time-
space” (Savolainen, 2006, p. 1118).  Instead, she defines it as “the sense made at a particular 
point in time-space by someone” and as “product of and fodder for sense making and sense 
unmaking” (Dervin, 1998, p. 36).  In other words, knowledge or information is both the input 
(fodder) and output (product) of sense-making.  Individuals proceed with the knowledge they 
have in or about a situation until they experience a gap in their knowledge.  This bridging of 
gaps requires information or knowledge outside the individual’s previous experience.  This 
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conceptualization of knowledge vividly visualizes how knowledge is used for its further 
creation, which is fundamental to this research.  
 
In addition, being the sense made, knowledge is not a fixed commodity, but constructed by 
the individual.  Thu, sometimes it is shared and codified; sometimes a number of people 
agree upon it; sometimes it enters into a formalized discourse and get published; sometimes it 
gets tested in other times and spaces and takes on the status of facts; sometimes it is fleeting 
and unexpressed; sometimes it is hidden and suppressed, sometimes, it gets imprimatured and 
becomes unjust law; sometimes it takes on the status of dogma (Dervin, 1998, p. 36).  SMM 
demands attention not only to the material embodiment of knowing such as cognitions and 
ideas, but also to the emotional / feeling framings of knowing.  In other words, the whole 
human being in terms of body-mind-heart-spirit with a past history, present reality, and future 
dreams or ambitions is assumed to move through time-space; it is utterly impossible to 
separate “the inner and outer worlds of human existence” (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p. 7).   
 
Knowledge is also conceptualized as a “construction, a product of observer and observation” 
(Dervin, 2003d, p. 32).  Dervin is highly critical of the mechanistic transmission model of 
knowledge, under which knowledge is conceived as objective and absolute that can be passed 
on to users who receive them as messages or information as things to be gotten, like dumping 
something into the heads of receivers as though they were empty buckets” (Foreman-Wernet, 
2003, p. 5).  Dervin (1999a) does not find this traditional mode useful in modern days as it 
“freezes time-space and person and restricts information to that produced and used by one 
narrow set of sense-making strategies” (p. 740). In fact, human species historically have used 
a wider group of strategies in using knowledge.  She argued strongly that the relativistic 
sciences of the 20th century have shifted the conceptions of knowledge from observer 
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constructions to user constructions. Knowledge should be studied as a phenomenon of human 
communicating, which must be subjective and experiential as persons subjectively perceive 
their worlds and get their views shared.  However, given the observational constraints of time, 
space, change and physiological limitations, no amount of knowledge provided by another 
can satisfy the needs of an individual in coping with the limited reality of a personal existence.  
With meanings being in people and with differences in people across time and space, Dervin 
proposes the view that knowledge use is inherently a creative rather than a passive process as 
the traditional transmission model suggests.  It mandates “making sense when none is given” 
(Dervin, 2003d, p.33).  SMM is introduced as an alternative approach.  It assumes that all 
knowledge is subjective even those agreed upon and called fact; all observing is relevant to 
both the physical time-space at which the observations were made as well as the 
psychological time-space of the observer because of the limitations of human observation; 
knowledge seeking and use is entirely a constructing activity – the personal creating of sense 
that is tied to the specific time, place, tools and histories of its making; and individuals use 
their own observations as well as the observations of others to construct their pictures of 
reality and use these pictures to guide their behavior (Dervin, 2003a, p. 255). 
 
Another characteristic of knowing is that it is “a human tool designed by human beings to 
make sense of a reality assumed to be both chaotic and orderly” (Dervin, 2003c, p. 328).   
Given that the reality is both orderly and chaotic, and no human movement in time-space can 
be fully instructed, each sense-making step must be partly designed by the actor himself, 
resulting in multiple gap-bridging strategies and multiple outcomes. This human difference 
means that only the actor himself or herself is an expert as well as the theorist of his or her 
world.  Human beings are conceptualized as information designers rather than information 
seekers and finders (Dervin, 2003c, p, 329).   As a result, SMM requires that knowledge 
 187 
should be studied from the perspective of the actor, or under a communication perspective, in 
which knowledge is made and unmade in communication – intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
social, organizational, national, and global (Dervin, 2003c p. 331).  Information systems 
created should assist people to design their own information and share with others the diverse 
ways they have struggled to move through the world that is both orderly and chaotic.  Only 
by so doing can a person define his or her own standards to judge something as informative 
and hence permits humans to tolerate and muddle through diversities and seeming 
incompletenesses (Dervin, 2003c, p. 331).    
 
This emphasis on looking to the actor and receivers on their own terms mandates “respectful 
listening to users as theorists and knowledge-makers in their worlds; as actors who if asked 
can tell you at least something of what they need” (Dervin, 1998, p. 42).  As a consequence, 
there is a need to call for respondent-centered and open-ended techniques to measure 
knowledge about those issues that are of value to the user.  
 
Snowden shares the same thoughts of Dervin on the nature of knowledge.  In his view, 
knowledge is the sense making capability both to oneself and to the community (Snowden, 
2000, p. 241).  He admits that knowledge is not only a thing or entity that can be managed 
and distributed through advanced use of technology, but also a flow that should focus more 
on context and narrative than on content (Snowden, 2002, p. 101).  Both states can co-exist at 
the same time and he makes use of his Cynefin framework to demonstrate these different 
states and the flow of knowledge.  In the complicated and simple domains, there are best 
practices and expert knowledge that can be shared with the community.  In the complex and 
chaotic domains, the emphasis is on an open learning culture and environment to breed new 
and innovative ideas.  This concept of diversity is embraced by both Dervin and Snowden.  
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However, unlike Dervin who states how knowledge can be created, Snowden (2000) attempts 
“to create an understanding of what it would mean to use knowledge while embracing its 
ambiguity” (p. 242) and the purpose is to facilitate a user to create meaningful messages that 
inform other community members to comprehend complex situations without accepting the 
restraints of a pseudo-rational simplification (p. 243).  
 
More importantly, Snowden (2008a) proposes seven principles of KM, which can be shown 
in his Cynefin framework.  They are deemed useful to this research. 
1. Knowledge can only be volunteered, it cannot be conscripted - You can’t make 
someone share their knowledge, because you can never know if they have. 
2. We only know what we know when we need to know it – We cannot distinguish in 
advance what we need to know as an organization.  Human knowledge is highly 
contextual that needs to be triggered by circumstance. 
3. In the context or real need few people will withhold their knowledge – It is more 
important to connect people than storing their artifacts as usually people will not 
decline a genuine request for help unless there is literally no time or a previous history 
of distrust. 
4. Everything is fragmented - Our brains evolved to handle fragmented patterns such as 
fine granularity information objects not highly structured documents. 
5. Tolerated failure imprints learning better than success - All human cultures have 
developed forms that allow stories of failure to spread without attribution of blame. 
Avoidance of failure has greater evolutionary advantage than imitation of success. It 
follows that attempting to impose best practice systems is flying in the face of over a 
hundred thousand years of evolution that says it is a bad thing. 
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6. The way we know things is not the way we report we know things - People use 
heuristics, past pattern matching and extrapolation to make decisions, coupled with 
complex blending of ideas and experiences that takes place in nanoseconds.  This is 
different from the more structured process oriented approach that people said they 
will use when describing how to make decisions after the event. 
7. We always know more than we can say, and we will say more than we can write 
down – The process of taking things from our heads, to our mouths (speaking it) to 
our hands (writing it down) involves loss of content and context.  That is, codification 
of knowledge will lead to loss of content. 
 
In brief, the conceptualization of knowing and knowledge as a user construction activity that 
serves as both input and output of sense-making is essential to this study.  It provides a strong 
theoretical framework to study the process of knowledge creation and the elements involved.  
The emphasis on the actor enables this research to focus on the lived experience of users and 
to listen to what users really think and feel.  Snowden’s concept of knowledge also throws 
light to the need to study the impact of context and the macro environment on knowledge 
sharing. 
 
3.5 Knowledge Creation as a Verbing and Process Approach 
All three scholars concur that knowledge is for action and only by taking actions can one 
realize the existence of knowledge.  Dervin’s SMM is a verbing communication practice.  As 
discussed in the above section, SMM conceptualizes knowledge as a constructing activity in 
the perspective of the actor.  Both of these are so dynamic and fast-changing that 
contemplating them as nouns will only inhibit people from realizing the fact that they are 
“made, maintained, reified, and changed in communicating” (Dervin, 2003l, p. 106).  Nouns 
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stand for relatively stable interpretations of the reality and imply that there is only one right 
way to produce knowledge. This is not to preclude the attention to nouns, “but insists that 
they be examined outside the typical noun-based framework in which the bounds of the 
inquiry are drawn by researcher assumptions about and definitions of the objects of interests.  
Instead, Sense-Making conceives of nouns as being constructed by processes, and therefore 
fluid and open to interpretation” (Spurgin, 2007).  Dervin aims to break away from this static 
noun focus to make SMM a real dynamic process.     
 
To move away from the polarized world view, Dervin uses verbs or actions to point to the 
fact that the human nature as well as structures and agents are not absolute ontological 
categories, but are constantly evolving and becoming. It lets people focus on the “movement” 
of humans between different states when the sense runs out, not the “states” themselves.  A 
verbing approach is to allow us to focus on “changes across time and space and on the flows 
of events that we can search for and study patterns in the human condition without fixing 
them tautologically and a priori” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 732).  To study knowledge as a 
phenomenon of human communicating, sense-making focuses on behavior and 
reconceptualize individual as an entity behaving at a moment in time-space (Dervin, 2003f, p. 
274).  These behaviors are the step-takings, or communicatings, that human beings undertake 
to construct sense of their worlds (Dervin, 2003f, p. 273).  Therefore, verbings are ways to 
make sense and these verbings “involve the making or using of ideas or both, cognitions, 
thoughts, and conclusions, attitudes, beliefs, and values; feelings, emotions, and intuitions, 
and memories, stories, and narratives.  For example, sometimes sense-making involves 
borrowing an idea, sometimes it involves making one, sometimes it involves rejecting one 
(Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 239).   
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Dervin (1998, p. 39) asks us to look to the gap as it is where action in sense-making and 
unmaking, in communicating, and in the creating, seeking, using and rejecting of information 
and knowledge.  Hence, the myriad ways of gap bridging or knowledge creating are also 
conceptualized as verbings.   They include a host of strategies including the making of facts 
or factizing, which most people assume to be a noun only.  Other verbings include 
consensusing, negotiating, power-brokering, defining, hunching, muddling, suppressing, 
comparing, categorizing, liking, disliking, polarizing, stereotyping, shouting, ignoring, 
agreeing, disagreeing, attending, listening, arguing, cooperating, contesting, vacillating, 
reasoning, observing, totalizing, challenging, averaging, exampling, authorizing, evidencing, 
generalizing, personalizing, imagining, experiencing, resisting, relating, picturing, trusting, 
idea making and idea repeating.  In short, the tactics vary according to the gap an individual 
is facing.  They can be sometimes repetitions of ideas used in the past if the new moments are 
seen as repetitions of the past, and sometimes newly created depending on how the individual 
defines the new situation.  However, some structural constraints such as economic class, 
income or education can delimit new responses.  Therefore, Dervin argues that constancies 
are found more in the use of channels (e.g. how much a person uses a library) than the use of 
information (e.g. what a person does with what he or she reads) (Dervin, 2003f, pp. 274 - 
275).  But it is in the action of gap-bridging in time-space that differences emerge.  The 
pattern may pertain to noun aspects of the human condition or fluidities in sense-making and 
–unmaking that open up a new kind of theorizing.  Actually, SMM “mandates an organizing 
conceptualization that stands between structure and agency, habit and resistance, flexibility 
and rigidity.  It incorporates them all in a verbing framework” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 743).     
 
The verbing approach posits that communication is a process; sense-making is a process 
(Savolainen, 1993, p. 16).  By privileging processes over outcomes and setting outcomes into 
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process, each element in the sense-making and sense-unmaking becomes a verb in a set of 
verbings.  These verbs in the hows of sense-making - how people see themselves as moving 
through life, the gaps they face, and the help they seek - provide a set of universal descriptors 
that allows comparison of “sense-makings of one human to those of another, of one human to 
self across time and space” and the emergence of patterns of centrality (homogeneity and 
agreement) and dispersion (diversity and disagreement) (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 240).  
This verbing analytics is useful to this research as comparing sense-making across time, 
space, and people can be more powerfully done and a basis for systematic study can be 
emerged in SMM.      
 
Like Dervin, Weick (1995, p. 187) also urges people to stamp out nouns.  Nouns are 
perceived to connote concepts of stable entity.  Since organizations are never stable, there is 
nothing about organizations as nouns.  In fact, Weick concurs with Dervin to emphasize the 
need to move away from viewing reality as a collection of static, fixed entities (nouns) to 
viewing reality as ever-changing entities (Marshall, 2011) and to focus on “process of 
becoming” rather than the “states of being” (Gioia, 2006, p. 1711).  There is no such thing as 
organization; there is only organizing (Dervin, 2003g, p. 116).   Weick goes a step further to 
give prominence to gerunds or verbal nouns is to highlight his view that organizing is about 
flows, change and processes (Gioia, 2006, p. 1711).  Sensemaking is in fact the process of 
organizing and it itself is also an ongoing process and the sense made is transient (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409; Weick, 1995, p. 188).   
 
The use of verbs captures “the action that lays down the path for sensemaking” (Weick, 1995, 
p. 188).  Sensemaking is regarded as “a way station on the road to a consensually constructed, 
coordinated system of action” (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409).  It is about the 
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interplay of action and interpretation.  Interpretation is about reading a text, but sensemaking 
involves reading as well as authoring – creating the text (Weick, 1995, p. 7).  One of the 
seven properties of Weick’s sensemaking is concerned with enactive of sensible environment.  
It means that people are part of, and, in fact, create their environment (MacIntosh-Murray, 
2005, p. 266).  People enact the environment in order to develop a sense of what to do next 
and to co-construct the environment with fellow sensemakers.  Sensemaking is “a matter of 
thinking that is acted out conversationally in the world as it is a matter of knowledge and 
technique applied to the world” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 412).  They quoted an 
example of how a nurse makes sense by acting thinkingly, by interpreting their knowledge 
with trusted frameworks and mistrusting those very same frameworks by testing new 
framework and interpretations.  Action is the central focus in the study of person-to-person 
interaction in Weick’s sensemaking (Bakken & Hernes, 2006, p. 1605).   
 
Similarly, Snowden regards the purpose of sense-making is to how we can act in it and 
argues for the need for organization to build fluid structures responsive to changing and often 
elusive conditions (Dervin & Naumer, 2010, p. 4701).   In his chaotic domain, he emphasizes 
that the best strategy to deal with the situation is “to act, quickly and decisively, to reduce the 
turbulence; and then to sense immediately the reaction to that invention so that we can 
respond accordingly” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 469).   The ultimate aim is to enable 
organizations to identify what knowledge they have that leads them directly to action 
(Browning & Boudès, 2005, p. 36).   
 
3.6 Knowledge Creation in Dialogue and Narratives 
Again, all three scholars hold the same view that sense-making must be realized in dialogue 
and particularly narratives.  To Dervin, “knowing is made and remade, reified and maintained, 
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challenged and destroyed in communication: in dialogue, contest, and negotiation” (Dervin, 
2003i, p. 86).  Dervin strongly espouses the theory of dialogic communication or 
communicating communicatively, as spelled out in the following: 
 Dialogic ideas about communication position communication as dialogue, as a 
dynamic and complex process through which people create, change, and re-create 
sense, meaning, and understanding in their interactions with others, media, events, 
and experiences.  A dialogic or communication theory of communication focuses not 
on homogenizing differences but on putting difference into dialogue and, thus, using 
it to assist human sense-making.  Such a communication theory of communication 
assumes that when difference is not treated dialogically it appears both capricious and 
chaotic as if needing homogenization. (Dervin & Huesca, 2003, p. 310) 
In order to allow multiple voices to be heard and to accommodate the vast differences in 
human observations and experiences, the transmission model of communication that 
conceptualizes the message as the thing to be gotten and perceives the receiver who failed to 
get the message as deficient must give way to another alternative communication system that 
is designed for dialogue, as only this kind of system packages messages “as constructions that 
are tied to the specific times, places, and perspectives of their creators” (Foreman-Wernet, 
2003, p. 5), and thus promotes two-way sharing and negotiating of meanings to address 
differences and contests in human beings’ understandings and experiences (Foreman-Wernet, 
2003, p. 6). In other words, communication must be designed to acknowledge people’s 
everyday sense-makings, and “mandate a procedural circling of the reality being made and 
remade by citizens from multiple perspectives” (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p. 12).  The move to 
the verbing approach that pays attention to how people make and unmake sense in the context 
of their lives in fact “permits dialogic interface to be established” (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 
236) as nouns are bracketed to turn the primary focus to the moment of sense-making instead 
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of the person as the entity.   With this dialogic approach that is framed communicatively, 
Dervin believes that it can avoid the solipsism that results from trying to handle difference 
non-communicatively and acknowledge that knowledge is something that is contested and 
negotiated over time (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p. 12). 
 
Genuine dialogic communication is not possible unless it is designed as such.  Dervin 
proposes to bring a “disciplined approach to communicating”, meaning to develop dialogic 
procedurings that are reflected in framing research questions, interviewing methods, data 
collection and analytic procedures as what SMM does (Dervin, 2008a).  It also requires 
positioning the researcher as humbled and dialogically involved (Dervin, 1999a, p. 734).  
This means that we must trust the informants to have the capacity to articulate knowings from 
the unarticulated realms of their beings such as emotional, spiritual and embodied 
unconscious as these are their own struggles in life.  They will in fact talk about their 
confusions and stumblings if the dialogic interface is conducive to trust (Dervin, 1999a, p. 
734).  In this regard, the researcher should not interpret the worlds for others.  Instead, it is 
crucial for them to act as the vehicle of dialogic practice by asking dialogic questions and 
listening to how the informants construct her / his concepts, experiences and connections” 
(Souto, 2010, p. 122).   
 
This dialogic approach operationalized through open-ended interviews leads to the use of 
narrative analysis.  In the interviewing process that focuses on the hows of human sense-
making and sense-unmaking, people will be inclined to organize their experiences in terms of 
plots or stories that reveal their cognitive and affective motivations and contextualize 
information behavior.  Therefore, fitting narrative analysis with sense-making principles will 
“offer potential for discovering new vistas of information behaviour” (Tidline, 2005, p. 116). 
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Both Weick and Snowden draw heavily on the use of narratives.  This is rooted in the 
emphasis of both on the role of language in sense-making.  Daikar (2011) described Weick’s 
model of organizational knowledge creation as “the transformation of personal knowledge 
between individuals though dialog, discourse, sharing and storytelling” (p. 74).  It underlines 
communication as the central component of the model.  Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005, 
p. 413) claimed that the sensemaking, to the extent that it involves communication, takes 
place in interactive talk and draws on the resources of language in order to exchange through 
talk.  It is the lens through which people make sense of the organization.  When people 
interact and speak, they will gradually develop a shared understanding of the problem and 
start to flesh out hunches that lead to action.  It is the time in which equivocal knowledge is 
lifted out of the tacit, private, complex, random, and past to make it explicit, public, simpler, 
ordered and relevant to the situation at hand.  Talking and saying is central to organizational 
action.  Thus, Weick argues that sensemaking is an issue of language, talk and 
communication, whereby situations, organizations and environments are talked into existence 
(Bakken & Hernes, 2006, p. 1602). 
 
 
The central role of talking in Weick’s theory leads to the dominance of narratives in his 
approach.  In his view, “sensemaking is not about truth and getting it right. Instead, it is about 
continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes comprehensive” (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 415).  Browning and Boudès (2005) analyzed in details the 
different ways Weick found narratives important.  They commented that storytelling is 
democratic rather than a privileged concept: anyone can tell a story and anyone can criticize 
and analyze a story; it does not require any special technical skills for comprehension.  
Stories can help invoke a personal philosophy of reason, value and action and capture the 
nuance and uncertainty present in a given situation.  Narratives are also valuable for allowing 
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multiple voices, from marginal to central, to register as a response to complexity because it 
matches the local, fragmented, emergent story so well.  They are needed for people to 
appreciate disconformity and develop the collective mind in “heedful interrelating” and 
“mindfulness”.  To attend to narratives, Weick also widely adopts observation and interviews 
in his research.  
 
Stories and story-telling have a special role to play in Snowden’s sense-making.  To 
accommodate diversity, Snowden emphasizes the development of specific alternative 
procedures for organizational dialogue and stories are valued as the procedural response to 
complexity.  Narrative is seen as a powerful tool within organizations.  Snowden (2004) 
found that stories in organizations reveal patterns of culture, behavior and understanding in a 
different, and frequently more effective way than interviews and questionnaire-based 
approaches; allow specific patterns of an organization to emerge in understanding the story of 
a project and are in turn the means by which it can be patterned (Browning & Boudès, 2005, 
p. 33); deliver complex ideas in a simple, consistent but not oversimplistic form without loss 
of meaning or integrity, and convey success as well as failures without the need for direct 
criticism or admission of responsibility. Kolko (2010) pointed out that Snowden particularly 
likes to use fictional narrative as a way of positing "what if" scenarios. Participants who work 
backwards from the fictional end-state to reach the factual present-state will be able to derive 
the "sensemaking items" from these processes. In a nutshell, Snowden believes that narrative 
technique is the means for more effective communication. 
 
In this research, Dervin’s Micro-Moment Time-Line Interviewing as will be explained in 
Section 3.9 was adopted to inform the process of knowledge creation, sharing and utilization 
in healthcare organizations.  The interview is a narrative account of how a healthcare 
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professional makes sense of his or her gappy situations in the care of his or her patients.  
Narratives and story-telling will be studied whether they could serve as useful tools in the 
creation and spreading of knowledge. 
 
3.7 The Need to Attend to Power Issues 
Although power issues will exert substantial influence on team working and collaboration 
(Blackler & McDonald, 2000, p. 833), only Dervin addresses this extensively in her studies.  
She acknowledges that the issues of force and power pervade the human condition and thus 
takes the view that that the human movement through time-space is both “impacted by the 
constraining forces of structural power (both natural and societal) and that the individuals 
themselves in specific situations are sites of power to resist, reinvent, challenge, deny, and 
ignore (Dervin, 2003k, p. 142).  Humans are neither totally free nor totally prescribed.  SSM 
suggests that in order to allow users to disclose what they really think and feel, we need to 
attend to the power issues, how they interrupt communication in daily practice and to develop 
procedures to transcend these interruptions.   
 
First, SMM is to energize the in-between.  Because there are power differentials in human 
relationships, people are forced to provide one definitive answer and scared to disagree with 
those in authority even in face of their own experience.  SMM points out clearly that expert 
views can be entirely wrong, irrelevant, or inappropriate when applied in the contexts of other 
lived experiences.  To hear different voices, we must invite and assist others to speak their 
worlds in their own contexts.  SSM is to mandate attention to “forces that assist or facilitate 
movement in time-space (e.g., freedom and creativity) as well as those that constrain or 
hinder it (e.g., structure and habit)” (Foreman-Wernet, 2003, p.8), and emphasizes the 
importance of putting different voices into dialogue.   
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Second, to implement the attention to power in research, SMM mandates asking questions 
that focuses on users’ struggles, constraints, barriers, facilitation, hurts, hindrance, motivation, 
personal power, societal power and their assessments of the relationships between a given 
moment of sense-making and the power structures of an organization or society.  Dervin 
(1999a, p. 732) also suggests asking not what questions but what if questions – under what 
conditions does something ensue with what consequences. In the interview process, 
informants should be made safe to speak out their views.  Measures like anonymity are 
needed.  In data analysis, special attention should be paid to the impact of different 
manifestations of power.  For instance, when external forces such as economics constrain the 
informants, then demographic attributes of users will predict user behavior better.  When, 
however, external forces do not constrain, then situational conditions of use will predict 
better (Dervin, 2005b, p. 29).  SMM also mandates that in systems design, the principle is to 
seek out sites of maximum agreement as well as maximum disagreement.  In short, SMM 
advocates a utopian approach to place power as the central focus of attention either by 
bracketing (ie. deliberately setting it aside) or disclosing (ie. incorporating postmodernist 
deconstructing along with modernist constructing into the informational frame) so that 
research can break free of any particular assumptions about human rigidities, inflexibilities 
and incapacities for change (Dervin, 2003i, p. 87). 
 
The importance of power in influencing personal and social relations is also acknowledged 
by Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005, p. 418) who commented that the power issue can be 
studied to enhance sensemaking in future. Blackler and McDonald (2000) asserted that there 
is also direct link between the dynamics of power and organizational learning.  The study of 
Weick and Roberts (1993) on the process of heedful interrelating was cited to illustrate that in 
high reliability organizations such as aircraft carriers, there is little space for heroic, 
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autonomous individuals in such complex work settings.  In fact, people have to contribute to 
their work activity, subordinate their actions to the unfolding events to achieve the collective 
mind (Blackler & McDonald, 2000, pp. 836 - 837). 
 
The attention to power is useful to this research in its study of healthcare organizations in 
which power is dominant in the relations between physicians and nurses and amongst other 
healthcare professionals.  Thus, the critical inquiry paradigm is taken in this research.      
 
3.8 Individual versus Organizational Sense-making 
The power issue also relates to how individual sense-making is related to organizational 
sense-making.  It is obvious that Dervin’s SMM stresses more on individual sense-making 
rather than organizational sense-making.  Tidline (2005) had the view that Devin’s SMM 
“may seem inadequate for explaining group and organizational information exchange and 
communication processes” (p. 114).  However, Dervin and her associates refuted. Dervin 
(2003c, p. 332) argued that gaps existed between individual and structure, person 1 and 
person 2.   Dervin and Clark (2003, p. 170, 171)  claimed that the individual moments of 
communicating as procedure provides the missing energizing linkage between the macro and 
the micro and connects and disconnects individual, culture, institution, and society.  In the 
following, we will look at the role of individuals in sense-making first before exploring on 
the linking between individual and organizational sense-making of each sense-making theory. 
 
The importance of individuals in Dervin’s SMM is reflected in its bottom-line goal of finding 
out “what users – audiences, customers, patients, clients, patrons, employees – ‘really’ think, 
feel, want, dream” (Dervin, 1998, p. 39).  This is the basic assumption that lies at the heart of 
Dervin’s SMM.  Throughout her studies, Dervin (2006, p.5) focuses on users in frameworks 
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that have meaning to everyday actors rather than by imposing frameworks from the 
viewpoints of experts.  This is to understand the realities as seen by users themselves rather 
than letting experts interpret the world for them.  In the words of Dervin (2006, p. 5), if 
experts are allowed to impose their frameworks, “all we are able to learn is how users see us-
looking-at-them”, but what SMM needs is how “them-looking-at-us and them-looking-at-
their situations in which they actually or might position themselves as users”.  Thus, SMM 
mandates to position self as the focus of investigation. It lays emphasis on the role of the 
individual as the expert and theorist of his or her own world. The individual is regarded as the 
source of expertise.  In any sense-making movement, an individual is best positioned to 
theorize why certain strategies are appropriate for them and hence he or she is involved in 
designing the new step and developing strategies for bridging his or her own gaps.  
 
To put the individual in the centre of research, SMM aims to “provide a systematic approach 
to listening to the audience – how they see their situations, past, present, and future – how 
they move to construct sense and make meaning of these situations” (Dervin, 2003b, p. 223).  
Not only should listening and hearing be built into the hearts of the research methodology, 
SMM also emphasizes the need for designing practice that allow users to speak out their 
“hidden depths”, to articulate their own lived experiences including their struggles and 
resistances. This is accomplished by means of conscientizing. In the words of Dervin (1999a), 
“articulating one’s world without limiting it to how it can be easily described by dominant 
discourses requires a process of bringing the unsaid and unarticulated into consciousness, i.e. 
conscientizing” (p. 746).  Conscientizing is implemented through SMM’s interviewing 
method that requires framing research questions in such as way that the expertise of the 
individual participant can be uncovered and his theories elicited (Spurgin, 2006, p. 103).  
This includes asking the informants the micro-moments of the gappy situation, how they 
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define them, how they bridge gaps, what has hindered and helped, what conclusions are 
reached and what insights are arrived, and what they would like to do if there was a magic 
wand.  These users’ experiences should also be represented in data analysis and reporting. In 
contrast to other theories, the data analysis of SMM focuses on the triangle of the sense-
making metaphor.  Its unit of analysis is smaller than the person – the situation, the gap or 
question identified at a moment in time-space.  In other words, researchers should put into 
practice an interviewing approach that “does not name the world for the actor bur rather 
mandates the actor to name the world for herself” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 740). 
 
The whole idea above is to “move from a focus on users as nouns ascribed with adjectives of 
our choosing to users defined as actors navigating moments of situation-facing” (Dervin, 
2006, p. 6).  Dervin and others (Dervin, 2003e, pp. 66 - 68; Dervin, 2003f, p. 276; Dervin & 
Clark, 2003) argued repeatedly that this micro moment of behavings can be considered not 
only at the micro-level of individual behavior but also at the macro-level of collective 
behavior.  Each individual is situated at cultural / historical moments in time-space that is 
defined much by culture, history, and institutions.  No matter what these macro-level 
institutions are, there is always a mandate for the individual alone at the micro-level to make 
sense of the self’s relationship to them.  Both the individual behavior at the micro-level and 
its relationship to the macro-level institutions are self-constructions. Thus, Dervin (2003f) 
argues that “Structure is energized by, maintained, reified, changed, and created by individual 
acts of communicating” (p. 276). Tidline (2005, p. 113) also supported the view that sense-
making will help understand intrapersonal, interpersonal, small group, organizational, 
national, and global communication practices.  This specific moment of behavings which 
serves to link the micro with the macro can be applied to both individual and collective 
entities.  The communication-as-procedure framework proposed by Dervin and Clark (2003, 
 203 
p. 174) illustrates how an individual is related to self and other macro-level entities.  
Accordingly, there are six levels of relationship:  
(1) Individual relating to self: the individual is thinking, creating, observing, arriving at 
personal sense and understandings of self.    
(2) Individual relating to other individuals: the individual is relating to other individuals, 
learning about others, comparing self to other, connecting or disconnecting with others. 
(3) Individual relating to collectivity: individual communicating focuses on participating 
in a collectivity which can move as one. 
(4) Collectivity relating to self: a collectivity is focusing on itself. 
(5) Collectivity relating to individual: a defined collectivity is focusing on individuals. 
(6) Collectivity relating to other collectivity: one defined collectivity is relating to 
another defined collectivity. 
 
These different levels of relationships are termed “situation-defining strategies’, which are 
understood as the procedure through which the users construct sense of the situation and 
select any of these strategies that fit the sense made of the situation.  Another dimension of 
the framework is the communicating tactics which are what users attempt to do 
communicatively in those situations. The framework actually “provides a perspective for 
looking at any human microworld of individuals is connected to the macrolevel world of 
cultures, structures, and institutions, and vice versa” (Dervin & Clark, 2003, p. 177).  For 
instance, in a situation requiring an individual relating to other individuals, the individual can 
apply the tactics or the conversational rules of attending to, sharing ideas with, making 
decisions, expressing, confronting and mediating with each other.  One may also expect how 
a person creates ideas when relating to self will differ from that individual may do when 
relating to others.  It spells out the “hows” of gap-bridging can be communicated.  
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The main difference between Dervin and Weick that most scholars note is that Dervin 
focuses on the individual while Weick puts emphasis on group sensemaking.  One of them, 
Marshall (2011), claimed that Dervin’s approach was monadic as contrast to the dyadic and 
more often triadic or polyadic approach of Weick.  This is largely correct at least for the 
contribution of Weick.  Weick’s sensemaking also provides a micro-mechanism that 
produces macro-change over time (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 419). Drawing on 
Wiley’s (1988) four micro-macro levels in social analysis, Weick (1995) argued that 
“organizing lies atop that movement between intersubjective and generically subjective” (p. 
72). Intrasubjective is the self or individual level. It is undoubtedly at the micro-level. The 
intersubjectivity level is also regarded as the micro-level.  It is the level in which “individual 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions are merged or synthesized into conversations during which 
the self [intrasubjective] gets transformed from ‘I’ into ‘we’” (Weick, 1995, p. 71). Through 
interaction amongst individuals, the collective identity becomes emerged.  This is the level 
where sensemaking resides (Weber & Glynn, 2006, p. 1643).  Here, Weick did acknowledge 
individual sensemaker is one of the seven properties of sensemaking - grounded in identity 
construction.   Sensemaking begins with the individual, without whom there would not be 
any sensemaking.  This in turn is influenced by the sense of identity the individual is 
associated because “Depending on who I am, my definition of what is ‘out there’ will also 
change” (Weick, 1995, p. 20).  A person that perceived with a different identity will assign 
different meaning to the same situation.  Therefore, “identities specify relationships that are 
central to the social nature of sensemaking among diverse actors (Weber & Glynn, 2006, p. 
1646).  That identity will undergo continual redefinition, as it is constituted out of the process 
of interaction.  Thus, a person can have multiple identities representing the individual self or   
the organization self he works for.  Consequently, “the more selves I have access to, the more 
meanings I should be able to extract and impose in any situation” (Weick, 1995, p. 24).  
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When the individual sensemaker engages in dyadic interaction with others in a social context, 
sensemaking occurs at this intersubjectivity level.   
 
Institutions reside at the macro extrasubjective level of “pure meaning”, which is akin to 
organizational culture. What links the micro-levels and the macro level is generic subjectivity, 
which is the level of social structure and includes organizations.  The defining features are the 
disappearance of interacting human beings and their replacement by a generic self embedded 
in structures such as rules, habits and routines. Its function is to define roles that create 
interchangeability of people and produce premises for action through processes of arguing, 
expecting, committing and manipulating.  In times of stability, the shared understanding at 
the intersubjectivity level is enacted in the form of rituals, systems, norms and beliefs to keep 
coordinated action.  In times of change, generic subjectivity breaks down into 
intersubjectivity to arrive at new understandings or modify previous understandings.  In both 
scenarios, generic subjectivity is to create controlling structures to secure stability for the 
organization.  This is Weick’s (1995, p. 170) essence of organizational sensemaking:  
Organizations were conceptualized as social structures that combine the generic 
subjectivity of interlocking routines, the intersubjectivity of mutually reinforcing 
interpretations, and the movement back and forth between these two forms by means 
of continuous communication. Tensions between the innovation of intersubjectivity 
and the control of generic subjectivity animate the movement and communication. 
The goal of organisations, viewed as sensemaking systems, is to create and identify 
events that recur to stabilize their environments and make them more predictable.  
 
While both Weick and Snowden focus on organizational sense-making, Snowden does not 
explicitly deal with individual actors at all, and does not identify any process through which 
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individual sense-making is linked to organizational sense-making.  Weick covers the role of 
individuals but the link between the micro-level and the macro-level is provided by the 
generic subjectivity level of social structures.  Only Dervin places individuals at the centre 
and the moments of communicating links them to the macro-level structures.  However, 
Dervin emphasizes that her main difference with Weick is the absence of collective mind:  
While the gap idea applies equally well to collective and individual entities, when 
implemented for the understanding of collective entities it is assumed that there is no 
collective mind.  Rather, it is communicating that energizes the collectivity.  
Collective gap defining and gap facing are the complex result of individual 
communicatings. It is not assumed that the behavings of the collectivity are 
predictable or explainable solely based on some extrapolation of individual behavior.  
It is assumed, however, that individual communicatings have something to do with 
collective communicatings, at a very minimum in the fact that a collectivity lacking a 
mind cannot act.  Individuals act and the collective presence is produced 
communicatively.  (Dervin, 2003e, p. 68) 
 
The literature review in Chapter Two concluded that there is a missing link between 
individual and organizational knowledge. Devin’s deliberation on individual and 
organizational sense-making and the communication-as-procedure framework provides the 
direction of how this void can be filled in a more structured and practical way as compared to 
Weick’s.  It allows researchers to examine how the gap-bridging strategies differ for an 
individual in different situations so that how an individual’s perspective in a micro situation 
is connected to the macro world can be merged in the process.  This is exactly what this 
current research is interested to study, therefore, Dervin’s communication-as-procedure-
framework will be adopted to investigate how the knowledge is created, shared and utilized at 
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the macro level.  Dervin and Clark (2003, p. 182) also mentioned that there was very little 
academic research in “individual relating to collectivity” which focus on how the individual 
makes sense of and deals with his or her membership in a collectivity.  This is also one of the 
areas that this research will attempt to study.   
 
3.9 Sense-making as a Methodological Approach 
Another significant difference amongst these three sense-making theories is that only SMM 
provides a metatheoretical model that “moves from a generalized set of philosophic premises 
to a fully explicated methodology and practice for studying and engaging sense-making” 
(Dervin & Naumer, 2010, p. 4702).  Both Weick and Snowden did not provide any explicit 
methodology.  Weick was often criticized for lacking quantitative or empirical support 
(Miner, 2006, p. 103).  His research usually makes use of case studies coming from his field 
studies of jazz orchestras, firefighters, aircraft carriers and power plants.  He usually starts 
with theory to research practice and use the research result to amplify his theoretical ideas 
(Dervin & Naumer, 2010, p. 4700).  Snowden’s works are mainly based on action research.  
Browning and Boudès (2005, p. 33) stated that Snowden presents his ideas to workshop 
participants, and then uses an interpretation of their responses as evidence for his concepts in 
his articles about narratives and complexity. He will then apply them directly into his practice. 
 
For Dervin, what sets her SMM apart from others is that it provides a coherent set of meta-
theoretical assumptions, specific research methods that guide the design and implementation 
of communication research practice in framing research questions, data collection and data 
analysis.  Dervin found that the term methodology was used loosely in scholarship.  It is 
either collapsed into mere methods or quantitative methods in objectivist / scientific study or 
collapsed into metatheory or qualitative approaches in subjectivist / humanistic study.  The 
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former privileges substantive theory while the latter privileges metatheory. Metatheory 
consists of philosophical grounded assumptions about the phenomena and about how to study 
it so as to guide researchers in constructing theories proper (Dervin, 2005b, p. 25; Kari, 1998).  
Substantive theory is the most concrete form of metatheory.  It is a set of inductively and / or 
deductively derived concepts and their interrelationships that provides an explanation for 
certain phenomena to guide researchers in constructing specific research questions as well as 
hypotheses (Dervin, 2003k, p. 137; Kari, 1998).  Unlike metatheory, a substantive theory is 
empirically testable.  In both cases, “there are yawning gaps that remain between assumptions 
and the hows of methods” (Dervin, 2008a, p. 4).   
 
Dervin does not favor the above all-or-none approach.  SMM assumes that the reality is 
orderly in part, chaotic in part and evolving in part.  Similarly, the humans are sometimes 
static across time-space and sometimes fluid across time-space.  It is erroneous to assume in 
advance which across time-space characteristics account for individual as well as collective 
sense-making.  Consequently, there is no one single method to studying this elusive human 
condition.   Rather, SMM emphasizes that its methodology is “to unearth the conditions 
under which users turn to habit versus when they turn to behaviors linked more 
consequentially to particular contextual conditions versus when they turn to trying out new 
approaches” (Dervin, 2006, p. 8) (Emphasis added).   The is exactly the purpose of this 
research which is to find out conditions under which knowledge can be created and under 
which knowledge will not be created.   
 
To bridge the gap of the all-or-none approach and to enhance the systematic research of 
human conditions, Dervin turns to develop SMM as a “methodology between the cracks”, an 
“in-between” approach that takes both the quantitative and qualitative approaches without 
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admitting any determinism embedded in method.  SMM from the beginning has mandated 
itself to operate simultaneously in four planes of meta-theory, substantive theory, 
methodology and method such that the methodology-method connection is reflected by and 
reflects that connection between metatheory and substantive theory (Naumer, Fisher, & 
Dervin, 2008; Dervin, 2008a, p. 4). Methodology is broadly conceptualized as the 
relationships between the actual research methods used in any given situation and the 
substantive theory that direct those methods as well as to the metatheory that the entire 
research edifice rests.  It forges explicit bridges between metatheory and method, for the 
practices of research and theorizing (Dervin, 2003k, p. 138).  It involves the reflexive 
analysis and development of methods – with methods defines broadly as the specific “hows” 
of theorizing, observing, data collecting, analyzing, and interpreting (Dervin, 1999a, p. 728; 
Dervin, 2003k, p. 137).  In this sense, SMM not only is a metatheory but also provides 
guidance for method, including methods of framing research questions, methods of 
interviewing, and methods of analysis, all relating to substantive theorizing and of conducting 
research not anchored in any specific context but applicable to any setting relevant to the 
communicative study of communication – the constructing that humans do to make sense of 
their experiences.  Knowledge creation is defined by Dervin as a communication practice.  
Thus, the methodological approach of SMM will be adopted in this research.  This is covered 
in the following section. 
 
3.9.1 Methods of Interviewing and Data Collection 
The methodological approach of SMM that is to reflect its metatheoretical assumptions 
reviewed in the above section is implemented through the graphical tool, the Sense-Making 
metaphor, which serves as a generalizable microscope guiding the observation of 
communicating (Dervin, 2005b, p. 27). Interviewing is the primary research tool to apply 
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SMM’s methodological approach.  Thus, its practices are also derived from the same SMM 
metaphor.  Figure 3.7 below is the fully-developed version in 2008.  What it differs from 
Figure 3.1 in p. 164 above is that the sense-maker now carries with an umbrella labeled as 
“Context”.  It refers to macro-level structure, culture, person, situation, behavior, 
organization and so on (Dervin, 2003g, p. 112).  The sense-maker representing the agency 
that holds the umbrella moves with the umbrella can act inside, outside and against it.  This 
sense-maker, applying to any entity, no matter it is an individual or a collectivity, moves 
through time-space in its entirety in 6Hs – head (cognitive knowing), heart (emotions), hand 
(body), habit (repertoire building), hegemony (hidden forces of power) and habitus 
(communicating practice inscribed by hegemony) implying that in SMM it is impossible to 
separate the inner and outer worlds of the sense-maker.  In facing the ever-present gappiness 
by mandate of the human condition, the sense-maker has to cross over it by building bridges 
that can be unconscious repetition of the past or new construction when the old sense has run 
out.  This is the sense-making moment in which new knowledge will be created and is of 
particular interest for this research.  It does not mean that all gaps are problems and not all 
gap-bridging are problem-solving or decision-making.  There are many gap-bridging 
strategies and tactics, all involve internal and external verbings encompassing not only 
thoughts, ideas, observations, understandings but also emotions, feelings, dreams, visions, 
pretenses, illusions, connections and disconnections.  But no matter what tactic is used, it has 
consequences for the kind of idea created, and the kind of idea created has implications for 
the tactic used (Dervin, 2003f, p. 274).  The sense-maker may also need to make use of 
different sources of inputs such as own ideas,  information, documents, databases, and peers 
depending on their relevancy to the situation and gaps he or she is facing.  The outcome of 
bridging the gaps is to get either helps or hurts, which provides another fodder for the 
situational conditions of the new moment in time-space.  
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Figure 3.6 The Sense-Making Metaphor (Dervin, 2008a, p. 17) 
 
This Sense-Making Metaphor is not a literal map or model, but a metaphorical framework 
that “is intended as a highly abstract methodological tool, a way of looking” (Dervin, 2003k, 
p. 151).  Each step-taking across the gaps in the metaphor represents the central foundational 
concepts of SMM that mandates attention to these primitive terms – context, time, space, 
movement, gap, horizon, situation, bridge, history, energy, power, experience, constancy 
(habit, inflexibility, rigidity), change (flexibility, caprice, chaos), outcomes, helps and hurts.  
Together they constitute what Dervin (1983; 2003f, p. 278) called the Sense-Making Triangle 
of situation-gap-outcome shown in Figure 3.7 below that informs how interviewing is 
practised.  All interviewing approaches of SMM focus on the micro sense-making moment 
anchored in a particular time-space – the intersection of all parts of the situation-gap-outcome 
- in order to capture all step-takings.  The purposes are to hear what informants really think, 
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feel, need, experience and struggle with on their own terms, to facilitate the emergence of 
multiple perspectives so that different voices including the hidden and silenced can be heard 
but not homogenized, and to elicit from informants situated narratives of their internal and 
external movements through time-space that may be used for both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis (Dervin, 2008a, p. 15; Dervin & Naumer, 2010, p. 4703).  
 
Figure 3.7  Sense-Making Triangle of Situation-Gap-Outcome 
 
To achieve the above purposes, SMM stipulates a core set of fundamental mandates to 
conduct interviews (Dervin, 2008a, p. 15): 
1. Minimal intrusion by researchers of their credentials and expertise. 
2. Giving informants permission to not be representatives of collectivities but to be 
aware observers of collectivities. 
3. Understanding that informants do not come to interviews with answers on the tips of 
their tongues, or even well-articulated in their minds. 
4. Having informants talk only about situations real to them, that they have experienced.  
This has proved to be most effective in eliciting what the users really think and feel. 
5. Understanding that “real” to informants does not mean objectively real. Observations 
of how brutally imposed power hurts is “real” to informants but so are informants’ 
dreams of what would have helped and explanations of causes and consequences. 
Sense-making 
moment 
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6. Interviewing to build trust and willingness to disclose by implementing an 
interviewing approach focusing on the verbs of communicating in order to reach for 
an understanding of the elusive noun worlds of informants as seen by informants. 
7. Allowing informants to be the same and / or different as they move across time-space. 
8. Allowing informants to be confused and muddled; and at the same time intelligent 
and strategic. 
9. Allowing informants to see situations outside the boxes of our frameworks. 
10. Allowing informants to be aware creators of their worlds. 
11. Understanding that precision in question-asking may be less important than trust 
building and treating informants as individual sense-makers. 
12. Using redundancy during interviewing as an important communication tool for 
building the bridge between informant stories and researcher understandings. 
13. Inviting informants to talk about their situations in terms of how they are constrained 
and free of and freed by multiples forces – their own, those from others, those from 
structures. 
These interviewing principles are useful to researchers with the genuine interests in adopting 
and applying SMM in their research.  In this research, I have also designed appropriate 
measures to implement these mandates.  This will be elaborated in Chapter Four. 
 
There are many interviewing methods in SMM that can be administered in numerous ways 
including in-person, by phone, online, one-on-one, focus groups, surveys, participant 
observation, ethnographic studies, self-administered or interviewer-administered (Dervin & 
Frenette, 2003, p. 241; Dervin & Naumer, 2010, p. 4703).  The common core of them is to 
examine varying brackets of time-space as experienced by the interviewee in the moving 
through an experience, with each time-space bracket being conceptualized as another micro-
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moment of their lived and / or phenomenological experience (Dervin, 2008a, p. 20).  Since 
the interviewee may have multiple time-space brackets in an experience, SMM interviewing 
is designed to allow circling and re-circling of each sense-making moment in different ways 
depending on the research, application or context as captured in Figure 3.8.  
                                   
Figure 3.8 Circling reality (Dervin, 2008a, p. 20) 
 
The Micro-Moment Time-Line interview is the most foundational interviewing approach of 
SMM.   It requires the informant to describe a situation relevant to the research focus and 
then each step in detail in Time-Line steps – what happened first, second and so on (Dervin & 
Frenette,, 2003, p. 241).  For each Time-Line step, the informant is directed to the Sense-
Making Triangle by circling the micro-moment at specific points in time in terms of how the 
informant saw the situation, the gap and the help he or she wanted (Dervin, 2003f, p. 279).  
This SMM Triangle can be applied to each micro-moment or more if there is a need to dig 
deeper in some specific areas such as a certain conclusion, the gap-bridging tactic, etc.  This 
interviewing approach allows the informant to create his or her own context and to fully 
inform the interviewer about his or her own world (Dervin, 2003a, p. 257). In actuality, many 
variations have been developed to suit different research needs.  There are: Micro-Element 
 215 
Interview that focuses on only one step; Life-Line Interview that surveys the entire lifeline of 
experience vis-à-vis an issue; Helps Chaining Interview that focuses on how the informant 
“constructs the connection between information, system, or structure and self” (Dervin, 2003f, 
p. 281), and focus group interview.  But no matter which interviewing approach, all are 
guided by a roster of questions for each element in the Sense-Making Triangle. 
 
3.9.2 Framing Research Questions 
To allow the informants to speak for their own worlds, SMM mandates researchers to ask 
questions in a verbing approach and to silence their own nouns and instead focus on the 
universals of human movement through time space (Dervin, 2008a, p. 19).  These so-called 
SMM questions are all open-ended with prompts at specific points the researcher sees fit.  For 
each element of the Sense-Making Triangle, there is a roster of questions that can be used or 
modified to be used depending on the research context.  SMM also mandates repeated use of 
these questions as redundancy is key to get more understanding of the informant’s worlds and 
to allow time for the informant to think deep.  Here are a few examples (Dervin, 2008a, p. 19):  
To tap situations: 
1. What happened?     
2. What stood in the way? 
3. How did that connect with past events? 
4. How did it connect to forces of power in family, community, society? 
To tap gaps: 
1. What were your big questions? 
2. What questions, confusions did you struggle with? 
To tap bridges: 
1. What conclusions / ideas did you come to? 
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2. What emotions / feelings did you come to? 
To tap outcomes: 
1. How did that help? 
2. How did that hinder? 
3. If you could wave a magic wand, what would have helped? 
 
3.9.3 Methods of Analysis 
Data analysis in SMM aims at identifying patterns of sense-making across time-space in 
terms of universal categories, particularly at “how informant sense-making varies across time 
and space; for both stabilities and habits as well as flexibilities and changes; for connections 
between past, present, and future, and at how the informant sees self as constrained and 
struggling as well as moving and free” (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 241). The resulting 
pattern will allow comparison of the sense-makings of one human to those of another, of one 
human to self across time and space, and will yield patterns of both centrality (homogeneity 
and agreement) and dispersion (diversity and disagreement) (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 
240).  To accomplish this, Dervin found it necessary to avoid focusing on the noun 
experience of the informants and imposing the noun judgment of the researchers.  Thus, she 
introduced a verbing interface over the noun interface to focus on the sense-making moment 
such as how his or her movement can be stopped (as a perspective for looking at situational 
conditions), the kinds of gaps need to be bridged in order to keep moving (as a perspective 
for looking at sense-making or information needs), and the different ways for evaluating the 
success in gap-bridging (as a perspective for looking at information use or actor-created 
effects of information-sharing and communicating)” (Dervin, 2003a, p. 255). The focus of 
analysis is thus not on the person, but on the micro-moment of sense-making.  Consequently, 
the unit of analysis in SMM is informant-in-situation which is smaller than the person. These 
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informant-in-situations can be any or all of the components of the SMM metaphor – 
situational condition, the gap, the bridge or the outcome depending on the research objective.  
In SMM, these are to be measured by a set of universal descriptors which are proved in the 
40 years of projects of Dervin and her students in providing a better understanding of the 
informants’ sense-making than the traditional constant attributes across time-space like 
demography and personality.  These universals are to be derived from content analysis by 
intersecting a deductive set of frameworks based on Sense-Making’s verbing analytic with 
the inductive qualities of the data (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 242).  They are then used to 
code the interviewing narrative for both qualitative and quantitative analysis.  Again, it shows 
that SMM is a methodology between the cracks.  Various studies of SMM (Dervin, 2003a, pp. 
260 - 264) provide many such universal category of measurement for situations, gaps, gap-
bridging strategies, helps, and so on.  One example is the category “Situation Movement 
State”, which aims at taping how the informants see their movement through time-space 
being stopped.  There are 11 such states: decision, problematic, spinout, washout, barrier, 
being led, observing, out to lunch, waiting, time passing, and moving.   
 
3.10 Conclusion – Theoretical Framework for this Research 
This Chapter compares and contrasts the sense-making theories of three leading scholars, 
Dervin, Weick and Snowden, in different perspectives.  They all recognize that knowledge is 
created in the constructings and sense-makings.  A verbing and dialogic approach should be 
taken to capture the importance of action and dialogue particularly narratives in sense-making. 
All share the need to work in an environment with complexity and uncertainty and the 
importance to facilitate diverse voices to be heard.  Narratives and storytelling are effective 
tools to organize and contextualize individual experience, and is the way to maximize the 
sense-making’s explanatory power.   
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However, their differences are even greater than similarities. Only Dervin’s SMM looks more 
promising to provide a sound theoretical framework for this research.  The following is a 
summary of the contribution of SMM to this research in addition to the above: 
1. The conceptualization on the nature of knowing and knowledge as the sense made and 
as the input as well as output of sense-making provides the basis for this research.  By 
looking to the gap idea in the sense-making metaphor of situation-gap-outcome, one 
will find the moment under which knowledge creation and utilization can take place.  
By studying the gap-bridging strategies, one will know the hows and whys knowledge 
is created, shared and utilized. SMM allows this research to look at sense-making of 
healthcare professionals to map out the whole process of knowledge creation, sharing 
and utilization.   
2. Its universal variables of sense-making for predicting sense-making, information 
seeking and use provide another useful alternative to the traditional transmission 
model. Its focus on the situated behavior in sense-making allows this research to study 
all knowledge, sharing and utilization as a situated practice.  All the elements 
involved in this process can also be examined.    
3. It acknowledges that knowledge creation is a communication practice, the purpose of 
which is to find out what users realty think and feel.  An individual is put at the center 
of its conceptions.  The emphasis on an individual enables this research to focus on 
the real-life sense-making experience of healthcare professionals at a micro-level and 
the process of knowledge creation and utilization can be understood in this way.    
4. Its emphasis on power is particularly useful to this research as healthcare setting is 
highly sensitive to power issues.     
5. Besides focusing on individual knowing at the micro-level, SMM also claims itself 
applicable to the study of the relation between micro and macro levels.  It is argued 
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that the specific moment of sense-making behavings provides exactly the missing 
procedural link between the two.  Its communication-as-procedure provides a 
structured and systematic means to study this relationship.   
6. SMM provides a coherent and complete set of methodological approach based on her 
metatheoretical assumptions including guidance for methods, interviewing approach, 
framing research questions, data collection and analysis.  I echo with Souto (2010, p. 
117) that this bridges the distance between theoretical assumptions and research 
method.  This is not found in the approaches of Weick and Snowden. 
 
It is clear that Dervin’s SMM is significant to this study in many essential ways.  Thus, it will 
be adopted in this research as the basic research framework through which the knowledge 
creating process in the micro and macro level of a healthcare organization is investigated.  
The Cynefin framework of Snowden for organizational sense-making will be taken to 
supplement the data analysis.  The emergence and flow of knowledge in different domains 
proved useful for the understanding of the limitations of EBM and its failure to assimilate the 
humanistic dimension of clinical practice. The role of narratives and storytelling in 
knowledge sharing will be explored.  However, Weick’s sensemaking theory has a number of 
weaknesses that limits its application in this research. These include the retrospective nature 
of sensemaking, the resulting implication of the impossibility to make sense of situations not 
occurred before, the restrictive view of imposing order out of chaos, and the lack of testable 
empirical data and methodological connection to the three-part process of enactment, 
selection and retention.  Chapter Four delineates in detail how Dervin’s SMM is applied to 
this research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To admit that knowledge is intrinsically erroneous is not to imply that we should forego it. 
 
McGuire 
 
If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it. 
 
David Garvin 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This research aimed to find out how knowledge might be created, shared and utilized in 
healthcare organizations and in what ways the research-practice gap of EBM can be bridged 
through knowledge management.  In addition, the linking of individual knowledge at the 
micro-level to the organizational knowledge at the macro-level was also be explored.  
Essentially, the findings from the research were analyzed to derive concepts that could be 
added to or removed from the Sense-Making model of Dervin and a new micro-macro sense-
making model built on these findings to identify factors that would enable or block these 
sense-making activities.  Thus, healthcare information professionals can design relevant 
products and services to facilitate the process and to reduce the impact of the stumbling 
blocks.  Chapter Two outlined the clear trend towards a communicative approach in KM 
research that reflects the interpretive and critical inquiry perspectives taken in this research to 
derive the working definitions of knowledge and KM.  In fact, this perspective of viewing 
knowledge as both subjective and social is more amenable to the sense-making approach than 
other interpretive philosophies.   The comparison of the three leading sense-making theories 
in Chapter Three concluded that Dervin’s SMM is particularly relevant as the research 
framework for this research and it would be supplemented with Snowden’s Cynefin 
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framework in data analysis.  Dervin’s SMM is a coherent methodology based on her 
metatheoretical assumptions that provides guidance for methods, interviewing approach, 
framing research questions, data collection and analysis.  This Chapter details how the study 
of knowledge creation, sharing and utilization is designed as informed by Dervin’s SMM.  
 
4.2 Sense-Making Methodology 
The extensive review of the leading sense-making theories in Chapter Three explained in 
details the various reasons why Dervin’s SMM provides a sound theoretical framework for 
this research.  To recap briefly, knowledge is understood as the sense an individual has 
constructed at a certain moment in time-space (Dervin, 1998).  Whenever individuals 
encounter discontinuity, they can make use of the old sense to cross the gap.  However, when 
the old sense runs out, they need to define this gappy situation and decide what knowledge or 
other inputs are required to clarify this unclear aspect of the situation or to build a new bridge.       
Here, gap-bridging can be viewed as “the constructive process where an individual draws on 
cognitive and affective resources in order to cross the gap being faced” (Savolainen, 1999, 
78).  Or as Kari (2001, p. 32) remarked, gap bridging can be translated into information 
seeking, and bridge into “knowledge”.  The individual engages in various internal and 
external behavior including observings, thinkings, idea creatings, comparings, contrastings, 
rejectings, talkings, sendings, agreeings, disagreeings, and so on to make use of various  
inputs ranging from “ideas and cognitions, feelings, emotions, questions and muddles, angst 
and hunches, dreams and wishes” to “observations and understandings, visions, pretenses and 
illusions, connections and disconnections” for constructing the bridge (Dervin, 2003f, p. 273;  
1999a, p. 730).  The new sense made in this process constitutes new knowledge for the 
individual. The actor in this process can be any type of entity – individual, group, 
organization, or even society.  The moments of communicating of the actor with other 
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individuals or collectivity serve to link the micro world of the individual with the macro 
world of structures, culture and institutions, enabling the study of knowledge creation, 
sharing and utilization at the macro level.  It is clear that by employing SMM to study the 
constructing that healthcare professionals do to make sense of their experience in work, we 
are able to derive from such study the process of knowledge creation, sharing and utilization 
in a healthcare setting.   
 
SMM is not just a theory, but a methodology that contains a coherent set of research methods 
that guide the design of research questions, data collection and data analysis.  Time-line 
interviewing is its main research tool.  It can be said that Sense-Making methods are 
derivations of the theory (Dervin, 2003f, p. 279).   Since SMM is the theoretical framework 
for this research, it is essential for this research to adopt the research method that mirrors its 
theoretical framework so as to derive a complementary substantive theory.   
 
Moreover, this research is in the main an exploratory and qualitative study, though 
quantitative analysis will be conducted to supplement the findings.  Schamber (2000, p. 744) 
highly recommended time-line interviews for exploratory studies.   She also remarked that 
the flexibility of the method in the sense that time-line interviewing can be adapted to focus 
on any situational area of interest also made it suitable for qualitative and exploratory studies.  
Sense-making experience is very personal and subjective.  Time-line interviewing provided 
the means for the interviewees to reveal what they really think and feel about the situation.  In 
a nutshell, the in-depth interviewing approach developed by Dervin is the best instrument to 
use in this study as compared to other data collection means such as open-ended 
questionnaires.  In fact, my experience echoes that of Cheuk (2000, pp. 74 - 77) who found 
that only Dervin’s interviewing method overcame the problems she encountered with other 
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data collection methods attempted in her pilot studies to capture the information seeking 
situations of her respondents.   
 
Amongst the various time-line interview methods of SMM, the core one, Micro-Moment 
Time-Line Interview, was selected because it is the most comprehensive, in-depth and 
detailed method amongst other variants of this approach.  The Micro-Moment Time-Line 
interview starts with one sense-making situation the interviewee has experienced before and 
which also falls within the scope of the research.  This situation is the so-called critical 
incident that serves as the entry point for the interview.  Being critical, it is not an ordinary 
event, but one that has great impact on the interviewee or is so critical, perplexing or 
confusing that it left a deep impression on the interviewee, making him or her easier to 
remember.  The interviewee is then asked to recall what happened in that situation, which 
constitutes the time-line steps, and to describe what happened first, what happened next, and 
so on, until the details in each step are covered.  For each step in the time-line, the 
interviewee is directed to focus on “Sense-Making Triangle, circling the micro-moment in 
terms of how the actor saw the situation, the gap, and the help he or she wanted – that is, 
where he / she wanted to land after crossing the bridge” (Dervin, 2003f, p. 279).  As SMM is 
to allow the emergence of the actor’s own perspectives in their own terms without any 
obstruction, the interviewee is free to select “what time-space moments to attend, how to 
attend them, how to order them, how to collapse and / or expand time-space in the ordering, 
and how to connect one time-space moment to another” (Dervin, Jacobson, & Nilan, 1982, p. 
428).  There are neither hypothetical questions to respondents nor any elaborate lists of 
options to which respondents must reply (Kim, 2005, p. 485).  Unlike conventional critical 
incident or explicitation techniques (Urquhart et al., 2003), SMM interviewing focuses far 
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more on the individual within the situation, and their perceptions of the situation and less on 
the situation itself and how the situation unfolded. 
 
Depending on the research purpose, additional elements can be examined and stressed.  
Dervin illustrated this methodology by using studies of information needs as an example.  
She (2003f) said, “Emphasis has been placed on understanding how the individual saw self as 
stopped, what questions or confusions he or she defined, what strategies he or she preferred 
for arriving at answers, what success he or she had in arriving at answers, how he or she was 
helped by answers (i.e. how she or she put the answers to use), and what barriers he or she 
saw standing in the way to arriving at answers” (p. 279). 
 
One of the strength of this interviewing approach is that it enables a rich description of the 
interviewee’s experience in a highly structured manner yet independent of content (Dervin, 
Jacobson, & Nilan, 1982, p. 429).  The interviewer provides the structure based on the Sense-
Making Triangle.  The interviewees in turn provide the content at the level of details they 
pick.  
 
4.3 The Research Setting 
This study is to investigate the knowledge creation, sharing and utilization in healthcare 
organizations in order to shed new light on the practice of EBM.  As informed by SMM, 
knowledge creation is a situated practice.  Healthcare professionals were invited to share their 
real life experience in the care of patients or handling other hospital work that produced 
perplexity, ambiguity or uncertainty so that the gappy situations they have encountered 
before, the strategies they employed to define and bridge the gaps with the available sources 
of inputs, and the helps or hurts they got, can be studied.  It goes without saying that the 
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research setting is hospitals.  This study was conducted in Hong Kong.  Health services in 
Hong Kong are delivered by both public and private providers.   The following diagram 
illustrates the health service delivery infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Health Service Delivery Infrastructure (WHO & Department of Health 
Hong Kong, 2012, p. 5) 
 
The Department of Health is a government department that is responsible for health 
promotion and disease prevention services. Its counterpart, the HA, was established in 1990 
as the statutory body for managing all public hospitals and institutions and their services to 
the community (Hospital Authority, n.d., para. 1).  These services are highly subsidized.  
Since 1991, HA has taken over the management of all public hospitals from the Government. 
Currently, it has a workforce of around 64,000 people that spread across 42 hospitals and 
institutions, 48 Specialist Out-patient Clinics and 73 General Out-Patient Clinics (Hospital 
Authority, n.d., para. 2).  In 2010 / 11, the HA delivered 90% of total in-patient bed days 
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(WHO & Department of Health Hong Kong, 2012).  In addition, the HA strongly supports 
EBM practice and KM concepts and has began to implement them since the 1990s.  
According to Cheng (2006),  
The HA promoted evidence-based philosophy since 1998, and set up the Clinical 
Effectiveness Unit (CEU) and the Knowledge Management Unit in 2000 to 
institutionalize EBP initiatives.  The efforts culminated in the launching a KM 
platform, with comprehensive web-based resources – the e-Knowledge Gateway 
(eKG). 
Although the interview did not ask the respondents in the HA to talk about EBM and KM 
directly, their first-hand experience with these may have an impact on the care of patients, 
particularly in times when they encounter gappy situations.  With this background in EBM 
and KM, and the important role played by the HA in the provision of health services in Hong 
Kong, public hospitals are considered as the representative sites that must be included in this 
study.   
 
The private sector at the time of study mainly consisted of 12 private hospitals and various 
private clinics that deliver a wide range of services including general and specialist out-
patient services, day care services and in-patient services under various specialties.  Most 
doctors in private clinics will attach to one or more private hospitals.  Although they only 
accounted for around 10% of total in-patient bed days in 2010/11, about 70% of outpatient 
consultations are provided by the private sector in out-patient clinics attached to hospitals, 
clinics or stand-alone facilitates (WHO & Department of Health Hong Kong, 2012).  In 
addition, approximately 49% of registered medical practitioners practiced in the private 
sector (WHO & Department of Health Hong Kong, 2012).  The institutions in the private 
sector are also significant in heath service delivery in Hong Kong.  There is no literature 
 227 
reporting that private hospitals and clinics in Hong Kong implemented EBM or KM.  Thus, 
this difference may provide a contrast with the healthcare professionals in public hospitals.  
Interesting factors may come up about the implementation of KM, particularly the success 
factors such as the cultural factors.  Therefore, it was decided to include healthcare 
professionals either working in or attached to private hospitals via their own clinics.   
 
There are many specialty wards in public hospitals.  The internal medicine wards and general 
surgical wards including Intensive Care Units (ICU) receive the greatest number of patients.  
They are also general in nature with many different cases and all hospitals regardless of their 
nature will establish these wards. Nevertheless, they will cover a range of specialties from 
cardiology, neurology, gastroenterology, neurosurgery, and colorectal surgery to Ear, Nose 
and Throat (ENT).  In addition, the staff members in such wards constitute a large proportion 
of healthcare professionals in a hospital and thus the results of the research can probably be 
generalized to other specialties too.  With the greatest number of healthcare professionals 
working in these two kinds of ward, it was also deemed easier for me to find respondents.  
Therefore, these two wards were chosen as the study sites.    
 
Two groups of professionals, doctors and nurses working in the same ward, were selected as 
the participants.   The professionals working in the same ward can be viewed as members of a 
community of practice, as they have very similar background and training and thus 
knowledge and skills in the same specialty.  It can be said that they have the same domain of 
interests, engaging in the same work activities, and possess the same medical practice 
(Wenger, 2000; 2006).  It would be easier for them to establish shared meaning about the care 
of patients with more opportunities for knowledge creation.  With similar background, the 
gappy situations they encountered and gap-bridging strategies are more amenable for 
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comparison and generalization.  The allied health professionals were not included as they are 
not attached to a ward in Hong Kong.  The same two groups of professionals working in 
these two wards in the private sector were selected.   However, many of the doctors have 
their own private clinics.  Thus, the selection of respondents was not limited to private 
hospitals only.  Those working in private clinics were also included.  
 
4.4 Sampling Strategies 
Since the research aims at looking for doctors and nurses working in internal medicine or 
general surgery wards in either public or private hospitals in Hong Kong, nonprobability 
sampling was used.  By this sampling method, the selection of samples is not based on a 
random process that will map out a representative subgroup of the larger population, but on 
the human judgment of the researcher.   It does not require a list of all possible elements in a 
full population.  Instead, researchers are allowed to access otherwise highly sensitive or 
difficult to reach study populations in a focused way (Berg, 2007, p. 43).   
 
As compared to probability sampling, nonprobability sampling will inevitably generate a 
biased sample.  But there are both theoretical and practical reasons for this research to 
employ this method.  First, for theoretical consideration, Hayes (2005) advised that the 
sampling method used should depend on what kind of inference the researcher wants to make 
from the samples.  Non-probability sampling is best for making a process inference, which is 
usually the primary interest of most communication researchers. Process inference means that 
the research is more interested in testing a theory or a hypothesis (for example, if this 
happens, then something else will / will not happen).  The research focus is to make an 
inference about the process at work rather than the specific size of an effect in some 
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population from which the sample has been taken.  In his view, random sampling is not 
required for process inference. 
If the researcher does not want to make a specific statistical statement about a 
population (such as females are 2.3 units more shy than males on average), then the 
question of whether the sample is random or not becomes moot.  If the intent of the 
researcher is not to make a population inference but instead make a process inference, 
then the origin of the sample should loom less large in our evaluation of that research.  
(Hayes, 2005, p.41).   
This research is also focused on process inference. It is an attempt to study the knowledge 
creating process in the healthcare context and the generalization of this process.  The focus is 
not the individual healthcare professional but the individual-in-situation.  Since the 
generalization from the samples to the population was not undertaken, it was considered 
appropriate for this research to use a nonprobability sampling method. 
   
Second, for practical considerations, the procedures of nonprobablility sampling to select 
samples are much easier, quicker and cheaper when compared with probability sampling.   
Amongst the available nonprobability sampling methods, purposive sampling or theoretical 
sampling was employed.  Also known as judgmental sampling, purposive sampling refers to 
the selection of samples that relies on the special knowledge and expertise of the researcher 
about the population to evaluate whether the samples are able to meet particular research 
goals or whether they are likely to epitomize the analytic criteria required in the study or to 
provide variation (Berg, 2007, p. 44; Warren, 2001, p. 87; Bazeley, 2013, p. 49).  The process 
of finding respondents is an ongoing one until the emergence of meaningful patterns for 
comparison can be made (Bryman, 2004, p. 544). As explained in Section 4.3 above, the 
criteria to recruit samples in this study are that they must be either doctors or nurses working 
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in the same internal medicine or general surgical ward in either public or private hospitals in 
Hong Kong, on the grounds that these people would share similar background and training 
and thus have more opportunities for knowledge creation and sharing.  I have the personal 
network for contacting doctors and nurses working in public hospitals. At the time of 
research, I was the medical librarian of the Medical Faculty of a local university.  The 
Medical Library in which I was working is located in a large public hospital which is also the 
teaching hospital of the Faculty.  Prior to this job, I also worked in various hospital libraries 
in the HA for a number of years.  This relatively strong network enabled me to recruit 
samples more conveniently by purposive sampling as access was less problematic with 
known contacts.  These professionals also referred me to other healthcare professionals that 
have the relevant experience to share, reducing some sampling bias.  In view of the research 
needs of this study and the ease of access to the respondents, purposive sampling together 
with snowball sampling was the obvious choice of sampling method for this study. 
 
4.5 Recruiting Participants 
Based on the sampling strategy established above, potential participants should come from 
both public and private hospitals.  The first decision to make was how to approach the public 
hospitals, which have the greatest number of potential participants. 
 
There are 42 public hospitals in Hong Kong and all are organized into seven hospital clusters 
according to their locations in order to ensure that patients receive a continuum of care from 
acute care to convalescence and rehabilitation, and community after-care within the same 
location.  This is achieved through well-coordinated division of services within the hospitals 
in each cluster by having one major regional hospital to provide a full range of acute and 
specialist services, and a number of smaller district hospitals specializing in secondary and 
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sub-acute services, or other convalescent and rehabilitation services.  In each cluster, the 
regional hospital is the largest in terms of staffing, hospital beds and in-patient cases 
(Hospital Authority, 2012). It is more likely for potential respondents working in these 
regional hospitals to handle perplexing or complicated patient problems that require sense-
making and thus have more lived experience to share.  In this regard, regional hospitals were 
selected as the sample sites.  However, one hospital cluster only provides psychiatric hospital 
services and thus does not have internal medicine and general surgical wards.  It was 
excluded from the sample.  As a result, only six regional public hospitals were covered.   
 
The potential participants were recruited in the following ways:   
1. Starting from February to March 2008, a letter that described the purpose of the 
research, the research method together with the preliminary consent form and the list 
of interview questions was sent to the Chief of Service of Internal Medicine and 
Surgery of each of the six regional hospitals to seek their help to invite all their staff 
members working in the same internal medicine or general surgical ward to 
participate in the interview research.  The sample letter is in Appendix 4.1.  The list of 
interview questions is in Appendix 4.5.  The Chief of Service of both Departments 
were asked to distribute the letter and questions to their staff to inform them about the 
research and to give time to them for consideration before making any personal 
contact with individual staff.   
2. Personal phone calls or on-site face-to-face visits were paid to the Chief of Service 
whenever possible to elaborate again my research methodology, and to ensure that, 
with senior management support, the whole team would be engaged with the research 
and persuaded of my sincerity and credibility.   
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3. Finally, four regional hospitals responded actively to this research.  They are Prince of 
Wales Hospital (the teaching hospital of one of the medical schools in Hong Kong), 
Princess Margaret Hospital, Tuen Mun Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital.  There 
is no particular reason to include a teaching hospital.  It is just one of the regional 
hospitals included in the sampling plan.  But in actuality, healthcare professionals 
working in the teaching hospitals were more responsive to the research as they are 
more involved with research activities generally. 
4. After obtaining the consent of the Head and the staff name list of both doctors and 
nurses working in the ward, the potential respondents were contacted by phone first, 
followed up by an e-mail with an attachment for the Participant Information Sheet in 
Appendix 4.2 to detail the purpose of the research, the research design, method of 
conducting the research and the measures taken to keep confidential the data collected 
about participants.   When the respondent confirmed willingness to participate in the 
research, the exact date and venue most convenient to them was negotiated.  Since 
doctors generally do not stay in the ward for a long time and the ward round was not a 
convenient time for them, most doctors opted to visit the medical library in which I 
was working to attend the interview.  A small room in the medical library was 
especially reserved for the interview so that there were only the respondent and 
myself as the interviewer.  Most nurses chose to conduct the interview in the ward in 
which they were working.   
5. Doctors and nurses in private hospitals were contacted mainly by referrals.  At first, 
letters like the sample in Appendix 4.1 were sent to private hospitals, but the response 
was not encouraging.  Thus, some previous public hospital doctors that have been 
moved to the private sector and the Hong Kong Private Hospitals Association 
(http://www.privatehospitals.org.hk/en/index.htm) were contacted to help in seeking 
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referrals.  Through various referrals, a couple of doctors and nurses finally agreed to 
participate.  The interviews for doctors were all conducted in their workplace, either 
in the hospital or in their own clinics.  Those for nurses were mostly conducted in the 
medical library. Only one case had to be conducted over the phone. 
 
The research did not have an easy start.  Doctors in Hong Kong are very busy all the time and 
they are often called to handle emergency cases. Requesting them to spare an hour for the 
interview might seem difficult if not impossible.  Very often, the interview date needed to be 
changed several times.  Nurses are equally busy and they are not as flexible as doctors for 
time arrangements when they are on duty.  Thus, it was crucial to obtain the consent of their 
Ward Manager, who, in the capacity as being the supervisor of all nurses in the ward, is able 
to re-arrange the shift of the respondent nurse to fit the interview schedule.   
 
Another major difficulty was that some respondents misunderstood the research design.  
Given the rich clinical experience of some senior doctors in their own specialty, they did not 
think that they had any medical cases that had produced confusion or perplexity in the recent 
past.  Some insisted that most of the cases they encountered were not difficult to them if not 
routine and were thus within their knowledge and experience that did not require any sense-
making.  To address this issue, the interviewing guide was revised to include examples for 
clarifying the meaning of perplexing medical cases.  It was stated that the case could be an 
unusual one that made an impression on them; the patient was unusual in a particular way, or 
they noticed that the treatment was not working as well as they thought it should.  These 
clarifications were made on the follow-up phone call when it was sensed that the respondent 
was unsure of the scope of the interview.  This change proved successful as I was able to 
recruit more respondents.      
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Through the above sampling process, a total of 43 respondents were recruited.  However, five 
respondents were unable to recall a specific patient case and just generally replied to the 
interview questions.  Thus, they were excluded from the analysis, but reference will be made 
to their interviews as and when needed. The final sample consisted of 38 respondents coming 
from three regional public hospitals and a number of private hospitals.  Their key 
demographic characteristics are listed in Appendix 4.3 with a summary in Appendix 4.4.  
These characteristics will not be used in the data analysis as the unit of analysis is the 
individual-in-situation.  They are provided to give an overview of the demographic 
distribution of the respondents.  In brief, there were 18 females and 20 males, aged from 26 to 
over 55 but mostly aged 36 to 45 (44.74% of the total no. of respondents) and 31 to 35 
(21.05%) with 10 - 25 years of experience in healthcare (60.53%), an average of 16.38 years.  
They should therefore have sufficient real life experience in the care of patients to share.  
About 60.53% were physicians and the rest were nurses, the majority of whom (78.95%) 
worked in public hospitals in the rank ranging from the most junior Resident and Registered 
Nurse to the most senior Chief of Service / Consultant and Ward Manager.  The respondents 
covered a wide range of specialties: 11 from Neurology, 10 from Hepato-Biliary & 
Pancreatic Surgery, 5 from Neurosurgery, 4 from Colorectal Surgery, 2 from 
Gastroenterology & Hepatology, 2 from Hepatobiliary & Pancreatic Surgery, 2 from Urology, 
1 from Cardiology and 1 from Intensive Care Unit.  These characteristics are also shown in 
the chart in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
There was no plan of a minimum or maximum number of samples.  Data collection stopped 
once the level of theoretical saturation was reached.  That is, until there is no new or relevant 
data emerges regarding a category and the category is well developed in terms of its 
properties and dimensions demonstrating variation; and well-established and validated 
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Figure 4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
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relationships among categories (Bryman, 2004, p. 305). Guided by this approach, I stopped 
recruiting participants when there was no new patterns emerging from the data.  Each 
interview was therefore reviewed immediately after the interview has been conducted, and 
assessed whether more interviews were needed to confirm or reject new patterns emerging 
from the respondents interviewed. 
 
4.6 Data Collection Methods 
4.6.1 The Interview Method 
As explained in Chapter Three and the sections above, SMM’s Micro-Moment Timeline 
Interview was adopted as the interviewing method.  All the principles of time-line were 
observed strictly.  An interview guide (Appendix 4.5) was compiled to guide the course of 
the interview to ensure the same interview protocol was applied to all interviews.   
 
I myself was the principal investigator in conducting all face-to-face interviews from March 
to September 2008 in Hong Kong.  To familiarize myself with the interviewing skills 
required to obtain quality sense-making data, I wrote to seek advice from Professor Dervin, 
and Dr. Cheuk who had made use of SMM in several sense-making studies. All SMM 
literatures were studied.  I also took several evening classes on qualitative interviewing in a 
local university.  After a few interviews, I became familiar with the interviewing approach.    
 
Before the start of the interview, I would briefly introduce myself and the research project 
such as the purpose, its importance and how the interview will be conducted in order to build 
up initial rapport and trust with the respondent.  In case the respondent was not at ease, I 
would start with small talk and chat with them in a friendly tone as a warm up.  Time-Line 
interviewing is a kind of qualitative interviewing which is based in conversation, with the 
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emphasis on researchers asking questions and listening, and respondents answering (Warren, 
2001, p. 83).  The rapport between respondents and interviewers plays a large role in the 
interview process.  A good rapport will gain the respondent’s cooperation to complete an 
interview (Carley-Baxter, 2008, p. 744; Berg, 2007, p. 117).  And in Time-Line interview, it 
is especially important to build up trust with the respondent so that he or she feels 
comfortable to immerse himself or herself and think deeply the sense-making questions asked.  
This is iterated repeatedly by Dervin (2008a, p. 15). 
 
After opening up the dialogue, the respondent was invited to complete the consent form in 
Appendix 4.6 which informed them of their rights in this study, which included their rights to 
join the study voluntarily, the rights to withdraw at any time, the rights to allow the audio-
taping of the interview and the rights to allow processing of the interview content by third 
parties.  They were also invited to complete the demographic data record sheet in Appendix 
4.7 to collect basic demographic data such as gender, age, specialty, positional, educational 
level, their experience and their knowledge of EBM, etc. in order to arrive at general 
understanding of the background of the respondents.  They did not form part of the core data 
analysis.  These key demographic characteristics are listed in Appendices 4.3 and 4.4 
 
The formal interview started after the initial warm up and preparation.  It started with asking 
the respondent to recall one patient case they have handled in the past 12 months that 
produced perplexity, doubt, or confusion, or in which they felt they were blocked (in time-
space moment) where new sense making was required.  However, in the first few interviews, 
the respondents seemed not understand the methodology and failed to recall a specific patient 
case that produced confusion and perplexity.  Instead they just talked about the general 
phenomenon.  At the end, five interviews of this kind had to be excluded from empirical 
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analysis.  To address this problem, the interview questions were slightly modified to ask them 
to think about a recent case that was unusual or in which the patient was unusual in a 
particular way or a case that really made an impression on them.  Examples were included to 
illustrate what these might be:  “the usual treatment was not working as well as they thought 
it should be”.  Alternatively, two nurses at management grade requested to talk about some 
ward management situations they had experienced with difficulties instead of a patient case.  
This was also allowed after confirming that their work is more related with ward management. 
    
After the respondents had identified the situation that produced confusion and perplexity, 
they were asked to describe the case first and then each step they went through to handle the 
case in details.  At each sense-making moment, the same set of questions focusing on the 
situation, the gap, the gap-bridging strategies and the helps or hurts in Appendix 4.5 was 
repeated.  However, questions were not asked in a linear sequence.  They were adapted 
according to the question-answering style of the respondent, and whether they might have 
expressed their views to some questions when they answered others.  Thus, it is essential to 
exercise active listening and reflective listening skills.  Those questions that were answered 
were not repeated.  In reflective listening, the respondents were asked to check that this was 
what they have narrated – “Is the really difficult part to finding the answer was…?”.  The 
paraphrasing was done to check that my interpretation of what the respondents said was what 
the respondent appeared to mean. Reflective listening is a listening skill associated with 
counselling but for qualitative research such listening skills help to maintain rapport with the 
interviewee as well as ensuring that the interviewer and interviewee understand each other. 
 
Besides those questions surrounding the Sense-Making Triangle, additional questions were 
posed about how the respondents related themselves to others such as “Do you think your 
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colleagues will have the same interpretation?”, and in what way the answer to the gap they 
faced helped creating knowledge such as “Has the answer created new knowledge to you?”, 
and “In what ways did you put the answer into clinical practice?”.  Respondents working in 
the same ward were also asked why they did not pick the same patient case that had caused 
confusion to one of their colleagues.  This can provide further information on how different 
professionals construct their own worlds and perceive their own discontinuities in the time-
space movement in both personal and social context.      
 
The term “information” was not used as far as possible, but if it had to be used, its meaning 
was clarified in order to avoid any misinterpretation.  For instance, it was stated that 
information was referred to the answer the respondent got to the questions he or she asked, or 
it was anything that the respondent resorted to in order to address the confusion and muddles 
facing them.   
 
After the interview, they were also invited to share what they thought about the interview and 
if there was any supplementary information they wished to add to what they had already 
recalled in the interview.  Most respondents were so busy that they had to leave or were 
called to leave after the interview had been completed.  But one respondent commented that 
the interview was too long especially for nurses who have a tight schedule in day time.  
Subsequently the interview time was shortened as much as possible in order to attract more 
nurses to participate.  Finally, all respondents were presented with a small gift to thank for 
their time.  They were also informed that the transcript of the interview would be sent to them 
for verification and information. 
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All interviews were taped-recorded upon the permission of the respondents.  Each interview 
lasted for more than 60 minutes on average, with the shortest being 30 minutes and the 
longest being 152 minutes.  It should be noted that all interviews were conducted in 
Cantonese.  This is one of the measures to encourage response from respondents.  All 
respondents were Chinese.  Since Cantonese is their main language, they would feel more 
comfortable speaking in their mother tongue.  This would also allow them to articulate their 
experience without any obstruction. Nevertheless, most expressed medical terms in English 
because of their education and work practice.  In addition, allowing the use of respondents’ 
mother tongue is also a measure to comply with SMM’s mandates to conduct interviews, that 
is, building trust and willingness to disclose (Dervin, 2008a, p. 15).  Other than conducting 
the interviews in Cantonese, all other correspondence with respondents including e-mails 
were in English. 
 
All the audio-taped interviews were listened to once after the interview.   Follow-up e-mails 
were sent to some respondents to clear up any queries found.  One of the respondents even 
agreed to interview again to provide more details.  
 
To help triangulate the interview data, I also took part three times as an ethnographic 
researcher, non-participant observer in the ward round of a surgical ward where the research 
was conducted.  Audio-taping of the conversations and dialogue on handling the patient case 
were not allowed as the patients were in the ward.  Thus, I took notes on my observations 
especially those that provided matches for sense-making of the case.  A small number of staff 
members were invited to attend a semi-structured interview.  However, they did not allow 
taping the interviews, thus, only notes were taken.  All these data are referenced in the final 
data analysis. 
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4.6.2 Data Processing 
All the audio-taped interviews were transcribed in verbatim in Chinese with the help of a 
medical student helper.  A total of 921 A-4 sized pages of text were generated, which means 
an average of 24 pages per interview.  Each transcription was numbered, notes added for the 
date, time, place for the interview, and the rank and hospital of the respondent for proper 
record and easy identification of each interview.  An excerpt of an interview is presented in 
Appendix 4.8.    
 
All the transcription text files were loaded onto NVivo (version 9) software for analysis. 
Using computer software like NVivo was chiefly to increase the effectiveness and efficiency 
of managing the voluminous amount of data generated in this study.  Bazeley and Jackson 
(2013) highly recommended NVivo which was claimed a software “developed by researchers, 
and continues to be developed with extensive researcher feedback to support researchers in 
the varied ways they work with data” (p. 2).  It is intended to release some of the researcher’s 
time in managing the data, thus, allowing increased focus on ways of learning from the data.  
The software has a wide range of features to enable researchers to track, query, visualize and 
report data.  It is not simply designed for qualitative research.  The counting of references 
from the codes and the matrix coding query will present a table of numerical data for 
understanding the data in a quantitative way.  In addition to these strengths, NVivo was 
selected because it is Unicode-based and thus is able to handle Chinese.         
 
4.6.3 Ethical Considerations 
In undertaking research, particularly qualitative research, Berg (2007, p. 53) argued that 
researchers have an ethical obligation to their subjects because the research will delve into the 
social lives of other human beings.  These obligations revolve around various issues of harm, 
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consent, privacy and confidentiality of data. The following measures were taken to address 
ethical concerns:    
1. Informed Consent – It means “the knowing consent of individuals to participate as an 
exercise of their choice” (Berg, 2007, p. 78).  In this research, all the rights of the 
participants were written down in the Consent Form each respondent was clarified 
and invited to sign prior to the interview.  They were also given sufficient time to 
consider whether to join the study or not.  
2. Privacy and Confidentiality of data -  
a. All information collected about respondents during the course of this research 
was kept strictly confidential.  All personal data were made anonymous in the 
transcript.  In case their names were mentioned in the interview, it was 
recorded as Dr. A or X in the transcript. Their names or identifying 
characteristics will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study.   
b. All respondents were sent a copy of the transcript of the interview to give 
them an opportunity to review the accuracy of the conversation and to add or 
clarify points if they wish. 
c. The transcripts of the interview together with the tape recordings were 
retained in their original form and kept securely in a locked filing cabinet 
accessible to me only.  The files for the data collected were kept in a 
standalone and password-protected home computer.    
d. The transcript of the interview together with the tape recordings will not be 
kept longer than necessary.  They will be destroyed after the completion of 
this study. 
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4.7 Data Analysis and Coding Procedure 
Data analysis for this research focused on the 38 interview transcription files, totally 921 
pages. Data analysis is the most critical and complex part of all phases of a qualitative 
research project.  It refers to the procedures used to interpret and organize the rich data 
collected from the data collection methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12), with the goal to 
uncover emerging themes, patterns, concepts, insights, and understandings as Patton (2002, p. 
432) reiterated. However, there is only guidance but no recipe to show how this should be 
done (Patton, 2002, p. 432).  Most scholars (Bazeley, 2003; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 
2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) concurred that the procedure largely consists of 
conceptualizing and reducing data, sifting trivia from significance, identifying significant 
patterns, and relating through a series of propositional statements.   These procedures are 
often referred to as coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.12).  Coding is in fact a fundamental 
skill for qualitative data analysis.  It is a form of content analysis, which Patton (2002, p. 463) 
suggested as the process of identifying, categorizing and labeling the primary patterns in the 
interview data.  The aim of SMM data analysis also shares the same purpose: “The aim of the 
Sense-Making-informed analysis is to provide contextually unique detail and a means of 
ordering unique lived experience in terms of universal categories of movement” (Dervin & 
Frenette, 2003, p. 241).  Dervin also adopted content analysis in her studies to put the verbal 
answers of respondents into categories which she consider to be the same versus different. 
Many of the universal verbing categories of SMM such as the situation movement state were 
developed by “intersecting a deductive set of framework based on Sense-Making’s verbing 
analytic with the inductive qualities of the data” (Dervin & Frenette, 2003, p. 242; Dervin & 
Clark, 1987, p. 415; Dervin et al, 2006).  This research also took the same coding approach to 
develop the coding scheme and derive answers to these two research questions: how 
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knowledge is created and how it is shared to others and the use made of that knowledge.  This 
section discusses the major coding procedures undertaken in this research. 
 
4.7.1 Identifying Unit of Analysis 
As informed by SMM, the unit of analysis is not the respondent, but the individual-in-
situation, the situation a respondent experienced in taking care of a patient or handling a piece 
of hospital work.  Each time-line step in a situation is conceptualized as the specific time-
space moment when the respondent came across a gap that needed to be bridged in order to 
move forward.  The bridge could be constructed by resorting to habits and routines, in which 
case no new knowledge was created, or by making new responses, that would add to his or 
her knowledge set.  The unit of analysis in the present research is this particular knowledge-
creating or non-knowledge creating moment identified in each time-line step.  This 
interviewing approach is considered “the deepest dig into a single situation” (Dervin, 2008a, 
p. 23) and is graphically represented in the following diagram:     
 
Figure 4.3 SMM Micro-Moment Time-Line Interview (Adapted from Dervin, 2008a, p. 
24) 
 
To do this, each interview transcript was read again and again before the actual coding in 
order to identify all the time-line steps a respondent took in the care of a patient or handling 
the ward problem.  All the responses of the respondent and questions asked relating to one 
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time-line step were grouped into a unit of analysis.  For each of these situations, the SMM 
triangle of situations, gaps and helps together with the gap-bridging strategies and whether 
knowledge was created as informed by the respondent was further explored to determine 
whether it was a knowledge-creating situation or a non-knowledge-creating situation.  It was 
then coded as “Situation 1-K-21” where: 
 “Situation 1” denoted the position of the time-line step in the situation; 1 meant the 
first time-line step, 2 meant the second time-line step, etc.; 
 “K” denoted it was a knowledge-creating situation; “N” was used for a non-
knowledge-creating situation; and 
 “21” was the respondent number 
An example demonstrating how a unit of analysis was identified is presented in Appendix 4.9.  
Those portions of questions and responses to the same time-line step were highlighted in the 
same color.  They were then grouped together and saved as a separate file before importing 
into NVivo for coding and analysis.  In the present study, a total of 100 units of analysis were 
indentified by this method, with 70 being knowledge-creating situations and 30 being non-
knowledge-creating situations.  This category of situation, including both knowledge-creating 
and non-knowledge-creating, constitutes the unit of analysis in this research and both were 
compared to derive the process of knowledge creation. This would answer Research Question 
One. These units of analysis also constitute the criterion variables for knowledge creation. 
 
4.7.2 Identifying Coding Categories 
Once the unit of analysis was identified, the next step was to code the data in each unit of 
analysis.  The interview transcripts in Chinese were used as there was a concern that the 
translation into English might lose some depth of the interview content.  But all the coding 
labels derived were in English for the purposes of the thesis.  Like other Sense-Making 
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studies, the coding strategy is content analysis (Kari, 2001, p. 57; Schamber, 2000).  The 
SMM categories were applied deductively to provide the general framework to capture the 
sense-making moment, in which gaps were experienced in a gappy situation, bridge was built 
by resorting to various strategies and inputs, and the resulting helps or hurts are got.  The 
coding labels in each SMM category were derived inductively from the natural-language data 
in the interview transcript texts because there was no previous Sense-Making study on 
knowledge creation, sharing and utilization in healthcare organizations.  Some coding labels, 
however, were also the outcome of the deductive use of codes mentioned in previous SMM 
studies.  Examples are the categories of situation movement state and helps.     
 
The process of developing the appropriate coding categories was highly iterative.  First, from 
the literature review, and considering the nature of the current study, broad SMM categories 
were employed for coding initially.  They are: situation, situation movement state (it means 
the different qualitative ways in which the respondent sees his or her movement through 
time-space blocked (Dervin, 2003a, p. 260)), knowledge gaps (the 5W, and descriptive focus), 
gap-bridging strategies, success in gap-bridging, helps, hurts, knowledge sources of inputs, 
relevance of sources of inputs.  Other inductively-developed categories were “new 
knowledge created” and “knowledge-sharing”.    
 
Second, this initial set of categories was tested with 15 interview transcripts to initially 
identify possible coding labels within each category.  I started from the most general level by 
reading and examining each word, phrase and sentence in each unit of analysis carefully and 
assigning them to as many appropriate broad categories as possible.  In case I did not 
understand the patient case in the interview, I would read relevant literature until I fully 
grasped the situation faced by the respondent.  After the general level of coding, inductively-
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developed coding labels were assigned to each of these text units.  The coding labels were 
either taken directly from the actual words or phrases used by the respondent, which were 
subsequently translated into English, or drawn from the meanings implicit in the respondent’s 
most emphasized responses.   These coding labels were the smallest meaningful level 
identified.  I purposely started the coding from the smallest category level as this would help 
keep track of the original meaning.   
 
An example showing how relevant texts in each unit of analysis were coded in NVivo is 
presented in Figure 4.4 below.  The text relating to Situation 1-K of this interview excerpt as 
indicated in Appendix 4.9 were all grouped together and imported into NVivo for coding. In 
this interview, the respondent faced the dilemma in applying appropriate treatment to a 
patient diagnosed with both pulmonary embolism showing an indication for anti-coagulants 
and hematoma causing internal bleeding which is a contraindication for anti-coagulants.  
After reading all the texts from the first word in this unit, those seemed relevant to the SMM 
categories were coded first.  As a result, the following texts were coded with category 
“Situation Focus”: 
 咁其實响呢個時候已經有一個 dilemma 喺度，首先唔講話究竟佢嗰個 hematoma 
喺邊度嚟，dilemma 已經係佢有 history of PE, 咁佢就需要 anti-coagulation，但係
佢依家流血 [bleeding] 喎，我哋又俾 anti-coagulation， 咁咪會流多啲囉，但係
我哋停咗啲 anti-coagulation，又驚佢  PE 喎咁。咁變咗佢依家  有一個 
contraindication for anti-coagulation，又有一個 indication for anti-coagulation… 
 
Their meanings as well as the words and phrases used were further analyzed in order to 
induce the appropriate coding labels.  All the related words and phrases were marked as 
shown above.  It was obvious that the respondent was facing a situation of treatment dilemma.  
Thus, the coding label “treatment dilemma” was assigned to the above paragraph.  The same 
coding logic and procedure were applied to the rest of the text to derive other coding labels.  
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The following two diagrams from NVivo illustrate all the coding labels used for the extracted 
text. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Coding in NVivo 
 
This initial set of coding labels were reviewed and modified at different times by removing 
the unnecessary ones, grouping similar ones together into a new sub-category or developing 
new ones to accommodate new concepts emerged in the review.  These main categories and 
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coding labels were organized in a hierarchy as tree nodes in NVivo.  Other coding labels 
organized as free nodes in NVivo were also used to capture related themes that were 
perceived useful for analysis but could not be incorporated into the main coding structure in 
the tree node.  These themes included ideas about EBM issues, KM, their knowledge sharing 
attitude, power issues, etc.  In order to keep track of my thoughts on coding as it was done at 
different times, they were recorded in the memos in NVivo so that they could be referenced 
conveniently during coding.  The new set of coding labels was then applied to another five 
interview transcripts for further testing and review.  This was also sent to my PhD supervisor 
for comments from time to time.  This was one of the measures to ensure consistency of 
coding.  All the 20 interview transcripts were then re-analyzed and re-coded with the new set 
of categories and coding labels.  Whenever similar codes were collapsed into a new group or 
new coding labels were added, all the previous coded transcripts were reviewed and re-coded.  
Being the only coder for this research, I went through five rounds of this kind of iterative 
analysis, review and re-coding at different times until each code carried an unique meaning 
and all the codable texts were assigned with appropriate categories and coding labels.  Again, 
this was to enhance the consistency of coding.  The outcome was a new set of revised 
categories and coding labels which changed substantially from the initial set.  This was then 
applied to the rest of the interview transcripts.   
 
The above complex and iterative process produced the preliminary coding schemes.  To 
stabilize their meanings further, and to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of coding, all 
the coded texts were reviewed again to identify if there were any concepts not coded in the 
same coding logic, or any extreme cases that should be coded separately in a new coding or 
sub-category.  This last round of review also resulted in a number of changes to the coding 
schemes, finally developing the coding schemes. Appendix 4.10 presents the coding schemes 
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for the 10 main categories and 3 different levels of sub-categories making up from 199 
coding labels.  Because of space limits in this thesis, other less core categories and free nodes 
cannot be presented.  They were used for analysis and reported in Chapter Five.  Similarly, 
four main categories were selected to illustrate the formation of the codebook in Appendix 
4.11 and the use of the specific coding labels.   
 
4.7.3 Coding Schemes and Analysis Approach 
The section reports the analysis approach for the main categories of the coding schemes: 
(A) Situation Focus:  
Situation refers to the starting or jumping off point for the respondent that would lead 
to the gap(s) to be overcome (Dervin et al, 2006, p. 3).   It provides the overall context 
and background for the respondent to assess his or her current position in the journey 
and how to move forward.  The coding was to tap the substantive focus of the 
problem or struggle the respondent faced in order to understand what healthcare 
professionals focused on when there was knowledge creation and sharing.  Therefore, 
the coding labels were derived from the description of the respondent at the micro 
level by considering the difficulties of the clinical case or the macro environment the 
respondent was positioned when he or she entered into the situation.  The label 
“Situation Focus” was adopted for this main category.  Accordingly, as shown in 
Appendix 4.11, 24 sub-categories were developed.  Their definitions are also provided.  
Different levels of sub-category are used in the analysis and results reported in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Since each unit of analysis was a time-line step with a unique situation focus, each 
(n=100) was coded into one sub-category only. 
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(B) Situation Movement State 
Situation Movement State is the means of “analyzing how people saw themselves as 
moving within the situation, over the gaps, building bridges, and finding information” 
(Dervin et al., 2006, p. 46).  It is different from Situation Focus in that it serves as the 
situation entry for the respondent and captures “cognitive aspects of movement in 
time-space bound moments based upon what people do and what they think or worry 
about at each step” (Kim, 2005, p., 486).  It is thus more revealing than situation focus 
to illustrate the particular state the respondent saw themselves in face of a gap.  In this 
regard, it can be used to analyze its relations with knowledge creation such that 
whether it can predict under what situation new knowledge will be created or not.  
Since situation movement state has a long history with SMM studies, the coding 
labels were developed both deductively from SMM studies and inductively from the 
descriptions of the respondent.   A total of 10 sub-categories were developed.  The 
definitions and use are provided in Appendix 4.11. 
 
While it is recognized that a respondent might have encountered a number of issues 
stopping him or drifting him to other directions, coding this to different sub-categories 
just makes analysis difficult.  Therefore, each unit of analysis was coded into one sub-
category only. 
 
(C) Knowledge Gaps 
Gap is another core element of the Sense-Making triangle.  It was the queries, 
confusions, riddles and muddles that the respondent faced.  This was articulated in the 
form of critical questions or problem statements.  This dimension is crucial to this 
study as the questions asked or the gap faced would directly lead to the kind of bridge 
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the respondent built to overcome the gap.  Thus, the label “Knowledge Gaps” was 
adopted to indicate what kind of knowledge the respondents need to know or are 
lacking of.  It is used as one of the predictor variables to predict whether knowledge 
would be created.  In many SMM studies, gap was tapped in several dimensions such 
as 5W focus, valence focus, entity focus, and entity attribute focus (Dervin et al., 
2006, p. 6).  In this research, only descriptive focus was analyzed as this was 
considered sufficient to study its relations with whether knowledge can be created. 
The coding labels were developed inductively from the questions or problem 
statements articulated by the respondent.  A total of 21 coding labels were used.  
Details are in Appendix 4.11. 
 
From the respondents’ responses, they might need to bridge several gaps in one 
situation.  But these could not be handled all at the same time.  The common approach 
they took was to handle one after the other; and the way a gap was handled might also 
impact on the definition of the second gap.  Therefore, if there were several gaps, they 
would be analyzed into different units of analysis.  Thus, each unit of analysis was 
coded into one sub-category of knowledge gaps only. If there was no question in 
knowledge gap, the analysis of other coding categories would stop.  There are 3 units 
of analysis in which “No question” were coded.  In the subsequent coding categories, 
the total number of cases was dropped to 97 only (n=100-3=97).  This was used in the 
analysis of other coding categories. 
 
(D) Gap-Bridging Strategies 
This coding category is central to this research.  In fact, the whole process of sense-
making is the process of bridging of gaps.  Individuals can use old senses, or construct 
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new senses with the help of source of knowledge inputs including respondents’ 
previous knowledge and experience.  After crossing the bridge and reflecting back the 
whole process, individuals might come out with certain knowledge or learning.  Thus, 
this SMM element directly informs the way knowledge is created.  It is the main 
predictor variable to study its relations with knowledge creation and the role of 
informational professionals to facilitate knowledge creation in healthcare teams.  This 
was done to answer Research Question One.   
 
However, this construct was not as thoroughly researched as other constructs with a 
range of well-established variables such as situation movement state or helps (Kari, 
2001, p. 39; Savolainen, 1999, p. 78); there was only an introductory list of verbings 
and suggested that researchers develop additional verbings tailored to particular 
research contexts (Dervin, 2003, p. 175; Schaefer & Dervin, 2009, p. 269).   This was 
followed in this study.  The coding labels were drawn from the actual thoughts, ideas, 
actions, and emotions articulated by the respondents in the interview.  A total of 36 
sub-categories grouped into 8 broad categories were derived.   
 
Another emphasis was the use of the communication-as-procedure framework to 
categorize the coding labels in an attempt to examine how individual sense-making 
efforts can be facilitated by or interrupted by macro-level structures, context, and 
culture (Schaefer and Dervin, 2009, p. 268), which provides answers to Research 
Question Two.  As can be seen from Appendix 4.11, the individual relating to self 
was labeled “dealing with self” and operationally defined as a) accepting reality; b) 
alerting; c) emoting; d) escaping; e) feeling stressed; and f) making intuitive 
judgments, testing hypotheses.  Individual relating to other individuals was sub-
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divided into two labels, namely “dealing with informal persons (patients or 
relatives) and “dealing with formal persons” because of the specific nature of 
healthcare professions and the need of this research to study knowledge sharing which 
can be reflected in “dealing with formal persons” such as supervisors and other 
specialists in the same or a different patient care team.  Dealing with informal persons 
was operationally defined as a) accommodating patients’ requests; b) assessing 
financial situation of patients; c) assessing patients’ physical conditions; d) assessing 
patients’ preference; e) clarifying misunderstanding; f) counseling patients or relatives; 
and g) suggesting advice to patients or relatives.  Dealing with formal persons was 
operationally defined as a) consulting or referring; b) discussing with colleagues; c) 
negotiating with authorities; and d) reporting to seniors.  Individual relating to 
collectivity was labeled as “Dealing with institutions” and was operationally defined 
as a) checking with drug companies; and b) referring to public hospitals.  The rest of 
the gap-bridging strategies were categorized into “comparing and contrasting 
scenarios”; “dealing with information”, “doing checks and trials” and “doing tasks”. 
 
In the sub-category “dealing with information”, respondents’ narratives were further 
analyzed into whether they searched for EBM literature or general literature in order 
to examine the relevance of EBM literature in bridging healthcare professionals’ 
knowledge gaps.  Attempts were also made to analyze why some gap-bridging 
strategies were chosen and some were not.  This would throw light on the process of 
knowledge creation. 
 
Snowden also mentioned four types of gap-bridging strategies in his Cynefin 
Framework: a) sense, categorize, and respond; b) sense, analyze and respond; c) act, 
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sense, and respond; and d) probe, sense, and respond.  Snowden did not provide any 
means of how this could be used in data analysis.  Neither did this research develop 
any coding category for this because it was considered inappropriate to analyze 
Snowden’s concepts in this way.  Instead, the whole sense-making moment will be 
investigated to examine whether respondents would experience the knowledge 
domains described by Snowden and their corresponding responses.    
 
A knowledge gap can be overcome by several gap-bridging strategies.  One gap-
bridging strategy might not be able to provide all the solutions; it might provide a 
partial solution and trigger the respondent to look for others; or it would fail at first 
and then the respondent explored other strategies until the gap was bridged.  
Therefore, each unit of analysis was coded into several sub-categories (n=312).    
 
(E) Success of Gap-bridging Strategies  
This coding category refers to whether the gap faced by the respondent can be bridged 
after acting on the various gap-bridging strategies.  There are two labels only: success 
bridging and unsuccessful bridging.  Individual gap-bridging strategies might fail, but 
if overall, the gap could be bridged after trying several strategies, it was coded as such.  
Therefore, each unit of analysis was coded into one category only.  The three unit of 
analysis without knowledge gap questions were coded as inapplicable.  The inclusion 
of this category was to analyze whether successful gap-bridging would lead directly to 
creation of new knowledge.   
   
(F) Knowledge Sources of Inputs 
This coding category is related to gap-bridging strategy.  As aforementioned, gap-
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bridging strategy is different from source-using.  They are the elements used by 
healthcare professionals to bridge situated gaps and create knowledge; they are not the 
bridges themselves.  In Dervin’s concept, inputs are not necessarily “information”; 
they can be anything such as ideas, insights, intuitions, experience, memories, 
opinions, etc.  In this research, special attention was given to whether explicit or tacit 
knowledge inputs were employed in the generation of new knowledge.  This is also to 
examine the importance of tacit knowledge in relation to EBM practice, which is the 
main concern of this thesis.  Therefore, this category included 5 coding labels based 
on tacit and explicit dimensions of knowledge.  They are: 
a) Explicit knowledge sources: They are defined as those could be “crystallized 
in the formalisms of words, pictures, formulae, or other articulate devices” 
(Polanyi, 1969d, p. xv). Accordingly, they can be letters, textbooks, maps, 
graphs and any documents or reports (Polanyi, 1969x, pp. 144-145). In this 
study, they include books; health magazines; information from drug 
companies; internal guidelines; investigation reports; journal articles from 
MEDLINE; journal articles from PubMed; medical web sites; patients’ 
medical records; and research evidence which referred to EBM literature. 
b) Own Tacit Knowledge, Observations, Thinking, Reflection, and Experience: It 
is defined as the respondents’ own intuitions, gut-feelings, thoughts and ideas, 
knowledge and experience, and their judgments that cannot be explicitly 
articulated and exemplified in devices. 
c) Other People's Knowledge or Experience, outside the immediate patient care: 
In order to study the phenomenon of knowledge sharing, this label was to 
identify whether respondents made use of the tacit knowledge of other people 
outside their own patient care team such as external experts, peers, hospital 
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administrators and other specialists. 
d) Team's Knowledge or Experience: It refers to the tacit knowledge of 
respondents’ own patient care teams such as supervisors and colleagues.  
Again, the purpose was to study whether there was any knowledge sharing.  
e) Patients or Relatives Opinion: The opinion of patients and their relatives 
constitute an important source of advice to healthcare professionals that could 
not be ignored in decision-making.  In fact, one of the cornerstones of EBM is 
the involvement of patients.  Thus, this was coded separately in order to 
understand their roles play in the gap-bridging of healthcare professionals. 
 
Each unit of analysis was coded into several sub-categories depending on what they 
have described in respondents’ narratives. 
It was also identified in the narratives of respondents that they would evaluate the 
importance and usefulness of different sources of inputs.  These would be captured as 
positive or negative evaluations.  However, as this was not the main theme of this 
research, they were only coded whenever evidenced in the narratives. 
 
(G) Helps 
 
Helps is also a key component in the Sense-Making triangle.  It refers to the outcome 
after the knowledge gap has been bridged.  It reflects how respondents need to be 
helped in order to move forward, and essentially what use they could make of the 
newly created sense.  As advised by Dervin et al. (2006),  
“Helps is coded metaphorically.  You read what the information says reaching 
for pictures of movement though time-space which the words present to your 
mind. You must constantly ask yourself- what help did the informant seek at 
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this point in time-space – for the whole situation?  For a specific learning?  
For use of a specific source?”  (p. 77) 
This is how helps was conceptualized in this study.  This is to analyze the utilization 
of knowledge.  The coding labels were mainly derived from previous SMM studies 
plus inductively developed from the respondents’ narratives.  A total of 22 sub-
categories were developed and, similar to gap-bridging strategies, each unit of 
analysis was coded into several categories as they would like to be helped in many 
different ways and put knowledge to many different uses.  Helps was also coded no 
matter whether the gap was successfully bridged or not as new knowledge can be 
created from failure and people might learn even from unsuccessful gap-bridging. 
 
Each of the sub-categories is defined briefly as follows: 
Educate Patients The respondent has taught, counseled patients or their 
relatives about the diseases and other related matters. 
Educate Staff The respondent need to educate his or her staff about 
some essential work information, procedures, etc. 
Got Chance The respondent need to find a right opportunity to do 
what is critical to them to bridge the knowledge gap. 
Got Confidence The respondent wanted to have or got more confidence. 
Got Connected to Others The respondent wanted to get or has got people to 
cooperate with him or her to work together. 
Got Control of a Bad 
Situation 
The respondent wanted to or has successfully got 
himself or the patient out of troubles. 
Got Directions (Able to 
plan) 
The respondent wanted to have or has got some hints or 
directions to manage the patient. 
Got Evaluation The respondent wanted to have or has got information 
to evaluate and justify their care to patients. 
Got Hope The respondent wanted to have or has got something to 
believe that the future will be bright. 
Got Insurance 
Information 
The respondent wanted to have or has got information 
on the insurance support of the patient. 
Got More Time The respondent wanted to have or has got more time 
needed to achieve the goals in managing the patient. 
Got Patient Consent The respondent wanted to get or has got informed 
consent from patients or their relatives on the suggested 
management plan. 
Got Pictures, Ideas, or 
Understandings 
The respondent wanted to have or has got ideas or 
pictures, and new or revised understanding about the 
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diseases, therapy and other related clinical concepts. 
Got Pleasure The respondent wanted to be or felt pleased by the 
outcomes of the management plan. 
Got Protection of Oneself The respondent wanted to have or has got protection or 
refuge coming from the inside. 
Got Resolutions The respondent wanted to have or has got solutions to 
the problem at hand or achieved the goals of the 
proposed management plan. 
Got Resources The respondent wanted to have or has got more 
resources in terms of staffing, financial support, 
equipment, etc he or she needs for moving forward. 
Got Skills The respondent wanted to be equipped with or has got 
the steps or procedures needed to manage the patient. 
Got Support and 
confirmation 
The respondent wanted to have or has got supportive 
opinion or comments from the sources consulted or 
information to confirm something uncertain. 
Got Updated Information 
or Guidelines 
The respondent wanted to have or has got updated 
information to solve the problem at hand. 
Kept Moving The respondent was able to continue to move forward 
down the road and staying on track. 
Refreshed Memory The respondent wanted to be or was refreshed of his 
memory. 
 
Table 4.1 Definitions of Coding Labels of Helps 
(H) Hindrance 
 
Hindrance is anther outcome of sense-making.  Instead of getting helps, respondents 
might also encounter difficulties that prevented them from getting more helps.  In 
many SMM studies, it is interpreted as the opposite of helps and thus the focus of 
analysis is helps.  In this study, there is a need to understand what specific difficulties 
did respondents encountered either in implementing gap-bridging strategies or the use 
of knowledge of inputs so as to map out a more detailed knowledge creation process.  
Thus, this coding category with 15 sub-categories was developed inductively from the 
narratives of respondents.  Each unit of analysis was coded into several categories 
because they may have met different kinds of hindrance.   The coding labels were 
listed in Appendix 4.10. 
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(I) New Knowledge Created 
 
This coding category is to tap qualitatively the new knowledge respondents claimed to 
have learnt in each unit of knowledge-creating situation (n=70).   The non-knowledge 
creating situations were not coded.  This is to give an overview of what kind of 
knowledge is created and thus would be shared in healthcare organizations.  A total of 
31 sub-categories were developed as can be seen from Appendix 4.10.  Each unit of 
analysis was coded into one or more sub-categories because it was likely for 
respondents to learn different kinds of knowledge in a single situation.   
 
 
(J) Knowledge Sharing 
 
This coding category is not found in any previous SMM studies as this area was not 
extensively researched.  Only Cheuk and Dervin (2010a) applied SMM assumptions 
to the implementation of a knowledge-sharing web platform. On the other hand, 
Snowden’s narrative techniques were applied in the study of knowledge sharing by 
Cheuk (2007a, 2007b).  In this research, this coding category is another key area.  
Research Question Two aims to examine the link between personal and organizational 
knowledge.  As informed by SMM, the moments of communicating links individual 
knowledge at the micro level to the macro-level structures which in turn “is energized 
by, maintained, reified, changed and created by individual acts of communicating” 
(Dervin, 2003f, p. 276).  Thus, knowledge sharing is the means through which 
individual communicatings have something to do with collective communicatings.  
When a healthcare professional’s knowledge is shared with others in the same or 
different team, they will develop a common understanding of the issue. All 
differences can be resolved in discussion and debate bringing a new level of 
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understanding amongst members, and the knowledge so shared and finally created by 
every staff member of the group will ultimately benefit the whole organization.  
 
Knowledge sharing activities were captured in two different sub-categories: a) inter-
professional sharing, which is sharing of knowledge between doctors and nurses; and 
b) intra-professional sharing, which is sharing amongst the respondent’s own 
professional group.  That is, sharing is amongst doctors, and amongst nurses. The 
strategies used to share knowledge were also coded in 20 sub-categories as listed in 
Appendix 4.10.  Each unit of analysis was coded into several categories as knowledge 
sharing can be with multiple professional groups using multiple strategies. 
 
Knowledge sharing is heavily influenced by the culture and context of an organization.  
Dervin warned of the need to look into the power issues.  This is a real concern in 
healthcare organizations as doctors are much more powerful than nurses in hospitals 
but both must cooperate to provide patient care services.  Snowden (2008a) believed 
that people will not withhold knowledge in the context of real need.  His storytelling 
technique was seen as a powerful tool in organizations to disseminate complex 
knowledge ideas.  In this study, knowledge sharing activities were examined in these 
aspects.  Thus, context in healthcare organizations was also coded. 
 
In addition, the gap-bridging strategies of dealing with formal persons such as 
discussing with own patient care team members and consulting external experts and 
peers also reflected knowledge-sharing activities.  Some knowledge gaps that are 
related to institutions such as lack of clear hospital policy and guidelines also 
reflected to some extent the need for knowledge sharing.  
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(K) Context 
Context constitutes another fundamental construct of knowledge.  Thompson and 
Walsham (2004, as cited in Evans & Alleyne, 2009) argued that “the meaning of all 
knowledge is tied up within the context of its development” (p. 151). Yet, the concept 
remains ill-defined and inconsistently applied.   Dervin (2003g) describes context as 
an “unruly beast” difficult to tame methodologically.  It “has the potential of being 
virtually anything that is not defined as the phenomenon of interest… a kind of 
container in which the phenomenon resides” (p. 112).  Besides, both Snowden and 
Weick place much emphasis on the impact of context on knowledge creation and 
management.  In this study, I’ll take Thompson and Walsham’s (2004, as cited in 
Evans & Alleyne, 2009) definition: “the relationally situated ingredients through 
which knowing occur” (p. 151). It helps determine interpretation and also places 
constraints on the assessment of problem and the selection of strategies to bridge the 
gap.  In turn, the individual might also be able to influence the context, that is, the 
context is being changed and created by individual’s communicatings in Dervin’s 
words.   
 
In this research, context refers to institutional policy, institutional resources, culture, 
power and administrative structures as identified from the respondents’ narratives.  It 
was analyzed from the perspective of its impact on assessment of situation focus, gap-
defining, the selection of gap-bridging strategies, the helps got and the hindrance met. 
The macro environment situated by respondents with reference to Snowden’s five 
different knowledge domains was also analyzed to see whether his suggested 
interventions apply.  Since no specific question was asked about this, the coding was 
developed from answers given in various questions such as situation focus, 
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knowledge gap, gap-bridging strategies, the helps got or hindrance met.  Studying 
context is crucial.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) said, "If one studies structure only, then 
one learns why but not how certain events occurs.  If one studies process only, then 
one understands how persons act / interact but not why" (p. 127).  Context is the 
macro level structure for the micro level process of knowledge creation and sharing to 
take place.  
 
In addition, it is acknowledged that public hospitals and private hospitals face very 
different environment in terms of working relations, organizational structure and 
resources.  While the unit of analysis is smaller than a person, analysis will be made 
to compare the data from public hospitals with that of private hospitals to investigate 
the impact of context on their sense-making behavior. 
 
On the whole, this research is basically a qualitative study of knowledge creation, sharing and 
utilization.  But it will be supplemented with quantitative analysis of the predictive power of 
different predictor variables and descriptive statistics to give more robust and clearer pictures. 
   
4.8 Ensuring Trustworthiness of Data Analysis 
It is important to establish the worth of a research study so that it can stand up to challenge 
and of value to others.  In qualitative research, scholars (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 
Silverman, 2005, Bazeley, 2013) speak of achieving trustworthiness in terms of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability to ensure it is valid and reliable, concepts 
that are traditionally applied in quantitative research.  In this research, these suggested 
techniques were incorporated as far as possible to improve its quality.    
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Credibility means the research is able to measure what is actually intended so that there is 
confidence in the “truth” of the findings.  It is also equivalent to internal validity, which it is 
regarded the most critical factor in establishing trustworthiness. To achieve this criterion, 
Dervin’s well-established and well-tested research methods were adopted.   SMM has been 
proved as a vigorous research method in information seeking and use study; it has also been 
applied in different ways to study KM.  Being the principal investigator, I have prolonged 
engagement with the research participants and the hospitals.  I have been a medical librarian 
for both the HA and a medical school for nearly 15 years at the time of research. The 
understanding gained of the organization and the research participants enables the building of 
rapport and trust with the participants within a short period of time before the interview, and 
keeps me vigilant to detect distortions that might be in the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).       
 
Attempts were made to collect data from different sources.  Besides the Micro-Moment 
Time-Line Interview, I also took part as an ethnographic researcher, non-participant observer 
in the ward round twice to observe in actuality how the doctors and nurses handle patient 
cases in the ward.  Whilst it is far from the truth to say that this observation supports 
confirmation to the findings of the interview, it is another means to let me understand the 
actual work environment of the research participants and the interaction amongst them.   
 
In addition, various measures were used to help ensure the honesty of participants.  For 
instance, they were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time without any punishment.  
The core set of fundamental mandates of SMM to conduct interviews did encourage 
participants to speak what they really think and feel. They were told to recall an actual 
experience with deep impression on them so as to elicit their true thoughts. Participants were 
given the understanding that they did not come to the interview with an answer on the tips of 
the tongue.  They could freely indicate what had been forgotten.  In fact, this did occur in the 
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interview.  Given the great number of patients they have to handle a day, it is understandable 
that they might forget some minute details. Fortunately, forgetfulness appeared as a 
minuscule problem only.   
 
Frequent discussion was made with my supervisor of this project though this could not be 
regarded as a formal debriefing session.  This kind of discussion was valuable in that “the 
vision of the investigator may be widened as others bring to bear their experiences and 
perceptions” (Shenton, 2004, p. 67).  The difficulties in undertaking the research were shared 
and solutions explored. More frequent contact was made at the stage of coding.  It could be 
said that the establishment of the coding scheme was the result of these rounds of discussion 
and advice. 
 
Further validation was sought through member checking.  This is a strategy for confirmation 
of findings as they are being developed during or at the conclusion of analysis by returning 
all data, especially interview transcripts, to their sources for validation, correction, or further 
approval before analysis (Bazeley, 2013, p.89).  This is considered the single most important 
provision that can be made to increase a study’s credibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  In this 
research, all interview transcripts were sent to each participant for verification.  Follow-up 
emails were sent to seek their help to clarify some confusions or misunderstanding.  Most of 
theme replied with positive confirmation, some with updates and another one proposed to 
take another interview.  As Bazeley (2013) commented, “When there are issues of fact in 
question, this can indeed be of value” (p, 90).  However, the results of analysis and the 
observation reports were not sent to them for verification.  This might also sound difficult to 
participants.  But given the above measures to ensure credibility of this search, this limitation 
will not pose great problem to its validity. 
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Transferability is concerned with the extent to which the findings of one study could be 
applied to other situations.  It refers to the external validity of a research study.  Qualitative 
research is often criticized of its inability to transfer its findings and conclusions to other 
situations because of its specific context and sometimes, small amount of samples.  Limited 
generalizability is indeed a great limitation for qualitative research. However, Dervin took 
another view.  She pointed out that “the gap-bridging analytic as sense-making is understood 
and interpreted situationally, but it may be generalized because it is related to a natural 
human behavior” (Dervin, 2003h, p. 302).  Since SMM focuses on the study of the sense-
making phenomenon in time-space rather than the person with constant characteristics across 
time-space, this methodology conversely guarantees a certain extent of generalizability.  In 
this research, the process of knowledge creation, sharing and utilization was analyzed from 
the knowledge-creating situations healthcare professionals situated at. Since inference was 
made to the micro situations and not the specific healthcare professional group, the findings 
can be generalized to other healthcare organizations in Hong Kong or other countries 
provided that they have similar healthcare systems and practices. Or similar knowledge 
process can be found in other professional groups in the hospital with similar work practice, 
or other knowledge-intensive industries with similar characteristics.  One obvious example is 
that the power issues between doctors and issues occur not just in Hong Kong but also 
reported in other countries (Teekman, 2000, p. 1132).  Of course, it is also unlikely to 
replicate the same results as contextual and cultural factors do have an impact on how 
healthcare professionals define and bridge the gap.  For instance, the Chinese are more 
conservative and more likely than Westerners to hoard rather than share their knowledge. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is a limited extent of external validity of this research. 
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Dependability refers to the reliability of the research which means that the findings are 
consistent and could be repeated.  Again, it poses difficulties to qualitative research because 
of the changing nature of phenomenon under study.  But Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued 
about the close ties between credibility and dependability so that a demonstration of the 
former is sufficient to establish the latter.  That is, a valid research is also reliable.  Another 
commonly used strategy is to ensure consistency in data coding by requiring a second person 
to code some portion of the data as a check on the reliability and consistency of the coding 
work.  While this kind of checking is sometimes seen as an indicator of the trustworthiness of 
the coding process, and as contributing to the reliability of the conclusions drawn from the 
codes, Bazeley and Jackson (2013, p. 93) questioned the value of doing so in a project with a 
solo investigator.  They claimed that each person approached data coding with their own 
goals and perspectives.  It is very likely for the second coder to see the code differently.  I 
echo this very much.  This research made extensive use of SMM and other sense-making 
theories and interviews were conducted in Hong Kong.  The second coder should be familiar 
with this research methodology, the healthcare context in Hong Kong and Chinese.  There is 
no guarantee to find a suitable second coder that would provide checking on the codes I used.  
In fact, another strategy of reflexive journal was adopted.  The memos in NVivo were used to 
record my thinking and insights about the research process and the coding approach and to 
keep track of the major changes in coding and the reasons for the change.  An extract is 
presented in Appendix 4.12.   
 
To ensure coding consistency, my supervisor of the research was requested to review the 
codes and make amendment. The process of discussion did clarify some of my confusions.  
The coding was done at least in 5 rounds, resulting in significant changes in the categories 
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and sub-categories.  Coding was also conducted at different times to make sure a fresh mind 
was available to review the coded text. 
 
Finally, the above strategies of reflexive journal and triangulation are proved useful to ensure 
confirmability or objectivity of qualitative research. Again, it is difficult to ensure real 
objectivity as even quantitative research requires the intrusion of human values and inevitably 
biases the data.  The purpose of qualitative research is to focus more on understanding than 
objectivity. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined Dervin’s Sense-Making Methodology employed in this research to 
investigate the micro process of knowledge creation and utilization in healthcare 
organizations.  SMM was also employed to study the relations of micro sense-making 
moment with the macro level structures in order to establish the link between individual 
knowledge and organizational knowledge.   The process of knowledge sharing could also be 
mapped out.  Snowden’s Cynefin Framework viewed knowledge generation as a sense-
making process and described how it happens in the five knowledge domains.  It provides the 
framework for looking into the macro environment healthcare professionals are situated and 
their corresponding responses.  This can help reflect the spread of knowledge in organizations. 
The research will also examine whether his storytelling and narratives techniques are able to 
disseminate complex knowledge ideas.  Data collection methods were elaborated. Ten major 
coding categories were identified to inform data analysis.  The coding process and analysis 
approached were also delineated in detail.  The next Chapter will report the findings of this 
study to answer the three research questions proposed in Chapter One.   
